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Abstract
This research is a contribution to feminist scholarship on the interrelationships among 
climate change, gender, and security. I explore the relationship between climate change 
and security and discuss why, in spite of the obvious threats that climate change poses 
to both the natural environment and human security, states of the world have been 
slow to react. What political and economic interests and cultural values are prevent-
ing the international community from addressing this important issue in an effective 
way? This overarching question is explored through three research questions, in which 
a case study approach in one Arctic state – Iceland – is used to explore climate change 
impact, policy discourses, and the values underpinning those discourses. A feminist 
social constructivist perspective is employed, through which concepts from feminism 
and gender studies are used as analytical tools. The empirical data comprises policy 
documents, interviews with policy shapers, and speeches by key politicians.
The case study analysis reveals that although climate change is perceived as a threat 
in Iceland, it is seen as an abstract and distant threat, and scant research exists on the 
socioeconomic impact. After evaluating climate policies and public discourses on 
climate change in Iceland, my overall conclusion is that the underlying values guiding 
public policy can be labeled neither overwhelmingly masculine nor overwhelmingly 
feminine. A key observation, however, is that in order to obtain a holistic picture, cli-
mate discourses need to be viewed in the larger context of more mainstream discourses 
on security and economic development. An examination of public discourses related 
to the emerging oil and gas sector in Iceland demonstrates that masculine values still 
dominate mainstream economic policy and that man’s right to exploit nature is deeply 
engrained into the culture. Yet, with a strong civil society, increased awareness of the 
climate crisis, and active resistance to dominant views, it is possible to carve out space 
for alternative values, emphasizing a more feminine approach toward the relationship 
between humans and nature.
The main obstacles preventing states from taking action to address the climate crisis 
appear are not to be an opposition to specific climate policies or explicit denial of cli-
mate change as an issue worthy of attention. Rather, climate issues are ignored, pushed 
to the side or actions delayed when other issues, considered more pressing, consume 
time and resources. Short-term economic gains still receive priority over long-term 
ecological and human security.
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Ágrip
Þessi rannsókn er framlag til feminískra fræða um tengsl á milli loftslagsbreytinga, 
öryggismála og kyngervis. Ég skoða hvernig loftslagsbreytingar og öryggismál tengjast 
og ræði hvers vegna ríki heims hafi ekki brugðist við þeim augljósu ógnum sem sem stafa 
af loftslagsbreytingum. Hvaða pólitísku og efnahagslegu hagsmunir og menningarlegu 
gildi koma í veg fyrir að við grípum til aðgerða? Ég leita svara við þessari spurningu 
með þremur rannsóknarspurningum þar sem tilviksrannsókn er beitt til að skoða í 
einu ríki á Norðurslóðum – Íslandi – áhrif loftslagsbreytinga, pólitíska orðræðu og 
undirliggjandi gildi þessarar orðræðu. Kenningarlegur bakgrunnur rannsóknarinnar 
er feminísk mótunarhyggja þar sem hugtök úr feminisma og kynjafræði eru notuð 
sem greiningartæki. Gögnin sem stuðst er við samanstanda af stefnumarkandi 
skjölum, viðtölum við fólk sem hefur beitt sér í umræðu um loftslagsmál og ræðum 
stjórnmálamanna.
Tilviksrannsóknin sýnir að þrátt fyrir að fólk upplifi loftslagsbreytingar sem ógn á 
Íslandi þá sé ógnin óljós og fjarlæg og litlar rannsóknir eru til um samfélagsleg áhrif 
hennar. Niðurstaðan, eftir greiningu á stefnumótun og orðræðu um loftslagsmál á 
Íslandi, er sú að þau undirliggjandi gildi sem vísa veginn í opinberri stefnumörkun eru 
hvorki afgerandi karllæg né kvenlæg. Rannsóknin dregur hins vegar fram mikilvægi þess 
að horfa heildstætt á umræðuna í samfélaginu og setja orðræðu um loftslagsbreytingar 
í samhengi við ríkjandi orðræðu um öryggi og efnahagsþróun. Greining orðræðu um 
olíu- og gasleit við Íslandsstrendur leiðir í ljós að karllæg gildi ráða enn för í ríkjandi 
efnahagsstefnu og hugmyndin um óskoraðan rétt mannsins til að nýta náttúruna 
liggur djúpt í menningu þjóðarinnar. Engu að síður er mögulegt að skapa rými fyrir 
aðrar skoðanir, sem byggja á kvenlægari gildum um tengsl manneskju og náttúru. Til 
þess þarf sterkt borgaralegt samfélag, aukna meðvitund um loftslagsvandann og virka 
móttstöðu gegn ríkjandi hugmyndafræði.
Tilviksrannsóknin sýnir hvaða hindranir koma helst í veg fyrir að tekist sé á við 
loftslagsvandann. Hindranirnar virðast ekki endilega felast í beinni mótstöðu við 
tilteknar aðgerðir til að sporna við loftslagsbreytingum eða afneitun á loftslagsbreytingum 
sem mikilvægu viðfangsefni. Málefni sem snúa að loftslagsbreytingum gleymast hins 
vegar, þeim er ýtt til hliðar eða aðgerðum seinkað ef önnur málefni kalla eftir athygli, 
tíma og fjármunum. Skammtíma efnahagshagsmunum er forgangsraðað fram fyrir 
langtíma öryggi mannfólksins og náttúrunnar.
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Abstrakti
Tämä tutkimus tarkastelee ilmastonmuutoksen, sukupuolen ja turvallisuuden vuoro-
vaikutussuhdetta feminististen tieteiden näkökulmasta. Tutkin ilmastonmuutoksen 
ja turvallisuuspolitiikan vuorovaikutusta ja pohdin miksi valtiot ovat reagoineet niin 
hitaasti ilmeisistä riskeistä huolimatta. Mitkä poliittiset sekä taloudelliset intressit 
että arvot estävät kansainvälistä yhteisöä toimimasta tehokkaasti ilmastonmuutoksen 
hillitsemiseksi? Tutkimuksessani lähestyn näitä kysymyksiä kolmen tutkimuskysy-
myksen avulla yhteen arktiseen valtioon, Islantiin, keskittyvän tapaustutkimuksen 
kautta. Tutkimuksen tieteellinen tausta on feministisen konstruktivismin teoriassa, 
joka perustuu feminististen ja sukupuolitutkimuksellisten käsitteiden soveltamiseen 
analyysivälineenä. Empiirinen materiaali koostuu poliittisista asiakirjoista, haastatte-
luista mielipidevaikuttajien kanssa sekä poliitikkojen virallisista puheista.
Tapaustutkimus todistaa että vaikka ilmastonmuutos ymmärretään uhaksi Islannissa, 
asia koetaan abstraktina ja kaukaisena, ja sen sosioekonomisista vaikutuksista on hyvin 
vähän tutkimustietoa. Analysoityani Islannin ilmastopolitiikkaa ja yhteiskunnallista 
keskustelua asian tiimoilta johtopäätökseni on, että arvomaailmaa, joka ohjaa julkista 
päätöksentekoa, ei voi mieltää ylivoimaisesti maskuliiniseksi taikka feminiiniseksi. 
Sen sijaan tutkimus paljastaa miten kokonaisvaltaisen käsityksen luodakseen on tär-
keää tarkastella ilmastopoliittista keskustelua yhtenä kokonaisuutena turvallisuus- ja 
talouspoliittisen keskustelun kanssa. Arvioitaessa julkista keskustelua öljy-ja kaasu-
alan kehittämisestä Islannissa on selvää, että maskuliiniset arvot hallitsevat edelleen 
talouspolitiikkaa ja ajatus ihmisen rajoittamattomasta oikeudesta hyödyntää luontoa 
on edelleen olennainen osa kulttuuria. Tästä huolimatta on mahdollista luoda tilaa 
vaihtoehtoisille lähestymistavoille, jotka korostavat feminiinisiä arvoja ihmisen ja 
luonnon suhteessa. Tähän tarvitaan vahvaa kansalaisyhteiskuntaa, lisääntynyttä ilmas-
totietoisuutta ja aktiivista vaihtoehtoisten näkökulmien vahvistamista.
Tapaustutkimus osoittaa myös mitkä tekijät estävät valtioita ryhtymästä tehokkaisiin 
ilmastonmuutosta hillitseviin toimenpiteisiin. Ongelma ei niinkään näyttäisi olevan 
suoranainen ilmastotoimenpiteiden vastustus tai ilmastonmuutoksen kieltäminen. 
Pikemminkin, ilmastokysymykset sivuutetaan ja toimenpiteitä lykätään muiden kii-
reellisemmiksi koettujen asioiden viedessä huomiota, aikaa ja resursseja. Näin lyhyen 
aikavälin taloudelliset edut priorisoidaan edelleen sen sijaan, että panostettaisiin pitkän 
tähtäimen inhimilliseen ja ekologiseen turvallisuuteen.
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PART I: THEORY – METHODS – CONTEXT
The first part of this dissertation comprises four chapters. First is an introduction, 
followed by a chapter on the state of the art and theory, summarizing the knowledge 
base on which the research is resting and giving an overview of the theories used to 
frame the analysis. Chapter 3 explains the methods used to collect and analyze data, 
and Chapter 4 on the Arctic and climate change provides the necessary context for 
the case study that is the main topic of Part II.
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1. Introduction
This doctoral research focuses on climate change in the Arctic, using Iceland as a case 
study. I explore the relationship between climate change and security and discuss why, in 
spite of the obvious threats that climate change poses to both the natural environment 
and human security, states of the world have been slow to react. What political and 
economic interests and cultural values are preventing the international community from 
addressing this important issue in an effective way? Given the crucial role of fossil fuels 
in the climate equation, the oil and gas sector will be at the forefront when digging for 
answers about the obstacles preventing us from tackling the root causes of climate change.
Although this research is interdisciplinary in nature, it is rooted in the field of 
international relations (IR). I approach the topic from a feminist social constructiv-
ist perspective, using concepts from feminism and gender studies as analytical tools. 
Constructivists within IR emphasize the social dimensions of international relations, 
including the importance of norms, rules, and language and the possibility of change 
(Fierke, 2010).
My interest in this topic can be traced back more than twenty years. I was first in-
troduced to the issue of climate change as an undergraduate majoring in international 
studies. I was drawn to this subject not only because I realized the significance of the 
relationships between human activities and the global atmosphere, but also because 
this was a challenge that could be addressed only with close collaboration of the in-
ternational community. Old methods of international relations, in which states focus 
primarily on protecting their self-interests and maximizing their power, would not 
work in dealing successfully with the challenges of climate change. It was clear to me 
that this new global challenge would call for new approaches to problem solving at 
the international level.
During my Master’s studies in international relations, I chose international environ-
mental and resource policy as my area of specialization and was able to dig further into 
questions related to climate change and international politics. I finished my Master’s 
degree in 1999, and in the next few years I was engaged with climate-related projects 
in various ways. I served as a special advisor in the Icelandic Ministry for the Environ-
ment for 15 months, where I participated in negotiations within the UN Framework 
Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) as a representative of Iceland, and I 
was a project manager of a climate project run by the Icelandic environmental NGO, 
Landvernd, the aim of which was to analyze the available options for reducing emis-
sions domestically. The longer I worked on climate-related issues, however, the more 
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pessimistic I became. In spite of many successful initiatives, overall emissions continued 
to rise and the climate challenge kept growing larger, without any drastic measures taken 
by the states of the world. This realization created a longing to explore in greater depth 
the obstacles that are preventing us from addressing the root causes of climate change.
1.1   Aims and Objectives
This research grew out my curiosity to understand why states of the world have been 
slow to react to the need to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, in spite of evidence for the 
way climate change is threatening both the natural environment and human security. 
Although lack of awareness is sometimes blamed, or even the psychology of denial 
in the face of a daunting task (Norgaard, 2011; Stoknes, 2015), it seemed to me that 
some forces other than simple ignorance or denial were at work. It is necessary to take 
a critical look at our economic and political systems and the power relations and values 
that feed those systems in order to gain an understanding of our inability to produce 
effective solutions for addressing the root causes of human-induced climate change.
The more the topic has been on my mind, the more convinced I have become that 
part of the problem lies in the imbalanced relationship between humans and nature. 
Rather than treating nature with respect and honoring her boundaries, the human 
race has viewed nature merely as a resource for humans to exploit. I also see a clear 
parallel between the imbalance in the relationship between humans and nature and 
the imbalance between men and women in different places around the world. Having 
lived and worked in several countries and continents, I had observed that while the 
manifestation of abuse is different depending on culture and local situation, women 
are being discriminated against in all places, and characteristics that are considered 
feminine are valued less than corresponding masculine traits. These observations finally 
lead me to feminism as an academic discipline that could provide useful tools to use 
for analysis of the climate problem.
So with these thoughts as a starting point, this research explores the relationship 
between climate change and security in the Arctic, by looking in depth at one Arctic 
state: Iceland. The overarching question always playing in the background is the one 
that ignited the research, and relates to the puzzle of why reaction to climate change 
has been so slow, in spite of the obvious security threats. Or as asked in the previous 
section: “What political and economic interests and cultural values are preventing the 
international community from addressing this important issue in an effective way?” A 
case study approach is used to examine this question by asking three research questions:
•	 How is climate change impacting security in the Arctic, and more specifi-
cally, in Iceland, which serves as the main case study site?
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•	 What do existing dominant political, economic, and security discourses 
reveal about the values underpinning policy decisions related to climate 
change and security?
•	 How much room is there for alternative approaches in public discourses 
related to climate change – especially feminist perspectives – and do such 
perspectives offer any new and useful ideas on how to address issues related 
to climate change and human security?
Although I consider all three questions significant for this research, they do serve 
different purposes, and some receive more attention than others. The first question is 
crucial to setting the stage, whereas the second and third questions receive more atten-
tion in the analysis because they deal more directly with the main task of the research: 
to examine the underlying values of policy, to aid in an understanding of the obstacles 
that are preventing action.
I examine these questions using a variety of qualitative methods. My data include 
interviews with policy shapers and written texts in the form of policy documents, 
speeches of key politicians, media reports, and transcribed texts from discussions in 
the parliament. I also rely on information I obtained as an observer (and sometimes 
also a participant) of public discourses about climate change and energy issues in 
Iceland over the past 15 years. The interviewees for this research are people who have 
participated in public discourses about climate change as politicians, civil servants, 
activists, or other experts. I call them policy shapers, because although only some of 
them have been directly involved in public policy making, all of them have tried to 
influence policy by publicly expressing their concerns about climate change and by 
emphasizing the need to respond.
In the sections that follow, I explain in greater detail my choice of topic, the theo-
retical and methodological approaches used, and why the small state of Iceland can 
serve as a relevant case study.
1.2 Why Climate Change?
Earth’s climate is changing. The burning of fossil fuels, land-use changes, industrial 
processes, and other human activities are increasing the concentration of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere, resulting in the warming of the atmosphere. According to the 
International Panel of Climate Change (IPCC), average global temperature increased 
by 0.85°C between 1880 and 2012, and most of this warming is considered to be hu-
man induced (IPCC, 2013). Drastic climate changes will deeply impact all aspects of 
life. Although the changes may bring some new economic opportunities, especially in 
the North, they will also create some major challenges for humankind.
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As Vogler (2008) notes, climate change is on a radically different scale from anything 
that the international system has previously encountered. There is almost no dimension 
of international relations that climate change does not actually or potentially affect. 
Thus, it is no surprise that climate change is the subject of discussion at a number of 
high-level meetings. One such example is the 15th Conference of Parties (COP 15) 
meeting in Copenhagen in 2009, where parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) met. Hopes were high at the meeting 
that a new climate treaty would be negotiated. This was one of the largest gatherings 
of world leaders ever to occur outside the United Nations (UN) Headquarters in New 
York, with a total of 115 heads of states and governments attending, and more than 
40,000 other participants representing governments, nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), intergovernmental organizations, and the media, among others (UNFCCC, 
2009). In spite of high hopes, no binding agreement was reached. Thus, the Copenhagen 
meeting is widely considered a failure, highlighting the inability of the international 
community to tackle the climate issue. 
The failure in Copenhagen delayed the process of a new climate agreement by six 
years, but finally, in December 2015, the Paris Agreement was negotiated. Although 
it remains to be seen how effective the Paris Agreement will be in tackling the climate 
crisis, at least it provides more hope for optimism than did the failed attempt for a new 
agreement several years earlier.
Climate change is not only on a different scale than other issues dealt with on the 
international agenda, but the nature of the problem is also significantly different. Be-
cause the atmosphere is a global common pool resource, solutions to climate change 
are not to be found within single states. In fact, even if all heads of states were to agree 
on a way forward, they would be unable to implement their policies without help 
from the business sector, the NGO community, and local authorities within their 
states. Climate change calls for the cooperation of all states and other players in the 
international system. It is the business of every individual on this planet, both current 
and future generations.
Yet, in the everyday lives of most people, climate change is a distant and abstract 
problem. The consequences of climate change (impacts) can appear far from the emis-
sions that caused them. In other words, our actions here and now can have negative 
consequences in faraway places, and far into the future. When people experience the 
negative consequences of climate change, they are not necessarily able to connect the 
dots and see a clear relationship between the causes (collective global greenhouse gas 
emissions) and the changes they are experiencing at the local level. To complicate the 
picture further, the impact gets entangled with other local political, economic, and 
cultural factors that influence the daily lives of people around the world.
For all these reasons, political discourses and the way we frame the climate change 
issue at the international, regional, national, and local level, is a fascinating subject 
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from an intellectual point of view. Such research, however, is not purely an intellectual 
exercise; it also constitutes an important contribution to our efforts to deepen our 
understanding of this complex topic.
1.3  Why Security?
Framing climate change as a security issue calls for an explanation. Climate change is 
one of several issues that have emerged in recent decades that can be categorized as new 
threats to security that military forces cannot cope with. Other examples include drug 
trafficking, failed states (that are unable to protect their own citizens), transnational 
crimes, terrorism, migration of diseases, and ethno-political conflicts (Barnett, 2001). 
Even more recent threats include issues as cyber security and threats related to failures 
of financial systems, as became apparent in the global financial crisis in 2009.
As Barnett explains, mainstream (realist) discourses of national security focused 
in the past mainly on the threat of armed attack – threats that originate outside the 
border of the relevant states, for which military forces are used as protection. The “new 
threats”, however, do not fit well into this narrow understanding of security, which has 
pushed both scholars and policy makers to take a critical look at traditional notions 
of security, and, in many cases, to redefine security, broadening the concept to create 
room for these emerging threats.
Although the topic of climate change has been on the international agenda as an 
environmental issue since the early 1990s, the reference to climate change as a security 
issue is much more recent. As scientific data have become more definite, and the con-
sequences of global warming are beginning to emerge, concerns about climate change 
have increased. It was not until 2007, however, that climate change really entered the 
discussion as a security issue (Brzoska, 2009; German Advisory Council on Global 
Change, 2008). That was the year Al Gore and the International Panel for Climate 
Change (IPCC) received the Noble Peace Prize for their efforts in alerting the world 
about the dangers of climate change. This was also the year that climate change was 
discussed for the first time in the UN Security Council (Security Council, 2007). 
Although other issues, like the global financial crisis and the refugee crisis, have been 
attracting the attention of world leaders, climate change remains high on the agenda 
in international affairs as a threat that the states of the world will be forced to address.
The securitization of climate change has occurred in parallel with the same process 
that has involved the broadening of the security concept in academic writings and in 
policy circles. The traditional state-centric understanding of security, with a primary 
focus on securing states from external threats and relying on military strategies as a 
solution, has been challenged by new ideas about security, including the more people-
oriented approach of human security. The concept of human security can be traced 
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back to a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, published in 
1994, in which the traditional concept of security is questioned:
The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security 
of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interest in 
foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It 
has been related more to nation-states than to people. (UNDP, 1994, p. 22)
Instead, the UNDP argues for a shift in focus from the armed security of territories 
to people’s security through sustainable human development. This new approach was 
welcomed by many groups, including environmentalists, human rights advocates and 
workers in the development field, all of whom contended that the more traditional 
security approach was outdated. By employing this broader understanding of security, 
climate change can be viewed as a human security issue, threatening the livelihood, 
health, and welfare of people around the world.
Comprehensive security is another term often used when discussing the environ-
mental and human aspects of security and their relationship with traditional security. 
A comprehensive security framework includes both general human security and the 
more specific human ecological security, referring directly to environmental security 
threats to people and their communities (Heininen, 2014).
1.4  Why the Arctic?
The Arctic1 is extremely vulnerable to observed and projected climate change and 
climate changes are being experienced particularly intensely in the region. This 
development, along with broader trends linked to globalization, such as increased 
international trade and long-range pollution, has put the Arctic in the spotlight of 
international attention. One needs only to follow news in the mainstream media to 
realize that the Arctic has become a hot topic in recent years. Big powers like China, 
India, and the EU have lined up to request observer status within the Arctic Council, 
and large corporations are knocking at the doors of Arctic nations. Rapid changes due 
to a warming climate create not only threats to the region, but also opportunities. The 
melting of the icecap has ignited interest in new shipping routes (Humpert & Ras-
potnik, 2012) and has created hopes that oil and gas reserves in the area will become 
more accessible (Keil, 2014).
1 The Arctic, as the term is used this dissertation, refers to Alaska, Iceland, Greenland, The Faroe Islands 
and the northern areas of Russia, Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Canada. A more detailed discussion 
on the definition of the Arctic region can be found in Chapter 4.
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One example of the intensity of climate change is the average temperature in the 
Arctic, which has risen at almost twice the rate of temperature increases in the rest 
of the world (Arctic Council, 2004). The results are far reaching. The melting of the 
Arctic icecap will not only influence the Arctic, but will contribute to rising sea levels 
worldwide. Other consequences include thawing of the permafrost soils of the tundra 
and increasing erosion of the coasts by wave action and storms. The 5th assessment re-
port of the IPCC (AR5) not only confirms earlier predictions for the Arctic, but also 
highlights the fact that changes are taking place more rapidly than expected, which 
will impact both natural and social systems at a rate that may exceed their ability to 
adapt successfully (Larsen, et al., 2014).
The changes in nature will impact northern populations in various ways. Severe 
coastal erosion is expected to increase the vulnerability of many coastal communities; 
thawing ground will disrupt transportation, buildings, and other infrastructure, and 
indigenous communities will continue to face major economic and cultural impacts. 
Vegetation zones will shift, and animal species will be affected. On the bright side, 
reduced sea ice is likely to increase marine transport and access to resources (Arctic 
Council, 2004). Even this potential positive impact, however, has been a cause of con-
cern among the people who worry about a “race for resources” in the Arctic (Borgerson, 
2008). Another thought-provoking point is the reality that easier access to resources, 
in particular oil and gas resources, can prolong dependency on fossil fuels, further 
intensifying the climate problem. This dilemma, in which climate changes will open 
access to resources, the utilization of which will further speed the changes, is commonly 
referred to as the “Arctic Paradox”2 (Palosaari, 2011).
In short, the Arctic is a relevant region for exploring the relationships between cli-
mate change and security. It also provides some interesting examples of the separations 
of discourses on mitigation and adaptation (of which the Arctic Paradox is a prime 
example), but this separation is one manifestation of the reluctance to address the root 
causes of climate change.
1.5  Why Iceland?
Using a small state as a case study in research that is exploring questions related to 
global climate change may, at first sight, seem odd. This section provides arguments 
for why the state is the most logical unit of analysis for examining climate policy and 
2 In recent years, referrals to the Arctic Paradox have become more common among scholars, policy makers, 
and the media. I first heard about the concept, however, in May 2011, in a lecture by Teemu Palosaari, 
as part of the Calotte Academy, located in Inaari, Finland. His talk was based on a draft version of the 
article cited, that was published later the same year.
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climate-related discourses and justifies why the small state of Iceland is a relevant case 
study in the Arctic context.
Given the nature of the problem, climate change is not an issue that can be solved 
by individual states, let alone small states with limited power in the international sys-
tem. In addition to states, a variety of other actors play an essential role in addressing 
challenges related to climate change, including international organizations, non-gov-
ernmental organizations, businesses, and consumers. Yet, states still play a key role in 
the international system, in regional cooperation, and in shaping and implementing 
public policy. As Giddens (2011) explains, the state continues to be an all-important 
actor, because so many powers remain in its hands – powers related to both domestic 
and international policy. States cannot be forced to sign international agreements; 
emission-trading markets can work only if regulated by the state, and important policy 
tools such as the planning, taxes, and subsidies are under the control of the state. The 
state, however, includes not only the national government, but also local authorities. 
The ability of the state to draw from the creativity of far-sighted individuals and the 
energy of civil society is crucial. In today’s world, states operate within the context 
of multilayered governance, in which they must work with a variety of actors, both 
internationally and domestically (Giddens, 2011).
Iceland is by far the smallest Arctic state in terms of population size. It is, however, 
the only independent state that is located entirely within the Arctic region, as it is 
most commonly defined. Its location as an island in the middle of the North Atlantic 
Ocean provides an interesting site to study the impact of climate change, and the small 
population and relatively simple political administrative structure makes it easier to 
trace trends in public discourses than would be the case in larger, more heterogeneous 
societies.
Yet, Iceland’s identity as an Arctic state is a relatively recent phenomenon. Ever since 
Iceland gained its independence from Denmark in 1944, Icelandic authorities have 
identified Iceland as a Nordic country belonging to Europe. With respect to national 
security, the most important ties were with the United States and NATO. The Arctic 
identity of Iceland has not been strong. This situation has been changing in recent years, 
however, as can be seen from the following quote by Iceland’s former foreign minister, 
Össur Skarphéðinsson3: “In essence, the Arctic is our home and its development is 
inherently linked with our own fate as a nation state” (Skarphéðinsson, 2011).
As a small island state with an economy that relies heavily on the utilization of natural 
resources, Iceland is relatively vulnerable to changes in the natural environment. Because 
of its status as a fishing nation, changing distribution of fish stocks and degradation of 
the marine environment due to acidification of the oceans or pollution from increased 
3 Össur Skarphéðinsson is a member of the Social Democratic Alliance (Samfylkingin) and was the foreign 
minister of Iceland, from 2007 to 2013.
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traffic in the Arctic region can be especially threatening. Climate change could there-
fore create some serious human security challenges nationally and at the local level in 
specific regions. Its location in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, however, also means 
that Iceland may be able to reap the benefits of some of the new economic activities 
expected to take place in the Arctic as the icecap melts.
But this location could also create challenges. Questions have arisen about the search 
and rescue capacity of Icelandic Coastal Guards if shipping in the region were to increase 
drastically. Furthermore, the fact that Iceland is a small state without an army makes is 
especially vulnerable if there were an increase in military tension between states in the 
region, related to access to resources (Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2009b).
As for mitigation policies, the smallness of the country prevents Iceland from hav-
ing the power to influence total emissions directly at the global level. Even if Iceland’s 
greenhouse gas emissions were reduced to zero, it would barely make a noticeable dent 
in global emissions. Nevertheless, given its abundance of renewable energy sources, 
Iceland could play a role beyond its size – as a role model. I have argued elsewhere that 
small states can influence the behavior of larger states by acting as norm entrepreneurs 
(Ingólfsdóttir, 2014). This idea could be applied to Iceland in the context of climate 
change and mitigation measures.
From a feminist point of view, Iceland is also a relevant case study, given its track 
record in gender equality. The feminist movement in Iceland is strong, and Iceland 
has held the top spot for several consecutive years in the Global Gender Gap Index, 
published annually by the World Economic Forum (World Economic Forum, 2014). 
Thus, according to this index, Iceland has the narrowest gender gap in the world. 
Because one of the aims of this study is to explore how much room there is for fem-
inine perspectives and values in public discourses related to climate change, the status 
of Iceland as a state where gender equality is highly prioritized makes it an interesting 
site to study.
Although exploring climate-related policies in one small state obviously does not 
provide answers that allow for generalizations, it can provide valuable insights into 
the kind of obstacles hindering progressive climate policies from being implemented. 
The hope is that this research can also deepen our understanding of the role played by 
values when collective community decisions are being made about ways of responding 
at the local level to a global problem like climate change.
1.6  Why a Feminist Approach?
Feminism as an academic discipline grew out of the feminist movement of the 1960s 
and 1970s, but feminist perspectives first entered the international relations discipline 
at the end of the 1980s, about the same time as the end of the Cold War. One interest-
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ing example of this early work is the book Bananas, Beaches & Bases by Cynthia Enloe 
(1990), in which she asks: “Where are the women”? A simple question, yet one that 
had rarely been asked in the context of international politics before. This situation was 
to change with scholars like Enloe and others who entered the discipline with fresh 
insights. The feminist researchers had a different starting point, and asked some criti-
cal questions that challenged the underlying assumptions that had shaped IR-related 
research when it was almost entirely male dominated (Tickner, 1992).
Most feminist research within the field of international relations has not followed the 
positivist path, whereby hypotheses are formulated and then evidence gathered to test, 
falsify, or validate them. Rather, feminist scholars in the field have situated themselves 
within theories of social constructivism, being conscious of how ideas help shape the 
world (Tickner, 2006). Although feminism includes a variety of perspectives, what 
unifies all of them is the belief that inequality exists and that action should be taken 
to move toward greater gender equality and more social justice.
As mentioned, feminist scholars have brought fresh insights into IR by asking critical 
questions and by deconstructing dominant theories through the exploration of under-
lying assumptions. The same is true for feminists within other disciplines relevant to 
this research, such as economics, environmental studies, and ethics. I provide further 
information about some of the most influential feminist scholars in those different 
disciplines in the theoretical chapter and give examples of how their ideas can be use-
ful as frameworks when analyzing climate-related discourses and the power structures 
underpinning those discourses.
Feminism is, of course, only one of several critical approaches that have emerged in 
recent decades, challenging mainstream theories. Within security studies, a subfield 
of international relations highly relevant for this research, a wide range of scholars has 
conducted critical research. Shepherd (2013a) discusses these critical approaches in 
her introduction in the book Critical Approaches to Security. In her view, a key dimen-
sion of critical approaches is the scholar’s desire to challenge and unsettle anything 
that is taken for granted in the research process. The book introduces various critical 
approaches, including human security, green security, securitization theory, security 
as emancipation, post-structural security studies, post-colonial security studies, and 
feminist security studies.
Although those approaches differ on many points, they have in common a rejec-
tion of positivism, which is the theoretical foundations of realism, the most dominant 
theory within security studies. Those that adhere to positivism assume that reliable and 
“true” knowledge can be generated only through rigorous and value-free observation 
and prefer to adopt the methodologies of natural sciences to explain the social world. 
Another aspect of most IR theories and conventional security studies is their tendency 
to be foundationalist – to assume the social world to be an objective reality that exists 
independent of our perception. Methods have also tended to be quantitative, whereas 
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critical approaches often adopt qualitative methods in their research (Sheperd, 2013a).
This also means that feminism is only one approach of many I could have chosen to 
grapple with the questions I am posing in this research. The reason I chose a feminist 
approach, rather than some of the other critical approaches available, is that it offers 
an intriguing way to study the power relations that I believe are at the core of our 
resistance to change, even in cases in which it seems obvious that such changes would 
be beneficial for the whole.
One unique feature of feminism is the close relationship between activism and 
academics, between the feminist movement and feminism as an academic discipline. 
Einarsdóttir discusses the relationship between the two, arguing that ideas originating 
within the academic arm of feminism provide an important fuel for the transformative 
power of feminism as a movement. She advocates that new ideas have the power to 
move, to create, and to transform, and that this transformative power, which can often 
be explosive, means that feminism challenges dominant ideas, values, and power struc-
tures (Einarsdóttir Þ. , 2000). In this sense, feminist research often has some elements 
of action research engrained, wherein one of the explicit objectives of the research is to 
facilitate social change. As Berg (2009) explains, action research is a research framework 
whereby groups undertake a collective, self-reflective enquiry in order to improve some 
conditions or situation they are involved in.
It is exactly the transformative power of feminism that Einarsdóttir refers to that 
makes it an interesting approach for exploring questions related to human-induced 
climate change. Traditional approaches to problem solving seem to come up empty 
handed in finding solutions to the climate problem, and are also insufficient in ex-
plaining why we are failing to address the root causes of climate change. By exploring 
the values that guide policy making from a feminist perspective, some important new 
insights can be gained.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation draws upon some key feminist writings in different 
disciplines, in order to demonstrate how masculine values are underpinning the politi-
cal, economic, and social theories that have been the most dominant in recent decades 
in shaping our understanding of the world and the relationship between humans and 
nature.
1.7  Academic Value
Climate change is one of the most complex issues on the agenda of the international 
community. Although global in scope, the changes manifest differently in local context. 
Scientific findings indicate that climate change will have great impact on the natural 
environment, which could pose a serious threat to human communities in various 
locations around the world. Yet, both states and other key players have been slow to 
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react to this new challenge. Thus, it is of great importance to shed light on the kind of 
political and economic interests and cultural values that are preventing the international 
community from addressing this important issue in an effective way. This research is 
a step in that direction, through an analysis of the climate and security discourses in 
one small state: Iceland as a case study. The qualitative nature of the research will not 
allow for generalizations. Nevertheless, the results from the case study can provide im-
portant insights into the way values and beliefs shape policy related to climate change 
and security in Iceland, and more generally in the Arctic.
1.8  The Role of the Researcher
One of the key contributions of feminism to academic research is the critical questions 
feminists have asked about the ability of the scientific method to approach a topic 
from a completely neutral and objective perspective. Over forty years ago feminist 
sociologist Dorothy Smith questioned whether sociology could be different if the 
starting point of the discipline were women’s traditional place and their daily realities 
(Smith, 1974). She points out that objectivity, so highly valued in her discipline, is 
made possible only because the male researcher is able to detach his work as a researcher 
from his direct personal experience. When he goes to work, he enters a conceptually 
ordered society in which he can work with facts and information about his research 
topic without having to worry about fulfilling his own bodily needs, because others 
satisfy those needs. Women are outsiders to this structure, although they participate 
in it by providing clerical work, nursing, and secretarial work.
It was clear to Smith at the time that women sociologists did not enter the discipline 
on the same terms as men. It was not possible for women to separate their work from 
their direct experience to the extent that men could. This experience made her question 
sociologists’ claims that their work constituted an objective knowledge independent 
of the situation of the researchers that were producing this knowledge. “We can never 
escape the circles of our own heads,” she stated (Smith, 1974) and suggested that rather 
than pretend that complete objectivity is possible, an alternative approach would be 
to use one’s experience as a starting point in understanding the world.
Sandra Harding takes this idea further in her writings about standpoint epistemol-
ogy. According to Harding, all knowledge attempts are socially situated. She rejects 
the conventional idea that knowledge building should break free of their ties to local, 
historical interests, values, and agendas. On the contrary, she argues for the need to 
locate knowledge in history and to understand the different kinds of politics that in-
fluence the production of knowledge. According to her: “The most fruitful feminist 
problematics have emerged out of the gaps between the values and interests of women’s 
lives and those that have organized the dominant conceptual frameworks” (Harding 
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S. , 1996, p. 244). In other words, rather than denying that our values and experience
could be influencing our research, we should make an effort to explain our starting point 
clearly and use our own experience to enrich the research with our unique perspective.
In the spirit of standpoint feminism, I recognize that my research is not and could 
not be value neutral. As a Western, middle-class, white, heterosexual woman, my views 
have been shaped by my background and identity. My perspective is also influenced 
by the fact that I have been involved in public discussions about climate change in 
Iceland for the past decade, first as an independent expert, for a short period as a civil 
servant in the Icelandic Ministry for the Environment, and later as the project leader 
of a climate project run by an environmental NGO. The starting point for my research 
is the normative position that climate change is a serious problem that we, as humans, 
should be responding to.
Although I would not categorize my research as action research, I recognize that 
my active engagement with the topic before and during the research process means 
there are some elements of action research integrated into my work. Action research 
refers to a type of research in which researchers are involved in the processes they are 
studying. The goal of most action research projects is to encourage social change by 
deepening the understanding of the specific topic under study, uncovering problems 
and identifying possible solutions (Berg, 2009). In Chapter 3, which deals with meth-
odology, I discuss in greater depth how my personal position could have influenced 
my data collection and my interpretation of the data.
1.9  Dissertation Structure
The dissertation is divided into three parts, each part containing several chapters. The 
individual chapters are then divided into sections in an effort to help the reader to 
follow the arguments. The first part of the dissertation, entitled “Theory – Methods 
– Context” provides an overview of the existing knowledge base and the theoretical
framing of the research. It also describes the methods used to collect and analyze data
and ends with a chapter about the Arctic, which gives the necessary context for the
case study discussed in the second part.
In Part II, the case study focuses on climate change and climate policy in Iceland. 
After a background chapter on Iceland, the next chapter is dedicated to climate impact 
and security threats, the next discusses past and present mitigation policies in Iceland, 
and the final chapter examines discourses related to oil and gas explorations off the 
coast of Iceland and how those discourses are linked (or not linked) to climate policy.
Part III, the final part of the dissertation, is called: “Discussions – Analysis – Con-
cluding Remarks”. It provides more systematic discourse analysis, using the data from 
the case study. It also includes discussions in which I pick up threads from the case 
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study and weave them together with some observations from the theoretical chapter 
in Part I. The final chapter draws together the main conclusions and provides some 
condensed answers to the research questions posed in the beginning.
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2. State of the Art and Theory
This chapter draws out the relationships among climate change, security, and gender, 
and provides a broad overview of the existing knowledge base in those intersecting 
fields. It discusses how climate change is perceived and responded to as a threat and 
points out the relevance of gender and feminism in this contexts. This chapter also 
presents the theoretical framework I use when addressing the research questions and 
analyzing the data.
2.1  Human-Induced Climate Change
Earth’s climate is changing, and human activities are the driving force behind this 
change. According to the Fifth Assessment Report of the International Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), average global temperatures rose by 0.85°C between 1880 
and 2012. The increase in temperature has resulted in more extreme weather and 
climate events. Beginning around 1950, for example, the frequency of heat waves 
has increased in large parts of Europe, Asia, and Australia, and the frequency or 
intensity of heavy precipitation events has increased in North America and Europe 
(IPCC, 2013). Temperature is expected to continue to rise in the coming decades, 
but the level of increase depends on future trends in global greenhouse gas emissions. 
Warming temperatures will impact the natural environment in a variety of ways, and 
changes in the natural environment will, in turn, have far-reaching consequences for 
human life on Earth.
Climate has changed throughout history due to natural factors. Current climate 
changes differ from those of the past, however, in that they can be blamed primarily 
on human activities; concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere is directly 
related to the average global temperature.
Greenhouse gases (GHG) occur naturally in the atmosphere. They are essential 
to the survival of life on Earth, because they prevent some of the sun’s warmth from 
reflecting back to space. Without greenhouse gases, the planet would be a very cold 
place indeed. But a balance is necessary. Since the beginning of the industrial revolu-
tions, human activities have been adding greenhouse gases to the atmosphere through 
the burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil, and gas), the clearing of forests, certain farming 
methods, and other activities. Thus, for the past 150 years, GHG emissions have been 
steadily increasing, leading to higher global average temperatures (UNFCCC, n.d.).
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The complicated science behind climate change has been subject to rigorous debates 
(Giddens, 2011). Diving into these debates is far beyond the scope of this research and 
my academic background, which is rooted solidly in the social sciences. Therefore, I 
rely on scientific results from the IPCC – the most significant authority in climate 
science internationally. Although I recognize that many aspects of the science remain 
unresolved, a certain consensus has been reached. By now, the scientific community 
clearly accepts human-induced climate change as a crisis that needs to be faced.4
Climate change as a social problem is no less complex than the physical science be-
hind it, however. Social scientists often refer to climate change as a “wicked problem”, 
in the meaning of complex, tricky or thorny. Wicked problems emerged as a term sev-
eral decades ago in discussions of complicated social problems with no clear solution. 
Rittel & Webber (1973) were among those who first introduced the concept in their 
effort to confront conventional planning methods, claiming that technical approaches 
to planning and policy were too simplistic and narrow for the type of social problems 
they claim fall into the category of a wicked problem (as opposed to “tame” problems 
with straightforward solutions). A wicked problem, according to Rittel & Webber, 
cannot be easily described; nor does it have a simple and clear solution. Head (2008) 
identifies climate change as a prime example of a wicked problem in public policy. He 
gives several reasons, among which are the interplays among global, regional, national, 
and local impacts; the tensions between short-term and long-term impacts; the com-
plications related to allocation of responsibility; and the patterns of burden sharing. 
Later writers have taken this analysis a step further, labeling climate change as a “super 
wicked problem”, emphasizing climate change as a problem in which time is running out, 
that those who cause the problem are the same people who are seeking solutions, and 
that the central authority needed to address the crisis (the international community) 
is weak. As a result, policy responses discount the future irrationally (Levin, Cashore, 
Bernstein, & Auld, 2012).
The discussion about climate change as a wicked problem clearly demonstrates that 
the climate crisis cannot be resolved using technological fixes. The problem is inherently 
political and needs to be addressed at that level. Thus, climate change has been as much 
a subject of international politics as it has been the topic of scientific debate. The issue 
first entered the scene of international politics when states of the world signed the UN 
Convention of Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. The treaty entered into force in 
1994 and marked the beginning of a long and tedious process whereby parties meet to 
4 The scientific concensus is clear in the most recent IPCC summary for policy makiers from Working 
Group I, which discusses the physical science basis. The report states that it is virtually certain that globally 
the troposphere has warmed since the mid-20th century. Furthermore, it is extremely likely that human 
influence has been the dominant cause for this change (IPCC, 2013). Earlier IPCC publications used 
weaker descriptives such as “very likely” or “likely”, but with time the uncertainty has been reduced.
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discuss what could be done to reduce emissions and cope with temperature changes. A 
few years later, in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was signed, with more powerful (and legally 
binding) measures than the UNFCCC had included (UNFCCC, n.d.). Negotiations 
about how to strengthen the climate regime further have been ongoing for several 
years although progress has been slower than many hoped for. A failed attempt for a 
new agreement in Copenhagen in 2009 set the process back, but finally, in December 
2016, the Paris Agreement emerged.
The two key methods used to address challenges related to climate change are mitiga-
tion and adaptation. Mitigation aims at preventing or limiting change by implementing 
policies to reduce emissions. Adaptation refers to initiatives to reduce vulnerabilities 
of natural and human systems to current and projected changes. Earlier efforts focused 
almost exclusively on mitigation, but as time has passed, and attempts to reduce overall 
global emissions have failed, adaptation has received more attention. Although adap-
tation strategies can help us cope with changes, there are limits to this approach. The 
more rapidly global average temperatures increase, the more drastic changes will take 
place, making adaptation more difficult.
States that have signed and ratified the UNFCCC have committed themselves to 
preventing dangerous climate change. There has been some debate, however, about what 
exactly can constitute “safe” warming. The Alliance of Small Islands States (AOSIS)5 
claim, for example, that a warming beyond 1.5°C would be a serious threat to their 
survival, but for a long time the larger powers within UNFCCC were not ready to ac-
cept this low limit. Instead, they committed themselves to 2°C warming as a threshold, 
admitting that more warming could result in “dangerous” climate change. This issue 
was revisited in negotiations for the Paris Agreement, with the results that the main 
aim of the agreement is to keep the global temperature increase well below 2°C and 
drive efforts to limit temperature increases even further, to 1.5°C above pre-industrial 
levels (UNFCCC, 2015).
Yet, in spite of this commitment, even if all states will fully implement their Paris 
pledges, the warming is still likely to reach 2.7°C (Climate Action Tracker, 2015). 
Earlier, before the Paris Agreement was reached, the World Bank had calculated that 
the pledges associated with the Copenhagen Accords would likely lead to a level of 
warming close to 4°C by 2100. If commitments to reduce greenhouse gases are not 
met, the warming may even exceed 4°C by that date (World Bank, 2012).
A report issued by the World Bank draws attention to this situation, outlining the 
range of risks the world would be facing should a 4°C warming become a reality. The 
report paints a pessimistic picture:
5 AOSIS is a coalition of 44 small-island and low-lying coastal states that share similar challenges due 
to climate change. AOSIS functions primarily as a negotiation voice for small-island developing states 
within the UN system.
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A world in which warming reaches 4°C above preindustrial levels…, would be 
one of unprecedented heat waves, severe drought, and major floods in many 
regions, with serious impacts on human systems, ecosystems, and associated 
services. (World Bank, 2012, pp. xiii-xiv)
The report highlights such issues as a dramatic increase in the intensity and frequency 
of high-temperature extremes, a sea level rise of 0.5 to 1.0 meters or more by 2100 
(compared to around 20 cm sea level increase with a 2°C warming) and significant 
increase in water scarcity in many regions. In a world of 4°C warming, climate change 
would surpass habitat destruction as the greatest threat to biodiversity. Furthermore, 
ocean acidity could increase by 150 percent, a situation that would likely result in a 
serious degradation of marine ecosystems (World Bank, 2012).
These are but a few examples of the destructive impact that climate change could 
have in the future, should emissions continue to rise. The World Bank is not the first to 
draw attention to this bleak future. Scientists have published results on selected issues, 
and similar impact projections have been made in the assessments report of the IPCC, 
not to mention the countless warnings by environmental NGOs. The importance of the 
World Bank report, however, lies in the fact that it is published by a mainstream inter-
national organization, with considerable political clout. Thus, it clearly demonstrates 
that warnings of the disastrous consequences of climate change are coming not only 
from lone and marginalized scientists or alarmists, but are recognized by mainstream 
actors in the international system.
The fifth assessment report of the IPCC (2014) was published two years after the 
World Bank report, reaffirming the dangers posed by climate change. Although the 
IPCC assessment reports do not publish any new research results, the publications 
of the panel are highly significant, because they review all existing knowledge about 
current and projected climate change and gather it together in one place. The report 
stresses the high risks associated with a warming of 4°C or more, explaining how this 
could include severe and widespread impacts on unique and threatened systems, sub-
stantial species extinction and large risks to global and regional food security. The risk 
associated with crossing multiple tipping points (points that could lead to abrupt and 
irreversible change) also increases with rising temperature. An issue receiving increas-
ing attention in recent years is ocean acidification, which poses substantial risks to 
marine ecosystems, especially polar ecosystems and coral reefs. Rapid acidification of 
the oceans can have detrimental consequences for fisheries and livelihoods associated 
with the fisheries sector (IPCC, 2014a).
As both the World Bank and the IPCC reports have noted , the distribution of cli-
mate change impacts is not even. The most serious consequences are likely to be in the 
Global South, where many of the world’s poorest regions are located. Furthermore, the 
impact on humans will depend not only on the scale of natural changes in each place, 
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but also on the economic, institutional, scientific, and technical capacity of each state 
to cope and adapt. Thus, climate change will manifest differently in different regions 
in the world. Nevertheless, the impact will be felt worldwide, and it is highly unlikely 
that any region can escape every negative consequence.
Given these dangerous trends, one would assume that effective mitigation measures 
to slow the warming would be placed high on the political agenda in all states. Yet, this 
is not the case. Although almost all states of the world have ratified the UNFCCC 
and have formed their own climate policies, these efforts have not always translated 
into concrete action. And even when policies have been successfully implemented and 
have curbed emissions in certain sectors or individual states, the scale of the measures 
has not been large enough to counteract the global growth in emissions.
According to the IPCC, despite a growing number of climate policies aimed at 
reducing emissions, the annual global greenhouse gas emissions are growing at an ac-
celerated rate. Although their average growth between 1970 and 2000 was 1.3 percent, 
they grew by 2.2 percent per between 2000 and 2010 (IPCC, 2014b). To put those 
numbers into perspective, it is useful to keep in mind the extent to which emissions 
need to be cut in order to stay within the 2°C limit. According to IPCC, global emis-
sions need to be 40 percent to 70 percent lower in 2050 than they were in 2010, and 
by 2100 they need to be close to zero (IPCC, 2014b).
Although sources of greenhouse gas emissions are multiple and are derived from a 
range of human activities, the burning of fossil fuels is by far the largest contributing 
factor. In 2010, the energy sector accounted for more than two-thirds of total emis-
sions. Yet, energy consumption continues to increase, led by fossil fuels, which in 2012 
accounted for over 80 percent of global energy consumed. Contrary to expectations, 
given the scientific evidence about climate change, this percentage has been increasing 
gradually since the mid-1990s (International Energy Agency, 2013a). Global energy-
related carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions reached a record high of 31.6 gigatonnes (Gt) 
in 2012 (International Energy Agency, 2013b).
With this information in mind, it seems clear that energy has a crucial role to play 
in tackling climate change. Reducing emissions from the burning of fossil fuels is cru-
cial, yet the trend is going in the opposite direction. Duncan Clark, a journalist at The 
Guardian, pinpoints the dilemma:
We have far more oil, coal and gas than we can safely burn. For all the mil-
lions of words written about climate change, the challenge really comes down 
to this: fuel is enormously useful, massively valuable and hugely important 
geopolitically, but tackling global warming means leaving most of it in the 
ground – by choice. (Clark, 2013)
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Yet this choice is proving to be an amazingly difficult step to take. The stakes are 
high, and although a reduction in emissions would benefit everyone, some powerful 
actors have high stakes invested in the current energy structures. In fact, governments 
seem to be going in the opposite direction, subsidizing the fossil fuel industry by bil-
lions of dollars every year. Despite political rhetoric about the importance of increasing 
the level of low carbon sources of energy, information from the International Energy 
Agency reveals that the fossil fuel industry is supported by subsidies that amounted 
to 523 billion USD in 2011, up by almost 30 percent from 2010. These subsidies are 
six times higher than subsidies to renewables (International Energy Agency, 2012). 
Whitley draws out the contradictions between government emission goals and their 
policies regarding fossil fuel subsidies:
If their aim is to avoid dangerous climate change, governments are shoot-
ing themselves in both feet. They are subsidizing the very activities that are 
pushing the world towards dangerous climate change, and creating barriers to 
investment in low-carbon development and subsidy incentives that encourage 
investment in carbon-intensive energy. (Whitley, 2013, p. v)
Given the enormous role that fossil fuels play in the climate equation, they will be in 
the spotlight in this dissertation, as I examine the obstacles that are hindering progress 
in the vitally important task of keeping the global temperature increase under the 2°C 
limit. A focus on the role that fossil fuels play in the climate problem is also fitting 
in the Arctic context, given that warming temperatures and the melting of the Arctic 
icecap are expected to make oil and gas resources in the Arctic region more accessible 
than they have been in the past.
2.2  Climate Change as a Security Issue
As evident from the previous section, climate change poses a variety of threats to hu-
mans. Yet, defining climate change as a security issue is not as straightforward as one 
would expect. Security is a concept with multiple meanings, and, as discussed in this 
section, there is a lively debate among scholars about the definition of security and the 
types of issues that can constitute a security issue.
As for the climate, it is only in recent years that concern over climate change has 
impacted the notions of security in international relations. Vogler describes this process:
As the public becomes more sharply aware of the full magnitude of the climate 
problem, political discourse begins to securitize the environment, that is, to 
characterize the environment as a security problem. Because governments 
34 | Auður H Ingólfsdóttir: Climate Change and Security in the Arctic
usually prioritize security matters, people wishing to mobilize political at-
tention and resources, and encourage potentially painful societal adaptation, 
will be tempted to stretch traditional definitions of security. (Vogler, 2008, 
pp. 365-366)
But what does this mean? Will different types of policy actions result from treat-
ing climate change as a security issue rather than a mere environmental and/or social 
issue? Does securitization imply a threat to national security and a danger of armed 
conflict? Who is the enemy in the fight against climate change? The answer to those 
questions rests on how we as a society define and understand security and the process 
of securitization.
In recent decades, there has been a clear trend toward a broader understanding of 
security. The traditional understanding of security relies on realist theories, whereby 
the political power of states is considered the main driving force in international rela-
tions. Realist theories assume that states are power-seeking entities with a principle 
goal of gaining and maintaining power over territories and resources. In this context, 
it is the sovereignty of the state that defines its existence as a state. The state must 
remain sovereign in order to exist as a state and security practices therefore focus on 
ensuring the survival of the state. For realists, then, security is mostly about the way 
states can protect their territories from external threats, most often by using military 
force (Sheperd, 2013a).
An example of such a narrow, state-centric view of security is presented in Walt’s 
much-cited article, in which he argues that security studies are about war and can be 
defined as “the study of the threat, use and control of the military force”. He warns 
against widening the security agenda outside the military domain, claiming that defining 
the field in that way would “destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult 
to devise solutions to any of these important problems” (Walt, 1991, pp. 212-213).
In spite of this resistance, the trend has been toward the broadening of the security 
concept. The state-centric, militarized view of security might have been relevant dur-
ing the Cold War, but in today’s globalized word its application is rather limited. Not 
only have a number of new global issues emerged on the scene, but states can no longer 
claim to be the only relevant actors in international relations, as they have to share the 
stage with such other influential actors as transnational corporations, international 
non-governmental organizations, and other transnational actors.
The Copenhagen School of Security Studies has made a systematic attempt to widen 
the security concept without losing coherence, by examining the process of securitiza-
tion. The pioneers of this school of thought have laid out their arguments in a book 
entitled Security: A new Framework for Analysis (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998). 
They argue for a wider conceptualization of security than the traditionalist position 
that security must relate to military threats. This does not mean they would categorize 
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any threat or problem as a security issue. Rather they propose that for threats to be 
categorized as a security issue, “[t]hey have to be stated as existential threats to a referent 
object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency meas-
ures beyond rules that would otherwise bind” (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, p. 5).
In other words, security is partly an act of speech; something is designated as an 
international security issue because it can be argued that this issue is more significant 
than other issues and that it should take absolute priority. Thus, an issue can become 
a security issue, not necessarily because a real existential threat exists, but because 
the issue is presented and perceived as threat. In response, emergency measures are 
discussed and justified.
Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde reject the idea of security being restricted to the military 
sector, arguing that a wide range of issues can emerge as security issues through the 
process of securitization. In their book, they divide security issues thematically into 
issues that belong to the military, environmental, economic, societal, or political sector.
The emergence of environmental degradation as a security issue is of particular 
interest for the purposes of this dissertation. Although concerns about the vulner-
ability of humans to environmental degradation were growing in the 1980s, spurred 
by events like the Exxon Valdez oil spill and the Chernobyl disaster, debates about 
whether and how environmental degradation should be linked to security emerged 
only in the early 1990s (Haldén, 2011). One example is Mathew’s 1989 article in the 
US foreign policy journal, Foreign Affairs. “The 1990s will demand a redefinition of 
what constitutes national security,” she wrote in a call for greater attention to be given 
to environmental and resources issues (Mathew, 1989). As Barnett (2001) points out, 
the article was clearly aimed at influencing policy makers by elevating environmental 
concerns to the level of security issues. In other words, environmental problems were 
securitized, in hopes that this would elevate them higher on political agenda.
Discourses on environmental security can be divided into two main camps. One 
focuses on the linkages among environmental degradation, violent conflicts, and 
national security; the other is concerned with exploring environmental security in 
the context of human security, in which the degradation of the environment poses 
a variety of threats – not necessarily involving open violence – to the daily lives of 
peoples around the world.
The first discourse, linking environmental issues to the traditional understanding 
of national security, is concerned with the potential for humans to engage in violent 
conflicts over resources, which, in turn, threatens the security of the state. Although 
much has been written about the potential relationship between environmental deg-
radation and violent conflict, the research has failed to establish a clear relationship 
between the two and seems to be theoretically driven rather than based on empirical 
evidence (Haldén, 2011). Others are doubtful about this approach and argue against 
linking environmental degradation and national security. Deudney (1990) is an often-
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cited example. In his view, security is first and foremost related to violence, and most 
of the causes and cures of environmental degradation are likely to be found outside the 
domain of the traditional national security system related to violence.
The proponents of the second environmental discourse do not necessarily disagree 
with Deudney about the point that the traditional national security system is not well 
equipped to deal with environmental degradation. Barnett (2001) agrees that as long 
as national security continues to be the domain of the military, national security logic 
will be incapable of grasping environmental issues and dealing with them effectively. 
This is not, however, the point that most writers who link environmental issues to 
security are actually aiming at. Most of them are also calling for a redefinition of the 
security concept and are critical of the realistic understanding of security, with its nar-
row focus on military security and its assumption that the military is the most relevant 
actor (Barnett, 2001).
As a better alternative for treating the environment as a sub-theme of traditional 
national security, Barnett proposes the following definition of environmental security:
The process of peacefully reducing human vulnerability to human-induced 
environmental degradation by addressing the root causes of environmental 
degradation and human insecurity. (Barnett, 2001, p. 129)
This definition implies that rather than linking environmental degradation directly 
to national security, it should be viewed as one dimension of human security. When 
environmental security is nested in the human security framework, it shifts the emphasis 
from national security and the armed protection of territories toward a focus on the 
security of individuals and sustainable human development. More recent literature 
establishes a clear relationship between climate change and human security. O'Brian, 
St. Clair & Kristoffersen (2010), for example, emphasize that climate change is not 
simply an environmental issue that can be managed through behavioral changes, sec-
toral interventions, or new regulations. Rather, it should be viewed as a problem that 
can be resolved only by focusing on climate change as a human security issue. Such an 
approach includes a thorough examination of what it means for humans to be “secure”. 
It also moves the focus away from the more traditional, technical, problem-solving ap-
proaches toward a framing that recognizes the capacity of individuals and communities 
to respond to and create change and shape their own futures.
The human security concept emerged from policy circles rather than from aca-
demia, although scholars who had been critical of the traditional meaning of security 
undoubtedly facilitated the process. States like Canada and Norway were at the fore-
front, but the most influential publication in putting human security on the agenda is 
a UNDP report from 1994 that argues for a shift in focus from the armed security of 
territories to people’s security through sustainable development (UNDP, 1994). The 
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UNDP groups threats to human security into seven categories: economic security, 
food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community 
security, and political security.
This new approach was welcomed by, among others, environmentalists, human 
rights advocates, and people working in the development field, all of whom considered 
the more traditional security approach to be outdated. Þórarinsdóttir, for example, 
embraces the concept as important in giving voice to the powerless: 
The human security approach is not only a matter of shifting the focus from 
the state to the people. Even more revolutionary, human security gives voice 
to the marginalized and powerless in the discourse about security and places 
it within the bigger framework of sustainable development. (Þórarinsdóttir, 
2009)
Skepticism about the usefulness of this concept has also surfaced. Paris asks if hu-
man security really represents a paradigm shift or is simply a concept filled with hot 
air. According to Paris, human security is a great deal like sustainable development:
…everyone is for it, but few people have a clear idea of what it means. Existing 
definitions of human security tend to be extraordinarily expansive and vague, 
encompassing everything from physical security to psychological well-being, 
which provides policymakers with little guidance in the prioritization of 
competing policy goals and academics little sense of what, exactly, is to be 
studied. (Paris, 2001, p. 88)
Although this criticism merits some attention, the danger of oversimplification is 
more worrying. We live in an increasingly interconnected and complex world, and 
relying on assumptions about security that are too simplistic is not only naive, but 
runs the risk of states using outdated military measures to protect themselves against 
security risks that are fundamentally different from the threats of the past. This reali-
zation has been the driving force behind the many initiatives related to the broadening 
of the security concept. In this respect, the human security perspective is only one of 
several propositions about ways of viewing security through a different lens. Heininen 
(2014), for example, discusses the concept of “comprehensive security” as an even wider 
concept that embraces both the traditional ideas of security and the environmental 
and human aspects of security. In this context, he emphasizes the need to examine the 
many aspects of security related to threats or risks and the people and locations they 
affect: individuals, communities, regions, or countries. Whereas a risk is something 
that is possible to quantify, rank, and measure, a threat is a more subjective term, often 
related to fears that may or may not be based on some actual risks.
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The Securitization of Climate Change
The debate on environmental security has been revitalized in recent years due to 
the increasing spotlight on climate change as a security issue. In the 1990s, climate 
change was discussed as part of the environmental security discourse, but it emerged 
as a separate issue at the beginning of the 21st century (Haldén, 2011). During 
the securitization process, a similar tension surfaced, as was present in the earlier 
debates on environmental security, wherein some scholars and policy makers im-
mediately connected climate change with future conflicts, while others emphasized 
the human security dimension.
A turning point in the securitization process of climate change occurred in 2007 
when the IPCC published its fourth assessment report, repeating its earlier message 
about human-induced climate change with much greater scientific certainty than 
before (IPCC, 2007). This was also the year when Al Gore and the IPCC were 
awarded the Noble Peace Prize for bringing attention to the danger of climate 
change, and the UN Security Council held its first debate about the impact of 
climate change on peace and security. The Chair of the Council, Margaret Beckett, 
the British Foreign Secretary at the time, was clear in her assertion that climate 
change is a security issue, but not a matter of narrow national security. Rather, it 
was about collective security in an increasingly interdependent world: “Climate 
change can bring us together, if we have the wisdom to prevent it from driving us 
apart”, she declared (Security Council, 2007).
In 2007, studies that addressed climate change as a security issue also increased 
in number. Brzoska (2009) examines four recent studies that pose climate change 
as a problem for security. He observes that in all four studies climate change is seen 
as great danger for international peace and security in the 21st century and that the 
authors expect major consequences for human security in several areas of the world. 
Among the many potential security threats identified are an increase in the num-
ber of violent conflicts, leading to inter-state wars; military interventions in poor 
countries by armed forces of Western states (to prevent humanitarian catastrophes 
and destabilization of states); massive migration; new safe havens for terrorists; and 
conflicts over changing coast lines and resource exploitation in the Arctic.
The tension between the traditional understanding of security and the more 
recent ideas about security as a broader concept are evident in Brzoska’s analysis 
of the four studies. He is critical of the studies, arguing that the framing of climate 
change as a security issue is based not on well-founded analysis, but largely on ad 
hoc theories on the relationship between environmental degradation and violent 
conflict. He notes that although all four studies recognize climate change as a 
security threat, different conceptualizations of security lead to different types of 
recommendations on dealing with the consequences of climate change as they relate 
to peace and security. “Traditional security conceptions are still around, but they 
2. State of the Art and Theory | 39
have lost their monopoly status, both in discourse and in practice. They have been 
supplemented and – at least in rhetoric and non-governmental circles – replaced 
by wider conceptions of security,” he says (Brzoska, 2009, p. 144).
In spite of this widening of the security concept, Brzoska warns that the securi-
tization of climate change may push the climate-change discourse toward the use 
of traditional security instruments. This is clearly not the aim of the writer of these 
reports, however. The authors of a study by the German Advisory Council, which is 
the most detailed and comprehensive of the four studies, state as their core message:
…without resolute counteraction, climate change will overstretch many so-
cieties’ adaptive capacities within the coming decades. This could result in 
destabilization and violence, jeopardizing national and international security 
to a new degree. However, climate change could also unite the international 
community, provided that it recognizes climate change as a threat to human-
kind and soon sets the course for the avoidance of dangerous anthropogenic 
climate change by adopting a dynamic and globally coordinated climate 
policy. If it fails to do so, climate change will draw ever-deeper lines of divi-
sion and conflict in international relations, triggering numerous conflicts 
between and within countries over the distribution of resources, especially 
water and land, over the management of migration, or over compensation 
payments between the countries mainly responsible for climate change and 
those countries most affected by its destructive effects. (German Advisory 
Council on Global Change, 2008, p. 1)
In other words, the study emphasizes the importance of recognizing climate change 
as a threat to security, in order to avoid militarization and violent conflict occurring 
as a reaction to those threats. By acknowledging climate change as a threat to human-
kind, the international community is more likely to strengthen the political processes 
necessary to prevent the crisis.
This analysis highlights the importance of challenging the traditional, state-centric 
view of security. As O'Brien et al. (2010) suggest, the people-oriented approach to 
human security may be a more appropriate framework for analyzing threats posed by 
climate change. By employing a human-security perspective, the focus also moves from 
the global to the local, providing a fruitful framework for exploring the relationship 
between human security and the socio-economic impact of climate change. The focus 
is not so much on the fear that climate change will increase the risks of violent conflicts, 
but rather on the way environmental changes will influence the security of common 
people in their everyday lives. An important feature of this approach is the opportunity 
to analyze security threats as they apply to subgroups of society – to move the focus 
to the way such factors as gender, race, class, and social status influence how people 
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are affected by climate change. This makes it possible to explore questions related to 
whether the risks differ for men and women, if the poor are in greater danger than 
the rich, or if people in certain geographical areas more threatened than others are. 
By identifying vulnerable groups, policy interventions can be better targeted and are 
more likely to address the real security needs of people at risk.
Although some feminist scholars have been critical of the human security agenda 
(Natasha, 2013), this approach is more appealing to feminist researchers than the 
traditional security concept is. Feminist scholars studying security have generally 
sought to emphasize marginal groups and give voice to the powerless, using gender as 
an analytical tool.
Before exploring in greater depth feminist writings about the relationships among 
gender, security, and the environment, a discussion about some key concepts of feminist 
analysis is useful. What does it entail to view a topic through a feminist lens?
2.3  Key Feminist Concepts as Analytical Tools
In this section, some key concepts used for analysis, including gender, masculinity, 
and femininity, are defined and discussed. I also introduce the idea of masculine and 
feminine values and discuss the relevance of these different types of values in policy 
making, especially in the context of social constructivism theories in IR, wherein the 
importance of norms, values, and ideas is highlighted. 
When feminism as a discipline entered the academic scene, the attention of most 
feminist scholars was on patriarchal discourses that were either hostile about women 
or remained completely silent on the topic. As Gross notes, feminists were preoc-
cupied with the inclusion of women in spheres from which they had been excluded. 
Instead of being ignored from theory, women were to be included as possible objects 
of investigation, and issues of direct relevance to women’s lives were to be included 
as a relevant and worthy object of intellectual concern (Gross, 1987). Broadening 
dominant discourses to include women was not always possible, however, and more 
and more feminist academics began to question the basic assumptions underlying 
methodology and theories. “The whole social, political, scientific and metaphysical 
underpinning of patriarchal theoretical systems needed to be shaken up,” Gross states 
(1987, p. 357).
As part of this development, feminists concern themselves not only with women 
and what have traditionally been considered “women’s issues”, but also with such 
topics as theories and systems of representation. In her article about feminism as an 
academic discipline, Einarsdóttir explains how gender studies is an interdisciplinary 
field that addresses not only men, women, and gender relations, but also the symbolic 
representation of gender in language and culture. Gender and related concepts are used 
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as analytical tools to examine power relations and the way some issues are prioritized 
over others. Gender relations are put in a larger context than has been the case, and 
the role they play in the interpretative frameworks we use to understand the world is 
examined (Einardóttir, 2004).
This study falls into Einarsdóttir’s last category, using a feminist lens to explore 
climate-related discourses and to examine the degree to which those discourses and 
related policy decisions are influenced by dominant patriarchal paradigms. It relies on 
analytical concepts like gender and descriptive adjectives like feminine and masculine 
to reveal power relations within public discourses.
I consider gender to be a socially constructed concept, the meaning of which varies 
across cultures and time. As Joan Wallach Scott explains, her definition of gender rests 
on two core propositions: “Gender is a constitutive element of social relationships based 
on perceived differences between the sexes, and gender is a primary way of signifying 
relationships of power” (Scott, 1988, p. 42). It follows from this definition that gender 
is a social organization of sexual differences. This does not mean that gender reflects 
biological differences between the sexes. Rather, gender is a socially constructed term 
that establishes different roles for men and women in society based on their bodily 
differences. I share with Scott the curiosity to understand how hierarchies such as those 
of gender are constructed or legitimized. Underlying this curiosity is the belief that 
if gender is a socially constructed phenomenon, it can be deconstructed and recon-
structed in a different form. New norms can emerge and become legitimized, leading 
to a different understanding of gender and gender relations.
Although all feminist theorists agree that gender matters, not all of them understand 
the concept in the same way. Shepherd claims that theories of gender can be broadly 
grouped into three categories: essentialist, constructivist, and post-structuralist. These 
three approaches offer different explanations for the relationship between the body and 
behavior (Shepherd, 2013b). Essentialists assume the most direct relationship between 
body and behavior: women are more likely to be nurturing, attached, and emotion-
ally attuned because of their biological features, and men’s biological features make 
them more likely to be assertive, calculative, and rational. In other words, sex equals 
gender, because gender roles are based on biology rather than on social construction. 
Constructivists, however, see a clear separation between sex and gender. Whereas sex is 
biological, gender is socially constructed. The concepts of “feminine” and “masculine” 
emerge from constructivist theories, linking certain types of behavior to socially con-
structed gender roles. Post-structuralist theorists of gender take the social construction 
of certain concepts a step further, challenging the assumption that bodily differences 
exist in reality between the sexes. In other words, sexual differences are also socially 
produced, resulting in little difference between the two concepts of sex and gender. 
Whereas essentialists collapse gender into sex as categories of analysis, post-structuralists 
do the reverse and collapse sex into gender (Shepherd, 2013b).
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As previously stated, the analysis in this dissertation relies on the constructivist ap-
proach, assuming that although certain biological differences exist between the two 
sexes, this difference is not sufficient to explain the different cultural roles assigned to 
men and women in most societies, and the associated characteristics defined as feminine 
or masculine. Although I label values as either feminine or masculine, this does not 
mean that I consider only women as able to hold feminine values and only men to prefer 
masculine values. Rather, values are categorized as feminine and masculine depending 
on their association with the traditional gender roles in modern Western cultures.
The idea that femininity has been historically placed in a subordinated position rela-
tive to masculinity is closely linked to the concept of hegemonic masculinity. Connell 
invented the term “hegemonic masculinity” to explain how one type of masculinity can 
occupy the hegemonic position in a pattern of gender relations. She defines hegemonic 
masculinity as “…the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently 
accepted answer to the problem of the legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is 
taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women” 
(Connell, 1995, p. 77). According to Connell, hegemonic masculinity is sustained 
through its opposition to various less-valued masculinities (e.g. homosexual males) 
and through its relationship to various devalued feminine qualities, creating unequal 
power relations among various groups of men and between men and women.
The normative starting point is that dualism, wherein femininity and masculinity 
are constructed as opposite but not equally valid concepts, results in a world in which 
the feminine is repressed, exploited or given limited space in certain spheres of society. 
Moving beyond this dualistic view of the world toward a more integrated and holistic 
approach offers hopes that other ideas can gain ground, not only ideas about gender 
and gender relations, but also about other socially constituted relations, including the 
relationship between humans and nature. For this to happen, more balance is needed 
in public policy between masculine and feminine values.
It is useful in this context, to clarify what I mean by masculine and feminine values. 
First, although I label values as either feminine or masculine, this does not mean that I 
consider only women to prefer and being able to hold feminine values and only men to 
prefer and be able to masculine values. Rather, values are categorized as feminine and 
masculine depending on their association with the traditional gender roles in modern 
Western cultures. Second, when I refer to masculine or feminine values, I am in most 
cases referring to the more positive traits associated with each gender. On the mascu-
line side this could include characteristics such as bravery, autonomy, logical thinking, 
initiative, and ambition. Corresponding positive feminine traits could include compas-
sion, the ability to cultivate relationships, intuition, receptivity and cooperativeness. 
I do not claim that one set of values is better than the other, but rather that they are 
complementary and that we need both types of values for balanced decision-making. 
Unfortunately, however, this type of balance has rarely existed. Although femininity and 
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masculinity have been constructed as opposite concepts, they have not been treated as 
equally valid in public policy. Masculine values have ruled in the public sphere, whereas 
feminine values have been considered more relevant in private settings.
But how could more space for the feminine transform our ideas about the relation-
ship between humans and nature? Studies exist that relate certain types of values with 
environmentally friendly behavior. One relevant study was published in a paper by 
Corner, Markowitz & Pidgeon (2014), wherein they examine the role of values in the 
public engagement with climate change. Their core argument, supported by a number 
of research results, is that people who endorse self-transcendent values and who exhibit 
high levels of altruism are more likely than those holding more self-enhancement 
values to engage in sustainable behavior, show higher concern about environmental 
risks, perform environmentally friendly actions such as recycling, and engage positively 
with climate change. In fact, the more likely people are to endorse hierarchical and 
individualistic worldviews, the more likely they are to downplay environmental risks.
Although Corner, Markowitz & Pidgeon do not label values as feminine or mascu-
line, the cluster of values associated more strongly with environmental awareness and 
concern for climate change has some clear resemblance to feminine characteristics, 
whereas the other cluster of values, belonging to those more likely to downplay envi-
ronmental risks, can easily be linked to masculinity. Hence, one can logically draw the 
conclusion that greater emphasis on feminine values in public discourses is likely to 
produce more environmentally friendly policies.
Although feminine and masculine values are not necessarily tied to gender, socializa-
tion generally results in women and men identifying with the dominant gender roles 
in their societies. In Western cultures, for example, boys often learn that masculinity 
means being competitive, independent, and unemotional, whereas girls learn that 
femininity means being compassionate, cooperative, and empathic (McCright A. M., 
2010). It comes as no surprise, then, that in most studies on the topic, women tend to 
be more likely to engage in environmentally friendly behavior than men do (Salehi, 
Pazuki, Mahmoudi, & Knierim, 2015). This is one of the reason why gender balance in 
policy making is one factor (but not the only factor) that could contribute to greater 
balance between feminine and masculine values in public policy.
Once again, the discussion needs to be understood in the context of social con-
structivism. One of the key elements of constructivism is the belief that our social 
reality is largely socially constructed, which also means that this same reality can be 
reconstructed and reshaped. A person with the mindset of a constructivist, therefore, 
includes in his or her worldview the possibility for positive social changes, especially 
if space is allowed for new ideas to gain ground.
Constructivist theories of gender rely on the same basic assumptions as constructiv-
ist theories within IR do, in that they emphasize the importance of ideas and focus on 
the social process of the emergence and legitimization of norms. IR theories in this 
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category also include the discussion of the relationship between structure and agency, 
the proponents of which claim that although the structure of the international system 
influences state behavior, this does not mean that states have no agency to influence 
social structures. In his article, “Anarchy is what states make of it”, Alexander Wendt 
points out that state interests are not static: “State identities and interests can be 
collectively transformed within an anarchic context by many factors – individual, 
domestic, systemic, or transnationals – and as such are an important dependent vari-
able,” (Wendt, 1992, p. 424). 
Constructivists within IR reject the idea that the world can be described as an ob-
jective reality. Instead, they argue that international politics is a world of our making, 
and they emphasize the process of interaction. Actors make choices in the process of 
interacting with others, resulting in distinct historical, cultural, and political realities. 
In this respect, international relations are socially constructed, rather than existing 
independently of human meaning and action (Fierke, 2010).
2.4  Gender, Security, Economy, and the Environment
As indicated previously, few topics are off limits for feminist scholars. Thus, exploring 
the role of gender in international politics and the relationships between gender and 
different sectors of society are already familiar topics within feminist theory. This sec-
tion examines how feminist scholars have challenged dominant theories within the 
various disciplines most relevant for this study. Of special interest are three relation-
ships: between gender and security, between gender and political economy and between 
gender and environment. A fourth component that is also of relevance is the work of 
feminist scholars who have developed the concept of the ethics of care as an alternative 
to dominant moral theories focusing on rights and justice. This prior work forms an 
important knowledge base that I use as a foundation for my analysis in later chapters, in 
which I focus on the role of values and dominant ideologies in public discourses about 
climate change and the actions and policy decisions that derive from those discourses.
Gender and Security
Few subject areas within international relations have been as clearly labeled “masculine” 
as has the field of security studies. As elaborated upon in Section 2.2, security has tra-
ditionally been associated with state survival, including competitions between states 
and a focus on the military capabilities of a state to defend its territory. In her landmark 
book, Gender in International Relations, Ann Tickner argues that because men have 
largely conducted foreign and military policy, the discipline that analyzes these activi-
ties is bound to be primarily about men and masculinity. “We seldom realize we think 
in these terms,” she writes, “however; in most fields of knowledge we have become 
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accustomed to equating what is human with what is masculine” (Tickner, 1992, p. 5). 
Tickner emphasizes the need for feminist theories to go beyond the injection of 
women’s experiences into various disciplines. There is a great need to challenge the 
core concepts of the disciplines. She takes such central concepts within IR as power, 
sovereignty, and security as examples of concepts that have been framed in terms that 
we associate with masculinity. Her analyses reveal how in realism, the most dominant 
school of thought within IR, the ideal of the glorified male warrior has been projected 
onto the behavior of states. Throughout history, characteristics associated with mascu-
linity, such as toughness, courage, power, independence, and even physical strength, 
have been those most valued in international politics. This glorification of the male 
warrior celebrates only one type of masculinity, but places other types of masculinity 
into a subordinate position, which fits well with Connell’s concept of hegemonic 
masculinity, mentioned previously. Tickner claims that in international politics, the 
characteristics associated with hegemonic masculinity are projected onto the behavior 
of states, for which success as international actors is measured in terms of their power 
capabilities and capacity for self-help and autonomy (Tickner, 1992).
To support her arguments, Tickner examines texts of several male writers who have 
been important actors in shaping theory in international relations. Morgenthau is one 
example of such a realist scholar, but in his influential book, Politics among Nations, 
he constructs a world almost entirely without women. He states that individuals are 
engaged in power struggles in all their interactions because the tendency to dominate 
exists at all levels of human life (Morgenthau, 1973). Tickner notes that because women 
have rarely occupied positions of power, Morgenthau’s arguments about domination 
refer primarily to men, albeit not all men. Thus, she concludes that his “political man” 
is a social construct based on partial representation of human nature, drawn from the 
behavior of elite men in positions of public power (Tickner, 1992).
But how does this gendered construction of the state and the international system 
influence our ideas about security? According to Tickner, it leads to security discourses 
that privilege conflict and war and silence other ways of thinking about security. She 
argues that by privileging masculine values over feminine values, the options available to 
states and their policy makers to tackle the global challenges of the present are seriously 
constrained. Because knowledge about the behavior of states and the international 
systems depend almost entirely on assumptions derived from men’s experiences, a large 
part of the human experience is ignored, limiting our ability to devise innovative and 
transformative solutions to problems.
Tickner’s analysis was published more than two decades ago, and since then several 
feminist scholars have used her work as a starting point, expanding on certain com-
ponents of her work in books of their own. Hooper (2001), for example, turns the 
question around in Manly States, by exploring not how masculinity shapes international 
relations, but how international relations shape masculinity. And in Gender, Violence 
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& Security, Shepherd (2007) investigates UN Security Council Resolution 1325, ad-
dressing gender issues in conflict areas. Detraz (2012) also writes about international 
security through a gendered lens, in International Security and Gender. And Tickner 
herself has written a follow-up book, wherein she extends some of her arguments and 
recognizes the growing work of feminist scholars in her field (Tickner, 2001). In spite 
of this more recent scholarship, Tickner’s analysis of how masculinity and masculine 
values have shaped international relations is still highly relevant, and it ended up being 
the material I found most useful as a critique of dominant IR theories, to be used as 
a general framework for the analysis presented later in the thesis, where I discuss the 
Icelandic case study. 
But even before Tickner’s 1992 book and long before the human-security agenda 
emerged, feminist scholars had been critical of the traditional state-centric view of 
security and the absence of women and the daily lives of ordinary people from security 
discourses. Enloe, for example, asks the question: “Where are the women?” From this 
simple question, she demonstrates that, although invisible in international politics, 
women’s daily lives are indeed relevant, and women have played important roles in 
matters related to war, peace, and security, whether as diplomatic wives, secretaries, or 
prostitutes. By taking all women’s lives seriously, Enloe claims, important new insights 
can be discovered (Enloe, 1990).
One important contribution of feminist scholars to an understanding of security 
is their analysis of the way structural violence can threaten the security of individuals 
and groups. Peace researcher Johan Galtung first introduced the concept of “structural 
violence” as a term to describe social injustice. He used the concept to explain how 
systems created by societies can discriminate, often unintentionally, against individuals 
in certain groups (Galtung, 1969). Feminists have developed this concept further to 
explain the exploitation of women under the patriarchal system and have pointed at 
the various dangers posed to certain groups in society, even if national security is not 
threatened (Shepherd, 2007; Detraz, 2012).
This criticism by feminist scholars of the narrow definition of security did not reach 
the mainstream discourse in security studies, however. Thus, the status of human se-
curity as a notion accepted by many mainstream policy actors as an alternative to the 
more traditional state-centric view of security creates an important gateway for feminist 
analysis to enter into debates about security. It should also be noted that although 
feminist insights were usually not recognized in mainstream security discourses, their 
analyses made an important contribution to the emergence of the human security 
agenda. Þórarinsdóttir points to three ways in which feminism influenced the human 
security agenda. First, the writings of feminist scholars on security issues helped create 
fertile soil for the new concept. Second, women activist organizations had prepared 
the ground by drawing attention to gender-based violence in conflicts. Third, it can be 
argued that the increasing number of women in positions of power, both in national 
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governments and within international institutions, helped pave the way for new ideas 
to emerge and gain acceptance (Þórarinsdóttir, 2009).
In spite of feminist contributions to the development of the human security concept, 
some feminists have been critical of the approach, claiming that there is a lack of gender 
sensitivity in the “human” part of human security (Natasha, 2013). Other feminist 
writers have argued that instead of abandoning the concept, gender theory should be 
incorporated into further development of the human security perspective. Hoogensen 
and Stuvøy argue that top-down articulations of security concepts often do not address 
the security needs of those “below” – on lower rungs of the hierarchy. They suggest 
that a gender approach to human security not only gives the concept more credibility 
and substance, but also makes it possible to be more reflective of security concerns that 
originate from the “bottom up”. Because gender analyses point toward relationships of 
power, they provide a useful framework for examining structural relations that often 
go unrecognized – namely relations of dominance and non-dominance (Hoogensen 
& Stuvøy, 2006).
In her book, Feminist Security Studies, Wibben also argues that feminists have played 
an important role in proposing alternative conceptions of power and violence that go 
beyond the more traditional notions of military security – including ideas of com-
mon and cooperative security arrangements and the role of non-state actors. Wibben 
uses a feminist narrative approach to explore the security concept. By telling security 
narratives from the ground up and by adopting a bottom-up approach to security, the 
attention is aimed at the way security policies influence the everyday lives of people 
(Wibben, 2011).
The broadening of the security concept, the increasing emphasis on human securi-
ty, and the focus on exploring how people experience security in their everyday lives 
indicate a shift, giving feminine values increased space in security discourses. One of 
the objectives of this thesis is to examine whether or not this shift is manifesting in 
climate discourse and climate-related policy decisions, focusing specifically on Iceland 
as an Arctic state known for its high awareness on gender issues.
Gender and Political Economy
Whereas realism has been the ruling theory in academic and policy circles dealing with 
security, liberalism is the dominant ideology within the field of international political 
economy. In contrast to realists, who emphasize competition and power struggles, 
liberals are advocates of free trade and cooperation between and among states that 
will maximize benefits. According to liberals, human beings are driven by rational self-
interest. The rational economic man is offered in contrast to Morgenthau’s political 
man. Tickner argues that in spite of this difference, masculine values also underpin 
liberal theories. In fact, the rational economic man has many similarities to the politi-
cal man, although his aggressive passions have been tamed by the rational pursuit of 
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profit. Women are still absent from the picture, and feminine values related to caring, 
nurture and service, all of which are crucial for the reproduction and survival of the 
younger generation, are nowhere to be found in liberalism (Tickner, 1992).
Liberalism – particularly neo-liberalism – has close ideological ties with classical 
economic theory, sharing assumptions about rationality and self-interest as key moti-
vators for the way actors in a system (states or individuals) behave. Similar to feminist 
scholars within IR, feminist economists have questioned some of the basic assumptions 
and values that underpin current economic practice. Nelson, for example, claims that 
various perspectives on subjects, models, methods, and pedagogy within the discipline 
of economics have been mistakenly perceived as value free and impartial, when, in fact, 
those perspectives are strongly gendered, prioritizing masculine values: “Traditionally, 
male activities have taken center stage as subject matter, while models and methods 
have reflected a historically and psychologically masculine pattern of valuing autonomy 
and detachment over dependence and connection” (Nelson, 1995, p. 132).
The rational, autonomous, self-interested individual is placed at the center of 
mainstream economic models. These individuals have no childhood or old age, are 
dependent on no one, and are responsible only for themselves. The economic models, 
however, capture only a small piece of reality as most people experience it. All humans 
need caring and nurturing at some point in their lives, as a child, when sick or as an 
elderly person.
Mellor (1995) is on similar wavelength as Nelson, arguing that the social construc-
tion of the “economic man” is the basis of the economic system that prioritizes what 
men value and do and undervalues what women value and do. In this system, based 
on the economic models that rest on the hierarchical dualism so influential in Western 
society, both women and the natural world are treated as externalities. Mellow claims 
that this approach will not work in the long run, as the current capitalistic market sys-
tem is both socially and ecologically unsustainable. She puts her faith in the alternative 
feminist perspectives, which, she claims, are beginning to emerge.
One such alternative is Nelson’s vision of an economic system that embraces a 
holistic view of the human being. Nelson does not argue for an alternative in which 
a masculine bias is replaced by a feminine one. Rather, she suggests a different way: 
to separate our judgments about values (superior/inferior) from our perceptions of 
gender (masculine/feminine). According to her, human behavior can encompass both: 
autonomy and dependence, individuation and relation, reason and emotion. Those 
qualities can manifest in economic behavior of individuals of either sex (Nelson, 1995).
Nelson takes her analysis further in Economics for Humans, in which she suggests 
that the metaphor, first proposed by Adam Smith, of “the economy as a machine” is 
replaced by a new metaphor: The market as a beating heart. A healthy beating heart 
circulates blood to all parts of the social body, while also serving as the center of com-
passion and care (Nelson, 2006).
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Although Nelson is critical of the traditional understanding of the economy, she 
rejects the rhetoric of anti-market groups that claim that markets, corporations, and 
capitalism are always fueled by the self-interest of those in power. In her view, the critics 
are starting from the same basic assumptions as classical economic theorists, by viewing 
the market as a machine, unable to consider moral values. Instead, she argues for an 
approach in which economic principles and ethical issues are integrated.
Because the economy is not a machine, both the pro-business and anti-market advo-
cates have only a partial picture. By respecting the good things that each side values but 
dropping the idea that these good things are automatically either provided or destroyed 
by the market, we gain a better understanding of the relationship between economics 
and ethics. Table 1 presents Nelson’s vision; in it the metaphor of the beating heart 
is emphasized by listing the positive features of economic (pro-business) and ethical 
(anti-market) perspectives.
Table 1: The Market as a Beating Heart
Recreated from Economics for Humans (Nelson, 2006, p. 55)
Economics
(pro-business advocates)
Ethics
(anti-market critics)
Positive •	Production	of	goods	and	services	that
support	survival	and	flourishing
•	Creation	of	employment	opportunities
•	Self-support	and	financial	self-
responsibility
•	Opportunities	for	creativity,	innovation,
and	growth	in	the	enjoyment	of	life
•	Aesthetic,	moral,	and	spiritual
development
•	The	creation	of	emotionally	healthy,	
mutually	respectful	relations	among
people
•	Care	and	concern	for	the	weak	and	needy
•	Ecological	balance	and	sustainability
Negative •	An	exclusive	focus	on	short-term	profit
•	Creation	of	boss/worker	relations	of
oppression and alienation
•	Greed	and	selfishness
•	A	fixation	on	growth	and	runaway
consumerism
•	Passivity	about	provisioning	of	goods	and
services
•	Otherworldliness,	with	little	attention	to
practical needs or constraints
•	Financial	non-responsibility,	leading	to
dependency
•	Fear	of	money	and	power
Although coming from a completely different background of natural sciences and 
environmentalism, David Suzuki arrives at the same conclusion as Nelson, rejecting 
the view that markets are controlled by forces that humans are unable to influence. In 
The Legacy, he writes about his vision for a sustainable future, stating: “Capitalism, free 
enterprise, the economy, markets, corporations, and currency are not natural elements 
or forces of nature. [...]. We created them and if they are not working, we can change 
them” (Suzuki, 2010, p. 39).
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But will viewing the economy as a beating heart rather than a machine change 
economic behavior? Nelson celebrates the work already accomplished by a number of 
people who are concerned with creating and preserving a healthy, vital economic life. 
The problem, according to her, is that neither the pro-business nor the anti-market 
camp is taking this work seriously. On one hand are the conservative economists who 
strongly believe that the market works fine without any ethical considerations – a view 
that is well captured in Milton Friedman’s famous essay, “The social responsibility of 
business is to create profit” (Friedman, 1970). On the other hand the anti-market 
advocates view corporate social responsibility as a contradiction, assuming that efforts 
by large corporations to show that ethical behavior can never be anything other than 
shallow public relations schemes. The strong image created by the metaphor of the 
economy as a machine is blocking dialogue and useful action. By deconstructing the 
metaphor and replacing it with another, Nelson argues that terms like “business ethics” 
and “the economics of care” seem less like oxymorons. On the contrary, a metaphor of 
the economy as a beating heart calls for an economic life that is caring and responsible 
(Nelson, 2006).
Nelson’s metaphor of the economy as a beating heart is an interesting attempt to 
create space for feminine values within economics. An increasing emphasis on social 
responsibility within the business sector provides an opportunity to explore whether 
a real value shift is occurring or if the shift is mainly rhetoric, useful for public rela-
tions, as claimed by the anti-market camp. The relevance of these trends for this study 
becomes obvious given the tension with which most societies struggle between the 
need to reduce greenhouse gas emission and the pressure to continue exploiting nature 
for short-term economic profit.
 
Gender and the Environment
Although the literature on gender and climate change is growing, it is only in recent 
years that feminists have paid attention to climate change. Writings about relationships 
between gender and the environment, however, can be traced back much further in time.
One often-cited source in this context is Ortner’s “Is female to male as nature is to 
culture? In the article she grapples with the question of why, in spite of cultural differ-
ences, the secondary status of women seems universal. Her argument is that women tend 
to be assumed, over and over again, to be closer to nature than men are. For reasons that 
seem to relate to women’s reproductive roles, they are identified with something that 
every culture defines as being of a lower order of existence than itself – namely “nature”. 
Culture is linked to human consciousness and how humanity tries to control nature. 
What follows, Ortner argues, is that culture is considered not only distinct from nature, 
but superior to it. Although Ortner does not believe that women are “in reality” any 
closer to (or further from) nature than men are, she does identify several reasons why 
they may appear to be, which in turn contributes to gender inequality (Ortner, 1974).
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Part of Ortner’s argument is that, in all societies, nature is constructed as inferior 
to culture. Other feminist writers have noted that hierarchical dualism culture/nature 
and male/female are specifically linked to Western culture, however, referring to the 
ideological changes related to the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment that 
took place in Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries.
Merchant, for examples, argues in The Death of Nature that before the Enlighten-
ment, nature was regarded as the benevolent mother of all things. During the scientific 
revolution, a model in which the domination of man over nature was a more integral 
feature gradually replaced this metaphor. With science, nature’s secrets were revealed, 
and it became easier to control nature. Conceptions of Earth as nurturing began to 
change to conceptions of nature as a resource to be exploited (Merchant, 1980).
Both Ortner and Merchant are examining themes associated with ecofeminism, a 
subdiscipline of feminism that links the domination of women and the domination of 
nature with values and activities specifically associated with women, including child-
bearing and nurturing. In the 1980s and 1990s, ecofeminism was harshly criticized by 
many feminist academics for being essentialist and for naturalizing women’s domestic 
roles. Merchant discusses this criticism in an essay written 25 years after the first pub-
lication of her book. As she explains it, ecofeminism was thought to imply that not 
only was it in women’s nature to nurture, but that it was women’s role to clean up the 
environmental mess made by men. Thus, women who came to the defense of nature 
as eco-feminists, were refueling their own oppression in the very same hierarchies that 
had identified men with culture and women with nature (Merchant, 2006).
More recent scholarship on ecofeminism, however, has explicitly rejected an es-
sential connection between women and nature, stressing instead that the oppression 
of women and the domination of nature are both results of patriarchy. Warren, for 
example, emphasizes that what unites all eco-feminists is not a belief in essentialism, 
but an agreement that there are important connections between the domination of 
women and the domination of nature. Integrated into modern Western culture is a 
value-loaded dualism, wherein whatever is historically associated with femininity (e.g. 
emotion, body, nature) is regarded as inferior to that which is associated with mas-
culinity (e.g. reason, mind, culture). This dualism has become part of an oppressive 
conceptual framework in which relationships of domination and subordination are 
justified and maintained (Warren, 1998).
For eco-feminists, one feature of addressing oppression is to dismantle the man-made 
rift created between humans and nature. For example, Ruether writes: 
We need to think of human consciousness not as separating us as a higher 
species from the rest of nature, but rather as a gift to enable us to learn how 
to harmonize our needs with the natural system around us, of which we are 
a dependent part. (Ruether, 1993, p. 396)
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Ruether envisions a world where mutual interdependency replaces the hierarchies 
of domination as the model of relationships between men and women, among human 
groups, and between humans and other beings. “All racist, sexist, classist, cultural, 
and anthropocentric assumptions of the superiority of whites over blacks, males over 
females, managers over workers, humans over animals and plants, must be discarded,” 
she claims (Ruether, 1993, p. 397).
There are, of course, a number of thinkers other than feminists who have drawn our 
attention to the need to take better care of the environment. Heininen (2013) gives an 
overview of the environmental awakening that started in the 1960s in the West and 
then became a global movement. This awakening eventually led to the “politicization” 
of environmental issues, making it difficult for policy makers to continue to ignore the 
environment in their decision making. According to Heininen, the global movement 
that emerged from this awakening was “…a moral protest against a new kind of mod-
ernized socio-economic development and the belief in progress based on economic 
growth and modernization.” (Heininen, 2013, p. 37).
Examples of important contributions to this environmental awakening are Silent 
Spring (Carson, 1962) and Limits to Growth (Meadows, Meadows, Randers, & Beh-
rens III, 1972), that was a report on the work done by the Club of Rome. In Silent 
Spring, Rachel Carson, drew attention to the dangers to the environment of man-made 
chemicals, particularly DDT. Written in a style easy for the public to comprehend, 
the book became highly influential in creating awareness about the vulnerability of 
nature to various types of human interventions. Limits to Growth, published ten years 
later, served as an important reminder of the ecological limits of the planet. Computer 
models were used to create future scenarios that could unfold, given the development 
of certain key variables, including world population, industrialization, pollution, food 
production, and resource depletion. The idea was to simulate the possible consequences 
of human interaction with nature.
Following this environmental awakening, the term “sustainable development” was 
born as a compromise; it was meant to decrease the tension between the competing 
interests of economic development and environmental protection. The concept was 
introduced in the report Our Common Future (World Commission on Environment 
and Development, 1987), and popularized in subsequent international meetings, such 
as the Rio Summit in 1992. There were high hopes that this new concept would help 
change our thinking about ways to manage the environment. Just like human security, 
however, the concept of sustainable development has been criticized as being ambiguous 
and slippery, allowing businesses and governments to articulate support for sustainable 
development without undertaking any fundamental change in their present course.
Hopwood, Mellor & O’Brian have mapped out the various approaches to sustain-
able development, dividing the different interpretations into those that support the 
status quo, whereby only minor adjustments may be needed to protect the environ-
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ment; those that call for the need to reform but maintain that this can be done within 
existing structures; and those that call for a more radical transformation. Those whose 
interpretations belong to the transformation group see the mounting environmental 
and social challenges as problems rooted in fundamental features of present-day soci-
ety and how humans relate with each other and the environment. Hooper et al. point 
to the deep divide between the supporters of the status quo approach and those who 
call for the need for transformation. Advocates of the status quo see change occurring 
through management of the existing structure of decision making, whereas transfor-
mation advocates understand change as taking place through political action inside 
and outside of existing structures. The sustainable development discourse at present, 
they argue, is dominated by the managerial outlook, which defends the status quo 
(Hopwood, Mellor, & O'Brian, 2005).
Ecofeminism clearly falls into the transformation group. Given the current struc-
ture of the international system, whereby states seek to enhance their own security at 
the expense of the natural environment, successful solutions to global environmental 
problems seem out of reach. Tickner argues that, although many new thinkers have 
realized the need for a fundamental restructure of the system in order to tackle emerging 
environmental challenges, few make similar references about the need to restructure 
the relationship between humans and nature. Ecofeminism offers this more radical 
view: that only by changing our relationship with nature can real ecological and human 
security be achieved. Or in her own words:
Only through the emergence of a system of values that simultaneously 
respects nature, women and a diversity of cultures – norms that have been 
missing from the historical practices of statecraft – can models that promise 
an ecologically security future be devised. (Tickner, 1992, p. 126)
In spite of existing literature on the linkages between gender and the environment, 
references to gender surfaced in climate change discourses only in recent years. Some 
of the first to pay attention to the relationship between gender and climate change 
were experts working for development organizations who noticed that climate change 
was affecting men and women in different ways in many developing countries, with 
women more often belonging to vulnerable groups. One example is Oxfam’s publi-
cation, Gender, Development and Climate Change, in which several authors discuss 
various linkages among those three fields (Masika, 2002). International organizations 
like FAO have also paid attention to these relationships (Lambrou & Pana, 2006), and 
more recently, emphasis on gender has been integrated into international negotiations 
within the UNFCCC (WEDO, 2013).
Although women’s vulnerability to climate change impact has been attracting 
most of the attention in discussions about gender and climate change in developing 
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countries, some research also points at the fact that women as a group tend to create 
a lighter carbon footprint6 than men do. In this case, the spotlight is on mitigation in 
industrialized countries, where different lifestyle choices and consumption patterns of 
men and women are examined, to estimate how different behavior contributes to emis-
sions. A Nordic report, summarizing existing research on gender and climate change, 
gives several examples of topics that have been explored under this theme. One is the 
different transportation patterns of men and women; men are more likely to use private 
cars whereas women are more likely to use public transport. Another involves eating 
habits; men usually eat more meat than women, contributing to emissions that derive 
from raising livestock. Women, however, play a key role in everyday consumption 
patterns, because they are often responsible for shopping for the entire family. Thus, 
some researchers have argued that as consumers, women have more power than men 
to push for reduction in emissions (Oldrup & Breengaard, 2009).
This early research on gender and climate change illustrates the ways in which 
women suffer more from the impact of climate change than men do and pollute 
less than men do. Arora-Jonsson draws attention to these two themes, claiming that 
women are painted as either vulnerable or virtuous in relation to the environment. 
She argues that this focus can draw attention away from inequality in decision mak-
ing, and generalizations about women’s vulnerability and virtuousness can lead to the 
expectation that women shoulder more responsibility without reaping corresponding 
rewards (Arora-Jonsson, 2011).
Arora-Jonsson argues for the need to direct attention to connections to the larger 
political economy and to the use of discourses that exacerbate and cause vulnerability 
and inequalities. She reminds us that marginality needs to be viewed through the power 
relations that produced vulnerability in the first place. She also stresses the importance 
of studying the role of gendered institutions to which men and women have to relate. 
In the few years since her article was published, a shift in focus can be detected, and 
several publications have emerged with a focus on the linkages among climate change, 
gender, and political discourses. One example is Alston & Whittenbury’s (2013) ed-
ited book, wherein various authors discuss gender and climate change from different 
viewpoints, including an exploration of climate discourses, how knowledge production 
can be gendered, and issues related to climate justice. Hyptaia, a Journal of Feminist 
Philosophy, also published a special issue on climate change in 2014, which included 
articles discussing more varied themes than the earlier writings on the topic (Cuomo 
& Tuana, 2014).
6 “Carbon footprint” is a term used to describe the level of greenhouse gas emissions for which a given 
actor is responsible. The more emissions that can be associated with our actions, the deeper our carbon 
footprint.
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Because this research relies on feminist concepts as analytical tools, an article 
exploring climate change through the lens of intersectionality is of special interest 
(Kaijser & Kronsell, 2013). In this article, the authors explore how intersectionality 
can be employed as an analytical framework for understanding complex dimensions 
of climate change. Intersectionality is a concept that emerged within feminist theory 
and through which researchers examine the interactions among gender, race, class, and 
other identities. As an analytical tool, the concept can help shed light on the ways in 
which structures of power emerge and interact. An intersectional analysis, according 
to Kaijser & Kronsell, goes beyond an identification of power patterns to an examina-
tion of the underlying social identities and how they are reinforced or challenged in 
the light of climate change.
Although intersectionality is not used as an analytical concept in this dissertation, 
it could serve as a useful tool in similar analyses – particularly where the communities 
under study are more diverse and heterogeneous than in Iceland, the site of the case 
study in this research.
This more recent scholarship on the linkages between gender and climate change 
directs us closer to the approach taken in this dissertation, whereby the attention is 
not so much on men and women in relation to climate change, but rather on how 
gender relations and associated power inequalities influence climate-related discourses. 
Climate-related discourses are discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, but first 
we turn to the fourth example in which feminist scholars have influenced a discipline 
by questioning the basic assumptions underlying theories: the discipline of philosophy, 
more specifically ethics and moral theories.
Ethics of Care
The ethics of care approach is relevant to this dissertation because it offers a moral 
theory that emphasizes the importance of relationships and recognizes emotions as 
an important and relevant element in moral decisions. Feminist philosophers have 
developed the ethics of care as an alternative to Kantian moral theory and utilitarian-
ism, the most dominant moral theories when feminism entered the scene in the late 
20th century. Their efforts were motivated by a desire to validate and make women’s 
experience more relevant when discussing moral questions.
Virginia Held (2006) explains how this approach challenges dominant theories. 
Kantian moral theory is concerned with rights and justice. It assumes all persons to be 
free, equal, and autonomous individuals who could agree to certain impartial, abstract, 
universal principles of justice. Utilitarian theories are more concerned with maximizing 
the utility of all persons than protecting individual rights, but just like Kantian theory, 
they rely on impartial, universal principles.
The ethics of care, Held suggests, differs from these theories in its assumptions, 
goals, and methods. A key feature of ethics of care is the view of persons as relational 
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and interdependent – as opposed to Kantian and utilitarian moral theories that focus 
primarily on the rational decisions of persons as independent and autonomous individu-
als. All human beings need care, at least in their early years, and often also later in life, 
due to either illness or old age. A moral theory that rests on the idea that humans are 
all independent, autonomous, and rational individuals overlooks the reality of human 
dependence and the type of moral decisions related to this dependency.
Held emphasizes a second characteristic of care ethics: It values emotions. In con-
trast to the dominant rationalist approaches, emotions such as sympathy, empathy, 
sensitivity, and responsiveness are seen as moral emotions that need to be cultivated 
as an important element when making moral decisions. This does not mean raw emo-
tions can be a guide to morality, because feelings need to be reflected upon (Held, 
2006). What is important to note is that the ethics of care does not deny the role of 
rational thinking in morality. Rather, what is emphasized is the notion that emotions 
and rational thinking can be complementary factors that both can contribute to moral 
theories and to good moral decisions.
The ethics of care approach demands not only equality for women; it calls for 
equal consideration for the experience that reveals the values, importance, and moral 
significance of caring. This approach addresses moral issues that arise in relationships 
between those who are unequal and dependent, not only within the household, but 
in wider society as well.
An implicit agenda of ethics of care is to shine light on feminine values, giving them 
space in moral theories. This also includes emphasizing the importance of caring and 
care work, and giving due recognition to the unpaid care work women around the 
world carry to a much greater extent than men do. In order to avoid falling into the 
trap of essentialism, however, it is vital that this approach be complemented with the 
awareness that the feminization of care work is socially constructed, and attention 
must be placed on the fair distribution of the burden of care work. Or, as Held says, 
“The ethics of care must thus also concern itself with the justice (or lack of it) of the 
ways the tasks of caring are distributed in society” (2006, p. 16).
The distribution of care work is also of great importance when the idea of care is 
extended to the environment. Fiona Robinson is a feminist scholar who has applied the 
ethics of care in her writings about international relations, including a book focusing 
on the ethics of care and human security. Just like Barnett (2001), she argues that envi-
ronmental security should be viewed as an integral part of human security and should 
include a recognition of the dependency of humans on the natural world. She does not 
propose an ethic of “caring for the environment”, but rather frames care ethics in this 
context as the moral responsibility to care for the environment because the health and 
flourishing of the environment is closely connected to the wellbeing of people. Or in 
her own words: “Our ability to care for each other depends fundamentally upon our 
ability to maintain a healthy environment” (Robinson, 2011, p. 144).
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Robinson discusses ecofeminism as an example of an approach whereby an ethic of 
care is applied to the environment, but agrees with those that are critical of this approach 
in the form in which it presents women as closer to nature than men are because of 
such biological traits as their reproductive roles. As discussed in the previous section, 
this approach also carries the danger that the main burden of care for the environ-
ment will be placed on women. In other words, the essentialist form of ecofeminism 
places disproportional duty on women to take care of the environment, based on the 
assumption that women are somehow more naturally inclined to do so than men are. 
Robison rejects this assumption, but asks if it would be possible to preserve the ethical 
ideas included in ecofeminism without endorsing the claims related to essentialism.
As discussed previously, more recent scholarship on ecofeminism explicitly rejects 
an essential connection between women and nature. Instead, the focus is on drawing 
out the parallels between the oppression of women and the domination of nature 
and demonstrating how both phenomena are products of patriarchy. In both cases, 
the value-loaded dualism so dominant in Western though is playing a role. Grounded 
in this perspective of social constructivism, ecofeminism offers some useful ideas 
that are relevant when expanding the ethics of care to take environmental issues into 
consideration.
Robinson argues for an ethic of care that recognizes that our relationships to the 
environment are crucial to our ability to perform life-sustaining tasks. “A healthy bio-
sphere is not just a background to security through care; it is inextricably intertwined 
with it,” she says (2011, p. 155). She reminds the reader how discourses of femininity 
and masculinity shape our understanding of the distribution of responsibilities for care 
and that awareness is needed to ensure that both men and women take their respon-
sibilities toward the environment seriously.
Neither Held nor Robinson discusses the role of emotions specifically in the 
context of care for the environment. As a moral theory, however, the ethics of care 
does recognize the relevance of emotions and how they can play a constructive role 
in moral decisions. This is one of the key reasons why the ethics of care is a relevant 
theory to discuss in the context of this dissertation, as one of the issues revealed by 
the interviews with policy shapers was that compassion and caring emotions for the 
environment can be an important driving force for environmental protection. This 
point is further discussed in Chapter 9, where the key motivations driving policy 
shapers are examined.
2.5  Climate-related Discourses
In this section, I consider the relationships between gender and climate-related dis-
courses, and how discourses can be viewed as feminine or masculine. I use the term 
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“climate-related discourses” to capture public discourses on topics in which climate 
change is at center stage and discourses in which economic development or security 
is at the forefront, but climate concerns are included as subthemes (or not included, 
yet the policy decisions produced by those public discourses can greatly affect either 
emissions or the capacity to adapt to climatic changes).
Examining public discourses is one approach to the study of power. Exploring how 
discourses enact, confirm, legitimate, reproduce, or challenge relations of power and 
dominance in society can provide valuable insights into the values and norms that guide 
policy making. Not every citizen has equal access to or control over public discourses. 
As Van Dijk notes, most ordinary people tend to be passive receivers of text or talk of 
their bosses, teachers, or public authorities who tell them what to believe or what to do. 
Members of more powerful social groups, however, have much easier access to public 
discourses and can influence and control certain types of public discourses, depending 
on their status. Professors control academic discourses, for example; journalists are in 
the best position to influence the discourse in media; and political leaders are in control 
of policy discourses (van Dijk, 2001).
In light of the various linkages between climate change and gender, discussed in 
the previous section, I am particularly interested in how dominant discourses consist-
ently frame the climate change issue as a scientific, gender-neutral problem. Sherilyn 
MacGregor addressed this topic in an article wherein she argues for the need for 
deeper gender analysis of climate change by examining the discursive constructions and 
categories that shape climate politics. She suggests that the study of gender relations 
should involve the analysis of power relations between men and women and social 
constructions of hegemonic masculinities and femininities that shape the way we 
interpret, debate, articulate, and respond to phenomena like war, economic crisis, and 
climate change (MacGregor, 2010). She asks the question: What are the implications 
of gendered assumptions about men and women for the climate debate? 
MacGregor identifies several discourses related to climate change that she catego-
rizes as masculine and feminine, based on the underlying values and associations with 
feminine or masculine characteristics. The two discourses she labels as masculine are 
the ecological modernization discourse and the discourse on environmental security. 
The ecological modernization discourse emphasizes how science and economics can 
work together for win-win solutions. This approach favors technological solutions 
and calls for the partnering of techno-innovators and brave capitalists. This discourse 
tends to be dominated by men, and the associated image is one of clever men solving 
complex problems. The environmental security discourse, according to MacGregor, 
is the other dominant discourse used to frame climate politics. This discourse stresses 
the danger of climate change resulting in conflicts over scarce resources between and 
within states, calling for militaristic approaches to address the consequences of climate 
change. By securitizing and militarizing the climate crisis, it becomes a problem re-
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quiring technical and military solutions, harmonizing directly with traditional ideas 
about hegemonic masculinity. Both the ecological modernization discourse and the 
environmental security discourse favor top-down approaches and the use of powerful 
institutions to implement policies. Both are mostly silent on the importance of coop-
eration, sustainable lifestyles, ethical consumption, and the precautionary principle as 
necessary elements of solutions to the climate crisis.
The two other discourses MacGregor identifies are closely linked to our ideas about 
femininity and come from the opposite direction, emphasizing bottom-up solutions 
whereby the importance of the behavior of individuals is highlighted. This includes 
the green duty discourse and the discourse on neo-Matlthusian population control. 
Whereas the masculine discourses focus on technical solutions, there are parallel femi-
nine discourses placing the responsibility on individuals as caretakers and consumers. 
Because women still bear the main burden of domestic activities within households, 
the call for individuals to tackle climate change by conserving energy, recycling waste 
and moving toward a low-carbon lifestyle is not gender neutral, but aimed at women 
more than at men (MacGregor, 2010).
MacGregor uses her analysis to demonstrate how the social constructions of mascu-
linity and femininity emerge and are reproduced through these dominant discourses 
on the different dimensions of climate change. These discourses continue to keep men 
and women in separate worlds. On one hand is the world of highly valued science, 
economics, and defense (the masculine world), and on the other hand is the world of 
devalued social reproduction and private domestic duty (the feminine world). One 
consequence, she argues, is that women are excluded from positions of leadership and 
citizenship, and given the choice of the much less attractive roles of victims, saviors, 
or culprits.
I borrow MacGregor’s categorization of masculine and feminine discourses when 
analyzing my own data in the following chapters. I use her model as a starting point 
for analyzing public climate discourses. Yet my analysis also reveals a weakness in her 
approach, given that her framework captures only discourses directly focused on cli-
mate, but overlook the important discourses that can be categorized as being climate 
related, even though climate change is not at the center of these discourse – discourses 
related to security and economic development, for example.
One interesting aspect of the broader climate-related discourses is the way dominant 
discourses on security and/or economic development are sometimes completely silent 
on the subject of climate change, even when discussing policies that will have a clear 
impact on greenhouse gas emissions or influence the capacity of the state to adapt to 
climate change. The silence about climate change is especially noticeable in dominant 
discourses about oil and gas developments in the Arctic, as discussed in some of the 
following chapters. Because MacGregor’s categorization captures only discourses di-
rectly related to climate policies, I rely on insights from Tickner and Nelson about the 
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masculine values underpinning our shared understanding of political and economic 
systems, to help explain the absence of climate considerations in those discourses.
2.6  Concluding Remarks
The goal of this chapter has been to summarize the existing knowledge base upon this 
dissertation builds. It starts with an explanation about what I am referring to when I 
talk about climate change and how climate change is associated with security and then 
moves on to discuss the key feminist concepts I use as analytical tools in the disserta-
tion. It also provides the theoretical framework used for discussion and analysis in the 
chapters that follow and demonstrates how feminism has entered and interacted with 
the various disciplinary fields associated with this topic – namely IR and security stud-
ies, economics, and environmental studies. Feminist contributions to moral theory in 
the form of ethics of care are also discussed.
As must be evident by now, using a feminist lens to approach my topic does not 
involve an analysis of the way in which climate change is influencing men and women 
differentially; nor does it focus on determining if men and women contribute to emis-
sions in different ways. Rather, my approach is to explore the role of values in policy 
making. The feminist lens refers to the concepts I use as analytical tools. Gender-related 
concepts developed within feminism are powerful analytical tools for exploring domi-
nant paradigms, unraveling inequalities, and illuminating underlying assumptions.
I use Tickner’s suggestion as a starting point; she claims that to create an ecologi-
cally secure future, we need a shift in values whereby there is more balance between 
masculine and feminine values. I am using those terms as labels for characteristics 
historically associated with either males or females, and one set of values has been 
prioritized over the other as superior within public domains. I emphasize, however, 
that as a social constructivist, I make no claim that only men can hold masculine values 
and only women can be advocates for feminine values. On the contrary, my view is 
that both masculinity and femininity are socially constructed concepts. By elevating 
feminine values so they receive equal space and respect in public decision making as 
the masculine values that have traditionally underpinned policy, we will be taking a 
crucial step toward dissolving the hierarchy that fuels both gender inequality and the 
tendency of humans to overexploit natural resources. Once such balance has been 
reached, categorizing values as masculine or feminine may become irrelevant, but until 
this is the case, the terms are useful to unveil biases created by the dominant paradigm, 
labeled by feminists as the patriarchal system.
I use the feminist concepts introduced in this chapter as a framework for analyzing 
the data I present in the following chapters, especially related to the case study about 
Iceland. The hope is that applying those concepts can provide a unique perspective on 
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the political, economic, and cultural obstacles that have hindered progress in reducing 
emissions and preventing dangerous human-induced climate change. I do not expect 
that this approach will answer all questions or solve the climate crisis once and for all, 
but I do firmly believe that it can provide some fresh prespectives on those pressing 
questions that could open up cracks for new approaches to be tested in our search for 
solutions.
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3. Methodology
This dissertation relies on qualitative research methods for both data collection and the 
interpretation and analysis of data. Unlike research in the positivist tradition, where 
the aim is to identify cause–effect relationships among variables, the main focus of 
interpretive qualitative research is on understanding events by discovering the mean-
ings human beings attribute to their behavior and the external world (Della Porta & 
Keating, 2008). Although feminist scholars use a variety of methods, most feminist 
scholars within the field of international relations, being mindful of the power of ideas 
in shaping reality, have rejected the positivist path and have instead situated themselves 
within theories of social constructivism (Tickner, 2006).
This chapter explains the methods I used to collect and analyze data for this study. 
Before discussing research design, data collection, and methods used to interpret and 
analyze information, I ponder questions related to my role as a researcher. This is in 
line with feminist ideas about standpoint and situated knowledge. In which context 
is the research conducted, and how is my own personal position as a researcher influ-
encing my work?
3.1  Feminist Standpoint and Situated Knowledge
Maintaining a value-neutral position has generally been considered a critical compo-
nent of scientific research in both natural sciences and social sciences. Researchers are 
expected to study the world as external investigators, removing themselves and their 
views and values from the equation. In research based on positivist theories, neutrality 
is a key ingredient. Feminist scholars and other researchers using critical theories have 
rejected the idea of neutrality, arguing that research can never really be completely 
value free. Or as Berg explains in his book on qualitative research methods: “The fact 
is research is seldom undertaken for a neutral reason. Furthermore, all humans resid-
ing in and among social groups are the product of those social groups. This means 
that various values, moral attitudes, and beliefs orient people in a particular manner” 
(Berg, 2009, p. 201).
Standpoint theory claims that all knowledge production is socially situated, and that 
we need to be aware of the starting point of a research project and how this starting 
point is influencing the knowledge being created. Sandra Harding (1996) points out 
that in societies with a structure shaped by politics of race, ethnicity, class, gender, and 
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sexuality, the activities of those at the top are more influential and visible. The activities 
and experiences of those at the margins tend to be ignored and not visible. She argues 
for the need to conduct research in which the starting point is different and explains 
how the activities of those at the bottom of social hierarchies can provide interesting 
starting points for research. The experience and lives of marginalized peoples have been 
devalued and their relevance in creating knowledge ignored, but their lives, from their 
own perspectives, can reveal important information about the ways in which marginal 
lives are shaped by the values and beliefs of those at the center, who are engaged in 
politics and decision making (Harding S. , 1996).
With the awareness that all knowledge is socially situated, I find it necessary to ar-
ticulate my own starting point and demonstrate how my personal situation may have 
influenced the research. This is also the reason I choose to stay present in the text, using 
freely the first singular “I” in my writing.
As explained in the introduction, I have engaged with the topic of climate change 
for the past 15 to 20 years, both through my studies and in my work. I have long been 
convinced that climate change is indeed taking place and these changes are – for the 
most part – driven by human activities. I consider it the responsibility of humans to 
modify their behavior and respect the ecological limits of the planet. I also believe that 
we in the West, historically responsible for the bulk of greenhouse gas emissions in 
the atmosphere, should take the lead in implementing progressive policies to address 
the climate changes. In my attempt to understand why we are not stepping up toward 
this responsibility, I chose to study climate-related discourses and policies in my own 
country, rather than examining policies in a place further away, where I would have more 
of an outsider’s view. This approach has benefits, but also creates certain difficulties. 
The benefits include me having followed and taken part in these discourses for a long 
time before I even began this research project. This meant I was already familiar with 
the discourses although I had not studied them in the context of the questions posed 
in this research. Being an insider also means that I have good access to information, 
understand the local language, and know where to look for data. The complicating 
factor is that I am studying processes that I have at times been involved in myself. 
As a civil servant in the Ministry for the Environment in 2002–2003, I worked on 
climate issues and attended one UNFCCC meeting as a representative for Iceland. 
In 2003–2004, I was the project manager for a climate project for the environmental 
NGO, Landvernd, the ultimate goal of which was to encourage the government to 
adapt and implement a more ambitious climate policy. I am a member of the Social 
Democrats, and although I have not been active in the party, I have at times expressed 
my opinions on issues related to climate change and oil and gas explorations in meetings 
organized by the party. I am known in policy circles in Iceland as a person with good 
knowledge of the politics of climate change and have taught courses on the subject at 
a university level for several years.
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Overall I think my experience strengthens the research, as this involvement has 
provided me with an enhanced understanding of the many dimensions of the topic 
and made it possible for me to explore the questions I am working with from a unique 
perspective. I did make a conscious decision, however, to withdraw from active partici-
pation in policy discussions about climate change, both within the Social Democrats 
and in public forums, after I started the research because I found it necessary to create 
some distance. In interviews with policy shapers, I tried to keep my opinions to myself 
and stay in the role of an active listener, but I am aware that some people I interviewed 
knew who I was beforehand and had some knowledge about my engagement with the 
topic in the past – an unavoidable situation in a small society like Iceland.
Although I was not studying marginalized lives, as Harding refers to in her discus-
sion about standpoint theory, I was looking for voices and perspectives that have been 
marginalized or silenced and trying to find out if it is possible to give those perspectives 
more space in public policy.
Although I chose not to be an active participant in policy dialogues on climate is-
sues during the time this dissertation was in making, I did give a number of lectures on 
climate change or climate-related topics, including the oil and gas issue, but those were 
all related to my research and given in that context. Most of them were at academic 
conferences, but some were in forums where politicians and policy makers were the 
main audience. I also gave three radio interviews during this time, in which I discussed 
different components of my research, and was interviewed once by one of the Icelandic 
newspapers with national distribution. Being ready to talk about my research, even 
though I was in the middle of it and not able to offer any final conclusions, was help-
ful in shaping and sharpening my thinking, and the feedback I received was useful, 
thought provoking and (most often) encouraging.
3.2  Research Design and Data Collection
Qualitative research methods refer to both the type of data gathered and how this 
data are analyzed and interpreted. Data collection methods for qualitative research 
include interviews, focus groups, ethnography, participatory approaches (including 
action research), and case studies. Qualitative research does not usually start with a 
set hypothesis, in which the aim is to collect data to test that hypothesis. The process 
tends to be more intuitive, deductive, and non-linear than the quantitative research 
process, conducted in the positivist fashion. Qualitative research can often take the 
researcher in unexpected directions. This does not mean qualitative research is without 
methodological rigor. On the contrary, good qualitative research should be rigorous and 
use systematic approaches (Berg, 2009). In this section, I discuss the main approaches 
I used when designing the research and collecting data.
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The Case Study Approach
Berg defines the case study as a method involving a systematic gathering of information 
about a particular person, social setting, event, or group. The researcher needs to gather 
enough information about the case in order to understand how the subject operates or 
functions (Berg, 2009). Data collection for case studies is usually extensive, drawing on 
multiple sources of information, such as interviews, documents, audiovisual material, 
and observation. Creswell (2006) describes a typical procedure for conducting a case 
study, which involves a detailed description of the case, history, and chronology of 
events. After this description, the researcher may focus on a few key issues or themes to 
assist in an understanding of the complexity of the case. The final phase draws conclu-
sions about the meaning of the case and provides lessons learned. Although a single 
case study using qualitative methods for data gathering and interpretation does not 
usually allow for generalizations or provide answers in the form of absolute truths, such 
in-depth analysis can provide useful and valuable insights into complex phenomena.
The unit of analysis in a case study can vary from single individuals to large corpo-
rations, or as in this research, the political unit of a sovereign state. Because the topic 
under study includes examination of public policies, one individual state is a logical 
unit of analysis. Even though climate policies are shaped and influenced by a num-
ber of non-state actors, the state is still a central actor in forming and implementing 
climate-related policies. I have already explained and justified in the introduction why 
Iceland is a relevant choice as a site to study with the research questions in mind, but 
the decision is also a practical one, relating to my location and background.
The key sources I used to for my case study comprise policy documents, interviews 
with policy shapers, and speeches of key politicians. I also relied on news accounts in 
the media and read through parliamentary discussions that related to climate policies, 
security, the Arctic, or oil and gas explorations. I have systematically listed in the bib-
liography all sources from which I drew specific information. My background knowl-
edge about the topic and the case study, however, is broader than the list of references. 
Given the length of time I have been engaged with this topic, it would be impossible 
to list all references that I have read over the years that have shaped my thinking. This 
broad knowledge base was, however, a great asset when I was summarizing and drawing 
conclusions from the data.
Policy Documents 
One of the key sources of information I relied upon for the case study were public policy 
documents, including government declarations, government policies, municipal policies, 
and declarations or legislations passed in the parliament. I used the policy documents 
as starting points for an overview of the various topics, but because the text in policy 
documents is generally the result of some political negotiations among those in power, 
those documents are also useful as indicators for the dominant discourse for a given time.
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Following is a list of the policy documents I reviewed for the case study, but they are 
also listed in the relevant chapters where those policies are discussed:
Government Declarations:
•	 Policy Declaration of the Government of the Independence Party and the 
Social Democratic Alliance (2007)
•	 Declaration of Cooperation of Government (2009)
•	 Policy Declaration of the Progressive Party and the Independence Party 
(2013)
Arctic Policy Documents:
•	 Iceland in the Arctic (2009)
•	 Arctic Strategy (2011)
•	 Iceland’s Interests in the Arctic; draft (2015)
Security Policy Documents:
•	 Risk Assessment for Iceland (2009)
•	 Report by a Committee about a National Security Strategy for Iceland 
(2014)
Climate Policy Documents:
•	 Iceland’s Fourth National Communication on Climate Change under the 
UNFCCC (2006)
•	 Climate Policy (2007)
•	 Report of the Scientific Committee on Climate Change (2008)
•	 Reykjavík Climate and Air Quality Policy (2009)
•	 Climate Action Plan (2010)
•	 Legislation About Climate Issues (2012)
•	 Iceland’s Sixth National Communication and First Biennial Report under 
the UNFCCC (2014)
I did read a number of other policy documents on issues either directly or indirectly 
related to climate change. For example, I scanned through the annual reports the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs introduces in parliament on key issues in foreign policy, 
to see if climate issues and Arctic affairs were on the agenda, and I also went through 
several policy documents related to gender equality. Even though I do not include 
those documents systematically in my analysis, they formed part of the background 
knowledge on which I relied.
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Interviews with Policy Shapers
Interviews are a common method used in qualitative research. I knew early on that I 
wanted to use interviews to try to tease out perspectives on climate policies that may 
not be evident in policy documents or mainstream political discussion. In the begin-
ning, I thought about interviewing people at the local level to find out how they viewed 
climate change and if they perceived it as a threat. This would have been in line with the 
approach taken by several feminist researchers in security studies who have emphasized 
the importance of viewing security through the lens of the everyday lives of common 
people (Wibben, 2011; Enloe, 1990; Hoogensen Gjørv, 2014).
In August 2009, I conducted interviews in a rural village in northeast Iceland 
for a research project on gender and mobility, unrelated to this one (Karlsdottir & 
Ingolfsdottir, 2011). I included two climate-related questions toward the end of the 
interviews, testing the ground for a dialogue on climate change. I quickly found that 
this was not an issue about which the people I interviewed had given much thought. 
Just like Norgaard (2011) found out in her research in Norway (see Section 4.2), the 
local people in this rural community found it difficult to connect climate change to 
their own lives. A few expressed some concern at the abstract level, but they did not 
perceive climate change as a threat in their everyday lives, and it was not an issue that 
was much on their minds.
I therefore turned to another group for my interviews, focusing on individuals who 
had already shown interest in climate change by participating in policy discussions in 
public forums. Although only some of them are directly involved in policy making as 
civil servants or as politicians, I refer to them as policy shapers because they all have 
tried to influence policy through their participation in policy dialogues about climate 
change.
My rationale was that those individuals had already recognized climate change as 
an important issue worthy of their attention, and they were therefore more likely to 
have thought enough about climate-related issues to be able to provide some in-depth 
answers to my questions. I used a targeted sample to choose the people to interview, 
meaning that the individuals had to fulfill a certain criteria in order to be eligible. The 
first criterion was that they had demonstrated, either through their work or participa-
tion in public discussion, that they were concerned about climate change. The second 
criterion was that they needed to belong to one of four groups: civil servants, politi-
cians, activists, and experts. Some of those interviewed had participated in forming 
climate policy directly, either as politicians or civil servants; others had had indirect 
influence through their role as activists or experts. Because they can all be considered 
to have taken part in shaping policy, they all fit the term “policy shaper” as I use it in 
this dissertation.
One of the elements I sought for in the interviews was to find out if the values ex-
pressed by the policy shapers could be labeled as more feminine than the values and 
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norms shaping the dominant climate-related discourses. My logic for expecting that the 
values of the policy shapers might deviate from the dominant discourse was that simply 
by identifying climate change as a topic worthy of attention (as opposed to focusing 
mainly on exploitation of resources for economic gains), those individuals would be 
more likely than others to hold views that emphasized the interdependence between 
humans and nature. To stay true to my belief that feminine and masculine values can be 
held by both males and females, I decided to target both men and women, and ended 
up interviewing a total of 18 individuals – 9 men and 9 women. Table 2 gives an over-
view of the policy shapers interviewed and the group to which group they belonged.
Table 2: Overview of interviews
A	total	of	18	interviews	were	conducted	with	9	females	and	9	males.	Some	of	them	were	
involved	in	policy,	mostly	at	the	local	level	(L),	some	at	the	national	level	(N),	some	at	the	
international	level	(I);	some	of	them	had	participated	in	shaping	policy	at	more	than	one	
level.	Similarly,	although	all	of	those	interviewed	belonged	to	one	of	the	four	targeted	
groups	(civil	servant,	politician,	activist,	or	expert)	some	of	them	played	more	than	one	role.	
A	lower-case	“x”	is	marked	in	the	relevant	column	if	they	had	played	a	different	role	earlier	in	
their career.
Overview of Interviews with Policy Shapers
Interviewees; age Civil Servant Politician Activist Expert
1	–	Male;	50+	 X	(L/N)
2	–	Female;	30+ X	(L)
3	–	Male;	50+ X	(N/I) x
4	–	Male;	40+ X	(N/I)
5	–	Female;	40+ X	(L/N)
6	–	Female;	50+ X 	 ( N / I ) x
7	–	Male;	30+ X X  ( N )
8	–	Female;	40+ X 	 ( N / I )
9	–	Male;	40+ X  ( N )
10	–	Male;	50+ X 	 ( N / I )
11	–	Female;	40+ X	(L/N)
12	–	Female;	30+ X  ( I ) X
13	–	Female;	50+ X 	 (N / I / L )
14	–	Male;	60+ X  ( N )
15	–	Male;	30+ X  ( N )
16	–	Female;	60+ X 	 ( L /N )
17	–	Male;	60+ X  ( N )
18	–	Female;	20+ X  ( N )
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As can be seen in Table 2, I do not reveal the names of those I interviewed, but iden-
tify them only by age, gender, and group. I made a conscious decision before I started 
the interview process that I would promise anonymity to those I talked to, meaning I 
would not reveal who I talked to and would refrain from using information from the 
interviews that could be traced back to specific individuals. I have tried to stay true to 
this promise by not using any names in my analysis and presenting the information in 
such a way that participants cannot be identified from the context.
Some of the policy shapers were surprised when I told them their names would not 
be revealed, and a few claimed they did not care if I used their names or not. Although 
the policy shapers did not all have formal access to power, they all had – in the name 
of their position or expertise – more opportunities to influence public discourses than 
the average citizen does. In this sense, the interviews can be considered elite interviews. 
Elites are usually not considered to be a particularly vulnerable group, but this does 
not make anonymity irrelevant. Blakeley (2013) explains how she decided not to 
reveal the identities of the elites she interviewed even though they spoke on record, 
because she recognized that the information could be sensitive for them, even if they 
were unaware of that possibility. In my own research, I often found that people were 
willing to share more than they otherwise would have knowing their names would not 
be revealed. Even some that in the beginning stated that they were willing to speak on 
record, shared information with me later that they said they would not have shared if 
I had not promised them anonymity.
All the interviews were conducted face to face, and I made a point of creating an 
atmosphere of both silence and privacy. Sometimes I met people in their office and 
sometimes in their homes, and sometimes I provided office space myself. Each interview 
lasted between 40 and 80 minutes, with most of them being a little under one hour. 
They were recorded and then transcribed. Once all 18 interviews were transcribed, 
they generated about 400 pages of data.
The interviews were conducted in Icelandic, but I have translated the direct quotes 
used in the analysis. The format of the interviews was semi-structured. I had a list of 
questions as guidelines (see Appendix I), and tried to at least touch on all of those 
questions in each interview, but I also allowed the conversation to flow and picked up 
on themes that emerged unexpectedly. Overall, the interview process was a pleasant 
one and with one or two exceptions, everyone contacted agreed to meet me.
President’s Speeches on Climate Change and the Arctic
Qualitative research often takes researchers in unexpected directions, and using the 
speeches of the Icelandic president as data, to complement information from policy 
documents and interviews, had not been part of my plan. I started reading his speeches 
to gain greater understanding about a specific question that emerged from my inter-
views, but after having spent a week reading through the speeches, I realized that they 
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told an important story and decided to include them in my data set when analyzing 
climate-related discourses in Iceland. The speeches not only provide a thorough over-
view of the views and values of a person in power, but also give several examples of how 
the dominant discourse of each time can limit even the powerful in how and when they 
express their views. Most of the interviews with policy shapers were conducted in 2012 
and 2013. The speeches of the president, however, span a much longer time period – a 
total of 15 years. The speeches not only complement the information gathered in the 
interviews but also add the dimension of time to the data.
The Icelandic president is a leading political figure in Iceland, and even though his 
direct political power is limited, his power to influence political discourses is consid-
erable. The speeches that I am using as part of my data were all given by the same pres-
ident, Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, who was elected to office in 1996 and was serving his 
fifth term at the time of this writing. President Grímsson was one of the first high-level 
politicians to discuss the danger of climate change, and he was also instrumental in 
placing Arctic issues on the agenda. His first speech in which climate change was a 
special topic was his New Year’s speech in 1998, and one of his first public speeches 
on the Arctic was given later that same year, at University of Lapland, Rovaniemi, Fin-
land. In the next 15 years, both climate change and the Arctic were recurrent themes 
in his speeches, and with time the two topics have become more intertwined. During 
the period 1998–2013, Grímsson gave close to 70 speeches on those topics, some in 
Iceland, but increasingly in later years in various international forums, where he is a 
sought-after lecturer.
As is the case with the policy documents, I list only those speeches that I cite directly 
in the bibliography. I did, however, read all of them for the period mentioned and 
use them collectively when I am drawing conclusions about the views the president 
expresses. All of the speeches are available on the website of the presidency7.
Just like my interviewees, Grímsson is a policy shaper, in the sense that he has ex-
pressed himself in public on a number of occasions, trying to influence climate policy. 
Because of his status as a prominent politician, his words can have more influence than 
the words of the other policy shapers may have, but he is still at times expressing views 
on climate change that have been more progressive than those of mainstream politics 
in Iceland during this period.
When I read through his speeches, the questions I had in mind were linked to the 
topics covered in the interviews with policy shapers. The key questions were:
• What are President Grímsson’s views on climate change?
• Does he perceive the changes as a threat, and if so, what type of threat?
• When discussing the Arctic, does he emphasize threats or opportunities?
7  See here: http://www.forseti.is/Raedurogkvedjur/Raedur2015/ 
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• What kind of solutions does he see to the climate crisis?
• Does he voice his opinion about the development of oil and gas resources
in the Arctic?
In addition to the president’s speeches, I also read a number of speeches by other 
key politicians, including speeches made in parliament, some of which I refer to in the 
analysis. But I did not systematically analyze those speeches in the same way as I did 
with the president’s speeches.
Viewed together, the policy documents, the interviews with the policy shapers, and 
the speeches of the Icelandic president, provide data that is rich in content and gave 
me the necessary material to work with in my case study.
3.3  Critical Discourse Analysis
Deciding the type of data to collect is important, but so is deciding on the methods 
to use when analyzing and interpreting those data. Because I am interested in the 
values and norms that shape policy, discourse analysis was a method that appealed to 
me. This method also makes sense for research that relies on theoretical approaches 
belonging to social constructivism, in which the attention is on the power of ideas 
and how norms emerge and are legitimatized. I use a method often labeled as Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA), which is a type of discourse analysis in which the focus is 
on how social power, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted 
by text and talk in the social and political context (van Dijk, 2001).
As van Dijk explains, the ideology and values of dominant groups in society are 
often integrated in laws, rules, norms, habits, and even general consensus. Thus the 
ideas of elite groups take the form of what Gramsci called “hegemony” (Gramsci, 
1971). Connell (1995) used Gramsci’s concept as the basis for developing the concept 
of “hegemonic masculinity” (see Section 2.3), used to explain how masculine values 
often underpin dominant ideologies.
There is often little awareness of how the dominant groups are exercising their power 
because their ideas become an integral part of actions so common in everyday life that 
they become taken for granted, even if they include discrimination or exploitation of 
certain groups (racism or gender discrimination, for example) (van Dijk, 2001). This 
is similar to what Fairclough (1989) refers to as “common-sense assumptions” in his 
book, Language and Power, in which he explains how language rests on common-sense 
assumptions and how power relations can be ideologically shaped by those assump-
tions. In this way, language can be used to dominate and oppress vulnerable groups. 
Fairclough also stresses that just as humans create discourses, so do they have the power 
to change what they have created. Part of social struggle is the struggle to challenge 
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dominant discourses. Those who hold power at a given time must reassert their power 
constantly, and those who do not hold power are always liable to make a bid for power 
(Fairclough, 1989).
Critical discourse analysis is a method that fits feminist analysis well, not only because 
of the focus on power relations, but also because, as a method, it rejects the possibility 
of a value-free science. Just like political discourses, scholarly discourses are also part 
of and influenced by social structure and produced in social interactions (van Dijk, 
2001). In fact, feminist scholars have been at the forefront of using critical discourse 
analysis in their research. This method can be useful in illuminating the complex, subtle 
ways that taken-for-granted gendered assumptions and hegemonic power relations are 
discursively produced, sustained, negotiated, and challenged in different contexts and 
communities. Or, as stated by Lazar (2007), the marriage of feminism with critical 
discourse analysis can produce a rich and powerful political critique for action.
When working with the data, I first read and reread the policy documents, the 
transcribed interviews, and the president’s speeches with specific questions in mind 
related to the formation of climate policy in Iceland. I had previously identified specific 
questions before reading the documents: if and how climate change was perceived as a 
threat and how the different actors in society should respond. I searched for informa-
tion about policies aimed at adaption and the types of policy measures that were being 
formulated and implemented with the aim of reducing emissions. The oil and gas issue 
emerged as a theme on its own through the interviews, but once I had identified this 
theme, I began to search systematically for information regarding views on the oil and 
gas explorations as well. As I was examining these themes, I simultaneously tried to 
detect the underlying values. I also approached the topic of values more directly, by ask-
ing all interviewees about their personal motivations in advocating for the importance 
of attending to climate change specifically and environmental issues more generally.
Once I had read and reread these data, I created memos on the different themes, 
using the interview data. I also wrote a ten-page narrative using discourse analysis to 
tease out themes, struggles and tensions, and historical junctures in the text of the 
president’s speeches. The memos and the narrative served as important material for 
the analysis I provide in the case study.
When writing the case study, I started each chapter by describing the context, and 
then summarized information from the data; I pulled out specific quotes to draw out 
tensions and struggles in the discourse. The case study comprises an introduction, fol-
lowed by three chapters, each focusing on one of the three main themes:
• Climate change as a security threat (Chapter 6)
• Domestic mitigation policies (Chapter 7)
• Discourses related to oil and gas explorations in the Dreki area (Chapter 8)
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In the conclusion of each chapter, I link the main discourses identified in the analysis 
to some of the concepts and theories discussed in the theoretical chapter, although the 
connection with theory is made more thoroughly in the final part.
In Part III of the dissertation, I take the analysis from those three chapters in the 
case study and provide a more holistic discourse analysis, integrating the three themes 
using the step-by-step process introduced by Jóhannesson (2010) to identify more 
systematically discursive themes, legitimating principles, historical junctures, and nor-
malization in the climate-related discourses identified in the case study. The concepts 
of power and silence also play a role. As Jóhannesson explains, patterns in the discourse 
create discursive themes. These patterns are legitimating principles that guide what is 
appropriate or safe to say at certain moments or in certain places.
When an alternative perspective is expressed, challenging the dominant discourse, 
it often involves pushing the boundaries of those legitimating principles to influence 
what is allowed to be said and what is being silenced. A historical juncture is a concept 
capturing what happens when there is interplay between historical events and political 
developments that change the dynamics of the discourse, and new ideas and practices 
gain more legitimacy. With time, these ideas are accepted as truth and are normalized 
through the power relations underlying the discourse ( Jóhannesson, 2010).
In Part III, I also make an effort to weave together insights from the case study with 
concepts and ideas introduced in the theoretical chapter in Part I and offer some les-
sons learned from the case study.
3.4  Concluding Remarks
As can be seen from the description in the previous sections, the research process was 
neither linear nor straightforward. There were plenty of surprises and unexpected 
discoveries, and I had to make decisions along the way about what to include and 
what to leave out. In some cases, I ended up dropping topics I had originally thought 
would play a large role in the analysis and including others that had not been part of 
my agenda. As can be seen from the list of questions in Appendix I, the last two ques-
tions focus on the relationship between gender and climate change. As the interviews 
progressed, I found that those questions did not necessarily provide fruitful answers, 
and I ended up placing less emphasis on them and keeping awareness of gender issues 
in the background rather than addressing them through direct questions. At the same 
time, the oil and gas issue emerged unexpectedly as a strong theme in the interviews, 
which eventually led to an entire chapter being dedicated to this topic.
In spite of the surprises along the way and the dynamic, non-linear process of the 
research, certain principles were used throughout the research to ensure academic 
rigor. I had a clear criterion in mind when deciding who to interview and which policy 
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documents to use. I was systematic in approaching those I asked for an interview, the 
type of information I provided them in advance, and how I conducted the interviews. 
The same applies to the way I used the methods I chose to rely on for analysis and 
interpretation of the data. With all this in mind, I feel confident that the research is 
carried out with the methodological discipline necessary to provide reliable results.
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4.  The Arctic: Is Climate Change a Threat?
Because climate change is a global issue, looking at the impact of climate change in Iceland 
in isolation from the rest of the world does not make much sense. Geographically, Iceland 
is located in the Arctic, which has been identified as one of the areas in the world most 
vulnerable to climate change. Framing the case study of Iceland into the larger context 
of the Arctic region, therefore, is both relevant and useful as a way to obtain a better 
sense of how climate change is impacting security in this part of the world.
This chapter addresses the question: How is climate change impacting security in 
the Arctic? In it, I examine the relationship between geopolitical concerns and local 
human security challenges related to the impact of climate change. Background infor-
mation on the Arctic is provided, Arctic regional security is discussed, and examples 
about local climate-related challenges are presented. As in other chapters, a feminist 
perspective and the roles that masculine and feminine values play in Arctic discourses 
are integrated into the analysis when relevant.
4.1  The Arctic Region
When discussing the Arctic, it is not always clear what geographical area is being 
referred to. Various methods have been used to define the geographical boundaries 
of the Arctic. In some cases, the Arctic refers to anything north of the Arctic Circle 
(66°N), but in most cases, when the region is being discussed in the context of politics 
or economic development, the area defined as the Arctic is broader.
Heininen and Southcott (2010) refer to the circumpolar north rather than the Arctic 
and define the region loosely as Alaska, Iceland, Greenland, the Faroe Islands, and the 
northern areas of Russia, Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Canada. The Arctic Human 
Development Report (AHDR) provides a similar, albeit more precise definition. In 
the AHDR, the Arctic encompasses all of Alaska; Canada North of 60°N, together 
with northern Quebec and Labrador; all of Greenland, the Faroe Islands, and Iceland; 
and the northernmost counties of Norway, Sweden, and Finland. In Russia, the areas 
included as part of the Arctic are Murmansk Oblast, the Nenets, Yamalo-Nenets, Taimyr 
and Chukotka autonomous okrugs, Vorkuta Citi in the Komi Republic, Norilsk and 
Igsrka in Krasnoyarsky Kray, and those parts of the Sakha Republic whose boundaries 
lie closest to the Arctic Circle (Young & Einarsson, 2004). When I refer to the Arctic, 
I am referring to the area defined in the AHDR.
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Figure 1: The Arctic Region
The	red	line	represents	the	area	belonging	to	the	Arctic	as	defined	by	the	AHDR	(Young	&	
Einarsson,	2004,	p.	18).	This	study	relies	on	the	same	definition	when	discussing	the	Arctic	
region.
Characteristics of the Arctic
The Arctic is a homeland to approximately 4 million people. People have been living 
in the region for thousands of years. According to the second Human Development 
Report, the overall population has remained roughly the same since 2000, although 
there have been regional variations (Heleniak, 2014)8. In the past, however, the Arctic 
8 The two Arctic Human Development Reports were published in 2004 and 2014. The first publication 
was a major effort in collecting and compiling aggregate information about the Arctic as a region. The 
second report builds on the first and expands upon many of the topics. Whenever possible, I rely on 
information in the second report for the most updated data, but in some cases this is not possible, and 
I refer to chapters in the first report.
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has often been presented as a pristine territory, waiting to be discovered. Arctic explor-
ers’ travelogues created an image of a cold, dangerous, distant, and mysterious region. 
Only the brave and heroic dared to travel there. The gendered aspect of discourses 
related to Arctic exploration in the 19th and 20th century is obvious. Not only were all 
the explorers men, but the image of the explorer was one of a warrior, whose goal was 
to conquer. In The Future History of the Arctic, Emmerson recalls a quote from a letter 
the famous explorer, Fridjof Nansen, wrote to journalist W. T. Stead: “True civilization 
will not have been reached until all nations see that it is nobler to conquer nature than 
to conquer each other” (Emmerson, 2011, p. 17). Whereas the image of the explorer 
is that of the masculine hero, the Arctic as a region is feminized. The Arctic environ-
ment is pristine, untouched, and almost virginal. It is to be “conquered” by the brave 
explorer, as demonstrated in Nansen’s quote.
Heininen and Southcott (2010) argue that since the 1970s, the notion of the Arctic 
as a frontier has been pushed aside and replaced with the notion of homeland: “The 
world outside this region has started to realize that people live here and that these 
people have aspirations to control their destiny in the same way that people in other 
regions have” (Heininen & Southcott, 2010, p. 1).
Yet, the external image of the Arctic as a frontier and untouched territory is still 
alive. During the 2nd Arctic Circle conference9 in Iceland, held in October 2014, 
Morgunblaðið, one of the largest newspapers in Iceland, published a special 50-page 
edition focusing on the Arctic. In flipping through the pages, one could easily conclude 
that the Arctic was only ice and snow, and most of the articles describe adventurous 
trips of white Western men exploring the region. There were no photos from local 
communities, hardly any discussion about indigenous groups, and no women were 
present. Heiðar Guðjónsson, an Icelandic economist and one of the investors in the 
emerging oil and gas sector in Iceland, wrote a five-page feature article in the edition 
titled: “Conquering the North” (Morgunblaðið, 2014). In other words, the masculine 
discourses about the Arctic are not merely a thing of the past; they are clearly notice-
able in present-day discourses.
Images of the Arctic are one thing, but describing actual geographical and social 
features is another. The Arctic spans a large area and conditions vary from place to 
place. There are, however, certain characteristics that merit the label of the Arctic as a 
unique geographical region. Some key elements include a cold climate, high latitudes 
with low levels of solar energy, limited biodiversity, and the existence of ice and snow. 
9 The Arctic Circle is an assembly held for the first time in Reykjavík, Iceland, in October 2013. The 
initiator of the Arctic Circle was Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, President of Iceland, 1996–2016. He envi-
sioned the event as becoming an annual international gathering of leaders from Arctic states: academics, 
politicians, environmentalists, business executives, representatives from indigenous groups, and other 
stakeholders in the region.
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These conditions have shaped the lives of people living in the Arctic region. Some of 
the key social elements shared by many Arctic communities include isolation, limited 
forms of agriculture, dependence on natural resource exploitation, and lack of diversi-
fied economy (Heininen & Southcott, 2010).
In addition to geographical features, there are certain population characteristics that 
make the various Arctic populations closely related to each other and different from those 
living in the more southern parts of their countries. Fertility rates tend to be higher in the 
Arctic than the southern parts and life expectancy lower. The region has been suffering 
from outflow in migration in recent decades, and this also contributes to an unusual age 
structure, with a relatively high proportion of population in the labor-force age group 
and younger, and a smaller portion in older age groups (Bogoyavlenskiy & Siggner, 2004).
Gender composition is another notable factor; the Arctic region has a higher male 
gender ratio than the rest of the world. This should come as no surprise, given the 
high reliance on resource extraction. The gender composition, however, differs greatly 
within the region. A new pattern has emerged, whereby females are increasingly seeking 
higher education. This has resulted in out-migration of women, first from smaller to 
larger settlements and then out of the Arctic, either to cities in the southern parts of 
Arctic states or abroad, in seek of employment that matches their skill levels (Heleniak, 
2014). At the other end of the spectrum is Russia, where male gender ratios in periphery 
regions in the Arctic have declined – not because of the out-migration of males, but 
because of their lower life expectancy. The lower life expectancies have been explained 
by Russia’s economic transition that disproportionally affected men, and the impact 
was even greater in the Arctic regions than in the rest of Russia (Heleniak, 2014).
The 4 million inhabitants of the Arctic are not evenly distributed around the region. 
The chapter about demographics in the first ADHR (Bogoyavlenskiy & Siggner, 2004) 
revealed that about half of the Arctic population resides in northern regions of Russia, 
the second largest group is in Alaska, followed by the Nordic countries. Canada, in 
spite of having almost as large geographical area located in the Arctic as Russia does, 
has only about 130,000 people living in its northern territories.
This distribution could be changing, however The 2nd ADHR, published in 2014, 
provides updated information on population trends, showing that in contrast to rapid 
global population growth, the population of the Arctic has declined slightly since 2000, pri-
marily because of the continued population decline in the Russian Arctic. Alaska, Iceland, 
and the Canadian Arctic, however, all grew faster than the global rate. (Heleniak, 2014).
Another key feature that makes the Arctic different from the rest of the world is the 
extremely sparse population, with vast uninhabited territories and relatively big settle-
ments. About two-thirds of the total population live in communities of 5,000 or more, 
but the pattern varies across countries and regions. In Arctic Russia, over 80 percent 
live in large communities, over 70 percent in Iceland, 60 percent in Alaska, and over 
half in northern Sweden. In Arctic Canada about 40 percent live in large settlements, 
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less than 40 percent in northern Norway and the Faroe Islands, and only one-third in 
Greenland (Bogoyavlenskiy & Siggner, 2004).
Part of the population of the Arctic is indigenous to the region, meaning that their 
ancestors have been living in the area for over a thousand years. In contrast, those 
considered non-indigenous are people with European background that migrated to 
the region much later, and remain closely connected to the societies south of them. 
Although indigenous populations account for less than 10 percent of the current 
population, the situation of these groups deserves special attention. They tend to rely 
more directly on natural resources than non-indigenous populations do, being engaged 
in traditional subsistence sectors, such as reindeer herding, fishing, or hunting, and are 
therefore especially vulnerable to climate changes.
Indigenous groups are as different as they are many and have diverse cultural back-
grounds. They do, however, share certain characteristics. In most cases, those groups 
were marginalized when the modern states were created. They speak a language that 
differs from that of the dominant group and have often experienced discrimination in 
both the political and legal system (Csonka & Schweitzer, 2004).
In summary, although Arctic external images often paint the region as untouched 
and isolated, the area is a homeland to over 4 million people. Although Arctic popula-
tions are diverse, certain commonalities can be identified across the region. Similarly, in 
spite of variations in the natural environment, certain common geographical features 
can be identified – features that have shaped the Arctic communities.
Governance in the Arctic
The Arctic is clearly a geographic region where the different areas share certain com-
mon features. But defining the Arctic as a political region is more problematic because, 
whereas eight sovereign states have territories within the region, only the most north-
ern areas of these states belong to the region. (The one exception is Iceland, which is 
located entirely within the Arctic.) These northern regions are at the mercy of national 
governments located in the southern part of their respective states, where the majority 
of the population lives. This not only makes it difficult to collect economic and demo-
graphic data specifically for the Arctic, but also complicates shared decision-making 
processes on issues that call for collective action – various environmental issues, for 
example, including climate change. This situation leaves us with the question of how 
an effective governance system10 can be built in the region without undermining the 
sovereignty of Arctic nations and the autonomy of indigenous groups.
10 The term “governance” is a concept with multiple and sometimes conflicting definitions. In this context, a 
useful and reliable definition is presented in the Arctic Yearbook published in 2015, in which governance and 
governing is the main theme. There, governance is defined as: “Numerous principles, objectives and mean-
ings that create the space in which actors will implement ideas, policies and institutions and/or institutional 
arrangements in a way to achieve collectively decided objectives” (Heininen, Exner-Pior, & Plouffe, 2015).
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In spite of these complicating factors, an active region building has taken place in 
the last twenty years, in which the Arctic has emerged as a distinct political region 
with its own unique governing system. Starting from the assumption that regions are 
socially constructed, Jegerova (2013) uses a theory of new regionalism to argue that 
the Arctic is a fairly well developed region. The individual Arctic regions have relatively 
strong social and political ties and strong incentives for cooperation. The notion of the 
Arctic as a political region, however, is a relatively recent phenomenon. During the 
Cold War, the area was highly affected by the political and military competition and 
arms race between the two superpowers: the United States and the Soviet Union. As 
the Cold War came to an end, cooperation among Arctic states and among Arctic civil 
society organizations increased. Since then, there have been some interesting and often 
innovating developments in the governance of the region, both at the local level, in the 
form of more self-government, and at the regional level, where international cooperation 
has increased. It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to give an in-depth analysis of 
this development, but two issues – devolution and cooperation – are discussed here.
First, devolution has occurred in many areas where power has been transferred to 
the subnational level and self-government increased, empowering communities to 
make decisions on their own affairs without the interference of external forces. McBeth 
(2010) discusses this development in a book chapter with a focus on political changes 
at the subnational level in seven Arctic states, (Iceland is excluded because it is one 
administrative unit and does not have sub-national governments.) He argues that in 
most Arctic states there has been a growth in new political structures that have had 
the effect of increasing the self-governing capabilities of people in northern communi-
ties. The editors of the Arctic Yearbook support this argument by proposing that Arctic 
governance is less hierarchical and more decentralized than conventional governance 
(Heininen, Exner-Pior, & Plouffe, 2015).
Second, increased regional cooperation has characterized the Arctic since the end of 
the Cold War, wherein representatives of states, civil society, the research community, 
and the private sector have been involved. Again, the approach at the regional level has 
been to avoid hierarchical discussions and decision making, and the focus has instead 
been on an inclusive approach, involving diverse stakeholders.
In 1991, the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) was created, eventu-
ally leading to the establishment of the Arctic Council. The Council was established as 
a high-level intergovernmental forum for promoting cooperation, coordination, and 
interaction among the Arctic states. Member states are Canada, Denmark (including 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, 
Sweden, and the United States. Membership in the Arctic Council is also open for 
civil society organizations of indigenous peoples in the region (Arctic Council, n.d.). 
The Arctic Council and associated working groups have been instrumental in creat-
ing a platform for cooperation, but as a soft-law body without a clear policy mandate, 
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and no permanent secretariat until recently11, its effectiveness as the key governance 
institution in the Arctic has been questioned.
This is, of course, the situation with international relations in general, because the 
international system is organized around sovereign states as the main actors. Although 
states have traditionally cooperated on a variety of issues, there is a certain reluctance 
to enter into legally binding agreements if such agreements compromise their sover-
eignty. Instead, the softer approach of a political arrangement without legal obligations 
is sometimes preferred. Abott and Snidal (2000) discuss the difference between hard 
and soft law in the international system, explaining that hard law generally refers to 
legally binding obligations that are precise and delegate authority for interpreting and 
implementing the law. Soft law, in contrast, does not impose the same level of bind-
ing obligations on states and is therefore often easier to achieve than hard legislation. 
Sometimes soft-law arrangements develop over time into more legally binding agree-
ments. This does not mean, however, that soft law cannot be valuable on its own. Soft 
law can create a forum for cooperation and helps to create new norms and discourses 
that can reshape international politics.
The Arctic Council was originally established as a soft-law instrument and is not 
based on a legally binding agreement between the Arctic states, but is a political dec-
laration, signed in Ottawa, Canada, in 1996 (Arctic Council, 1996). In recent years, 
however, steps have been taken to strengthen the Council. The signing of the Agree-
ment on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic in 
2011 is one sign of this development, but the signature marks the first time the Arctic 
States signed a legally binding agreement that was negotiated using the Arctic Council 
as a platform. The agreement was signed at the same ministerial meeting in Nuuk, 
Greenland, when agreement was reached to establish a permanent secretariat of the 
Arctic Council. Exner-Pirot (2012) argues that the meeting marked a move from a 
soft- to a hard-law approach to governing the Arctic region, and notes that the search 
and rescue agreement may be only the first of several legal instruments with the aim 
of regulating the Arctic Ocean. Other initiatives include the development of a manda-
tory Polar Code for ships that is being negotiated within the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) and an international instrument on Arctic marine oil pollution, 
preparedness, and response (Exner-Pirot, 2012).
In addition to the Arctic Council and specific Arctic-related agreements, there are 
international conventions, the rules of which apply in the Arctic, as elsewhere, even 
though those agreements are not specifically focused on the Arctic region. The most 
important one is the UN Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS), which provides 
11 In 2011, at the ministerial meeting in Nuuk, the member states agreed to establish a permanent secretariat 
of the Arctic Council to strenghten its capacity to respond to emerging challenges and opportunities of 
the region (Exner-Pirot, 2012). The secretariat is located in Tromsö, Norway.
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the legal basis for most issues relating to the oceans and continental shelves. The Con-
vention establishes the rights of coastal states to claim a 200-mile exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ), but it also gives the option to states to claim an even larger EEZ – up to 
350 nautical miles – if they can prove that their continental shelf extends that far into 
the sea (United Nations, 1982). This option is of particular relevance in the Arctic, 
because it may result in some overlapping claims.
Both globalization and environmental change, including climate change, are cre-
ating new challenges in the Arctic that are calling for a re-evaluation of the current 
governance structures. It remains to be seen if this will lead toward a governance system 
whereby binding agreements play a larger role, as argued by Exner-Pirot. What does 
seem clear already is that climate change has become entangled with questions related 
to geopolitics (and power politics) and is influencing security in the region. Concerns 
have been raised about the way climate change will impact both national security of 
Arctic states and human security at the local level. This topic is discussed further in 
the following section.
4.2  Security in the Arctic
Although the image of the Arctic as pristine territory waiting to be conquered by brave 
male explorers has been challenged in last few decades, masculine values continued 
to play an important role in the geopolitics of the region during World War II and 
the Cold War, when the Arctic had often served as a playing field for superpowers to 
demonstrate their military power. In recent times, however, the international relations 
in the region have been conducted in a more cooperative spirit, and increasing atten-
tion has been placed on human security at the local level.
Heininen (2010) identifies three stages of security in the Arctic in past decades. The first 
stage started during World War II, when the Arctic was militarized. During this period, 
open battle took place –bombings of the harbor of Kirkenes in Norway, for example, 
and the harbor and town of Murmansk in the Soviet Union. The struggle between states 
about sovereignty had reached these northern regions and military tension was high.
The second stage of security covers most of the Cold War, and Heininen identifies 
this stage as “military theatre”. During this period, political and military competition 
between the two superpowers – the USA and the Soviet Union – was a dominant 
factor, and the arms race was at its height. By the end of the Cold War, the Arctic was 
heavily militarized, the region was one of the most important platforms for nuclear 
weapons systems, and there was a strong sense of the enemy state being a threat to 
national security on both sides of the conflict.
Heininen’s third stage is the transition stage, indicating the shift toward demili-
tarization of the region after the Cold War. The transition was inspired by the 1987 
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Murmansk speech of Mikhail Gorvachev, then the President of the Soviet Union, and 
included not only demilitarization, but also an increase in civil cooperation in several 
fields such as economics, environmental protection, and science (Heininen, 2010). 
The establishment of the Arctic Council, discussed in the previous section, was an 
important component of this third stage.
Although masculine values of competition and control over territory can easily be 
linked to the two first stages of security, the transition phase introduces some new ele-
ments, indicating a possible shift in values. Heininen and Southcott’s (2010) argument 
that the Arctic is being viewed increasingly as homeland for indigenous peoples and 
as a platform for international and interregional cooperation supports the idea that a 
shift is taking place. This emerging vision not only challenges the myth of the Arctic 
as primarily frozen, extreme, and exotic, but also the view of the region as a military 
playing field.
But how do climate change and the melting of the Arctic ice influence this picture? 
Will the environmental changes threaten peace and stability of the region, leading to a 
race for resources and competition between and among states? Or will climate change 
provide added incentives for cooperation among states and other stakeholders, chang-
ing the third security stage identified by Heininen from a “transition” stage to a more 
long-term “transformation” stage?
The Impacts of Climate Change
Climate change in the Arctic not only influences nature, ecosystems, and communities 
in the region, but can have far-reaching consequences at a global scale. The melting of 
the Arctic ice cap will contribute to sea-level rise, ocean currents can be affected, and 
the thawing of tundra can lead to the release of large amounts of methane into the at-
mosphere (Arctic Council, 2004; Larsen, et al., 2014). The local and regional impacts 
will also be significant, and the increasingly rapid rate of climate change is already 
testing the resilience of Arctic communities in a number of ways and will continue to 
do so in the future. Severe coastal erosion is expected to increase the vulnerability of 
many coastal communities; thawing ground will disrupt transportation, buildings and 
other infrastructure; and indigenous communities will continue to face major economic 
and cultural impacts. Vegetation zones will shift and animal species will be affected.
On a more positive note, although many of the changes can threaten livelihoods and 
the wellbeing of northern communities, other changes may provide new economic op-
portunities. Reduced sea ice is likely to increase marine transport and access to resources. 
The three sectors most often discussed in this context are fishing, shipping, and the 
oil and gas sector. As for the first of the three – fishing – there is still great uncertainty 
about how climate change will impact fish stock and the management of fisheries in 
the Arctic. Some things, however, are more likely than others. Fish populations will 
move further north and certain fish stocks are likely to expand their range or alter their 
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migration patterns, which means that they will straddle the EEZs of numerous states. 
In some cases, stock abundance and productivity may increase ( Jeffers, 2010). The 
potential for increased shipping in the Arctic as the ice melts is another topic that has 
received considerable attention. New shipping routes, previously blocked by ice, may 
become an attractive alternative to current routes, saving shipping companies both 
time (due to shorter distances) and money (less fuel cost). The Northern Sea Route 
(NSR), north of Russia, is the most promising, but the North-West Passage, north 
of Canada, is also of great interest to the shipping sector, whereas the Transpolar Sea 
Route (TSR), directly across the North Pole, is a more distant option (Humpert & 
Raspotnik, 2012). Finally, warmer temperatures and the melting of the Arctic ice are 
expected to make previously inaccessible oil and gas resources attractive options for 
utilization. The often-cited US geological survey published in 2008 estimated that the 
Arctic could hold about 13 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves and up to 30 
percent of the world’s undiscovered gas reserves (U.S. Department of the Interior, 2008).
Even the potential positive economic impact of climate change in the Arctic, 
however, has been a cause of concern for many, who worry that this greater access to 
resources will turn into a “race for resources”. In fact, it is this tension between states 
about who has the right to resources in the Arctic that has grabbed a large share of 
the public attention when it comes to the relationships between climate change and 
security in the Arctic.
In an article published in Foreign Affairs, Borgerson (2008) argues that global 
climate change has given birth to a new scramble for territory and resources among 
Arctic powers. “Although the melting Arctic holds great promise, it also poses grave 
dangers. The combination of new shipping routes, trillions of dollars in possible oil and 
gas resources, and poorly defined picture of state ownership makes for a toxic brew,” 
he says (Borgerson, 2008, p. 73).
Borgerson’s concern has been echoed in numerous newspaper accounts in recent 
years (Pilkington, 2007; Rosenthal, 2012). Diplomats and officials of Arctic states 
have complained, however, about an overemphasis on the potential for conflict. The 
rhetoric of states is clearly one of cooperation. As described in the previous section on 
Arctic governance, international cooperation has increased over the past two decades, 
and a number of regional initiatives and forums have been created that have built a 
good foundation for peace and stability in the region. In a conference in 2010, Karen 
Elleman, the Danish minister for Nordic cooperation and the environment at the time, 
emphasized that when it came to the predicted rush for resources in the Arctic, there 
wasn’t very much to rush for. Around 97 percent of the resources to be found under 
the Arctic Ocean fall within states Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) according to 
UNCLOS, so there is not much left for other outside players. “In other words, there is 
not much left to disagree about,” she claimed. “The Arctic is not – and will not – be an 
area of conflict, no matter how much of the ice sheet should melt or how fast. All Arctic 
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states agree on a peaceful future for the Arctic.” (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2010, 
p. 14). A Russian official, Anton Vassiliev, expressed similar frustrations at the same 
conference over the emphasis the media has given to potential conflicts in the Arctic:
The predominant feature of state of affairs in the Arctic is low tension, grow-
ing cooperation and mutual trust among the regional states, who will not 
allow to “rock the boat” or impose on themselves non-existent or artificially 
overblown problems. (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2010, p. 32)
In spite of this emphasis on cooperation, some tension is lurking beneath the surface. 
For example, secret US embassy cables released by WikiLeaks in May 2011 quoted 
comments by Russian Ambassador Dmitriy Rogozin to NATO saying: “The 21st Cen-
tury will see a fight for resources and Russia should not be defeated in this fight.” Also 
released was the claim that the Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Moeller joked with 
the Americans, saying: “If you stay out, then the rest of us will have more to carve up 
in the Arctic” ( Jones & Watts, 2011).
The same kind of mixed messages can be detected when reading through the Arc-
tic strategies of the eight Arctic states. A comparative study of the strategies reveals 
that all states recognize the current stability and peacefulness of the region. Yet, state 
sovereignty is also emphasized as a major priority in many of the strategies (Bailes & 
Heininen, 2012). Also noteworthy is the fact that all states except Russia identify en-
vironmental protection and climate change as a priority or basic objective, yet all the 
Arctic strategies name exploitation of fossil fuels as one of the main economic activity 
and business opportunities in the Arctic region (Bailes & Heininen, 2012).
Keil (2014) expresses criticism that much of the discussion about potential resource 
conflict in the Arctic is speculative rather than empirically based. By looking system-
atically at the oil and gas interests of the five littoral Arctic states that have access to 
the Arctic Ocean (USA, Canada, Russia, Norway, and Denmark via Greenland), she 
finds that the potential for inter-state conflict is low. The USA and Canada are unlikely 
to join in a rush for Russia’s Arctic resources, given their own resource base, not only 
in their northern regions, but also in more southerly regions. Norway and Denmark 
both concentrate on their own resources, which are important for both economic and 
autonomy reasons. Should a conflict arise, she claims, it would be most likely to be 
related to the complicated business relationships between the Russian state and foreign 
oil and gas companies wanting to get a share of Russia’s vast hydrocarbon resources to 
satisfy European demand (Keil, 2014).
Even though the fisheries sector has received less media attention than the oil and 
gas industries have, when stories about the potential rush for resources are published, 
actual inter-state disputes may be more likely to appear in this sector. When migration 
patterns of fish stocks change, they may begin to straddle into new EEZs, disrupting 
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existing fisheries practices and creating confusion about which states have the right to 
exploit the resource. The mackerel dispute between the EU and Norway on one hand, 
and Iceland and the Faroe Islands on the other, is one example and has sometimes been 
labeled as the first climate-related fisheries conflict (Davies, 2010).
In summary, the increasing access to resources in the Arctic is likely to create some 
tensions among states, but this does not necessarily have to lead to open conflicts. On 
the contrary, cooperation is increasing, and the rhetoric of states indicates that this 
cooperation will deepen in the future.
Whereas the potential for tension over access to resources has frequently made head-
lines, other issues of concern related to human security challenges at the local level are 
receiving less attention, with the exception of some focus on indigenous communities. 
This means that little research has been conducted on the socio-economic impact of 
climate change on non-indigenous communities in the Arctic, and scant attention has 
generally been paid to the possible threats that climate change poses at the local level.
Global Concerns – Local Challenges
Climate change has generally been framed as a global issue. Nilson (2009) argues that 
this focus on the global character of the problem can delay a regional response and make 
policy makers less aware of the need for local adaptation. How an issue is framed, she 
explains, refers to the way we define a problem, its impact and potential solutions in 
ways that highlight certain aspects and downplay others. Framing is important because 
it molds and influences policy debates. Nilson uses the process of the Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment (ACIA) as a case study to demonstrate how moving the focus from 
the global to the regional brought new actors into climate knowledge production and 
policy, with an increased emphasis on the complexity of the social and cultural impacts 
of climate change among indigenous peoples (Nilson, 2009).
One consequence of framing climate change first and foremost as a global issue is 
that climate change becomes an abstract problem in people’s minds, and they find 
it difficult to relate it to their daily lives. Even in cases in which climate changes are 
having a direct impact on communities, those changes can become so entangled with 
other environmental factors or with local economic, political, and cultural issues, that 
the local people may not recognize the role of climate change. As a result, the local 
population may channel all its efforts into adapting to the changes, but put no pressure 
on policy makers to address the root causes of the changes, which would include more 
focus on reducing emissions.  
This is exactly what Noorgard (2011) found in her field research in a small commu-
nity in Norway. During the winter of 2000–2001, unusually warm weather occurred in 
the rural community where she was conducting her research. The winter was recorded 
as the second warmest in the past 130 years. As a result, the local ski area did not open 
until late December (and then only after investments in artificial snowmaking equip-
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ment), which had a measurable negative impact on the community. Also, the local 
lake did not freeze sufficiently to allow for ice fishing. Both local and national media 
related the unusual weather directly to climate change. Yet, residents did not respond 
by pressuring politicians to address root causes of climate change. In spite of being well 
informed and living in a democratic society, they did not write letters to the editor 
or pressure decision makers or take measures to cut down on the use of fossil fuels. 
Norgaard suggests this lack of response is due to a socially organized denial, whereby 
abstract knowledge of climate change exists among the population, but this knowledge 
is disconnected from political, social, and private life (Norgaard, 2011).
I found the same level of complexity when I started collecting information about 
climate policy nationally and at the local level in Iceland. As discussed in greater detail 
in the next chapter, the people I interviewed were knowledgable about climate change 
and concerned about the consequences, but generally did not view it as an issue that 
had any relevance to their daily lives.
Would framing climate change differently lead to different results? A feminist un-
derstanding of security often takes a bottom-up approach, starting from the everyday 
lives of ordinary people at the local level. Wibben (2011), for example, argues for a 
narrative approach to security by framing events in such a way that bottom-up narra-
tives are listened to and taken seriously. She takes as examples the stories of ordinary 
women about how they experienced the events of 11 September 2001 in New York 
and Washington DC, and how these events influenced their already-complicated lives. 
“The framing of events in a particular narrative always has implications for action,” she 
states, claiming that the framing decides what we hear and how we respond (Wibben, 
2011, p. 3). Hoogensen Gjørv (2014) suggests a similar approach in a book chapter 
in which she discusses the relevance of human security in the global North. By defin-
ing security from the bottom up, it becomes possible to dig deeper into the security 
perspective of communities, states, and regions, and security is articulated from the 
point of view of those who are most insecure or those who are often on the margins. 
With this approach, the individual experience is considered relevant, not just at the 
level of the individual, but also in the context of the community, the state, and the 
global order (Hoogensen Gjørv, 2014).
If we approach security from the bottom-up grassroots level, starting from the 
everyday lives of people at the community level, it could influence the stories we tell 
about climate change and how it is impacting security. In fact, our perception of climate 
change as a security threat could be quite different if viewed more as local issue relevant 
to the daily lives of ordinary people. An example from the past can help clarify how 
this process can work in practice.
The role that indigenous groups played in the international negotiations about 
Persistent Organic Pollutants (POPs) leading up to the signing of the Stockholm Con-
vention in 2001 provides an interesting example of how a global issue was reframed as 
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a local issue threatening the human security of Arctic Inuit communities. During the 
negotiations, Sheila Watt-Cloutier, representative of the Inuit Circumpolar Council 
(ICC), emerged as a forceful voice, telling stories about how chemicals released into 
the environment in more southern regions were poisoning the traditional food the 
Inuit people had enjoyed for centuries. She asked the negotiators and observers to 
imagine the emotions of her people – the shock, panic, rage, grief, and despair – as they 
discovered that the food that had nourished them and kept them whole physically and 
spiritually was now poisoning them ( Johnson N. , 2014). Her words were backed up 
by scientific findings; researchers had discovered that concentrations of contaminants 
were five to ten times higher in the breast milk of northern women than in the breast 
milk of women in the south, even though the northern locations were further from 
the industrial centers responsible for much of the pollution. Some of those chemicals 
travel through air currents to the Arctic and fall with snow into the tundra and into 
the ocean, where they are taken up by lichen, plants, and algae that are then consumed 
by many of the animals that Inuit like to eat and depend on for nutrition ( Johnson 
N. , 2014). To further emphasize her point, Watt-Cloutier presented the negotiators
with a gift, a carving of an Inuit mother breastfeeding her child. The gift was not only
accepted, but placed at the high table in front of the facilitators of the negotiations,
acting as a reminder of the ethical dimension of the negotiations and putting a human 
face on the otherwise somewhat technical problems under discussion.
Watt-Cloutier’s interventions in the negotiation process were in essence an act to 
carve out space for feminine values to be taken seriously. She did that by humanizing 
the issue and using the language of emotions to create empathy. Johnson, who has 
documented the process, summarized the role of the ICC with the following words: 
“Inuit knowledge was made visible and tangible in the negotiation process through 
personal narratives that encouraged empathy by way of shared feeling, as well as through 
the gift of an Inuit carving” ( Johnson N. , 2014, p. 163).
Although there have been some attempts to put a human face on climate change by 
sharing stories about the impact of changes on local communities, both in the Arctic 
and elsewhere12, the dominant discourse is still highly influenced by the framing of 
climate change as a global problem. Even in the Pacific Islands, often considered the 
most vulnerable of all regions in the world to climate change due to the risks associ-
ated with rising sea levels, the focus has been on top-down modeling approaches. This 
has included evaluating the impact rather than focusing on human security using a 
bottom-up approach in which the concerns and insights of people at the community 
level would be taken seriously (Barnett, 2010).
12 See, for example, a website on the Canadian Inuit perspectives on climate change (ITK, n.d.) and projects 
conducted by the international development agency CARE (CARE, n.d.).
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In the Arctic, the emphasis on the global nature of climate change, rather than 
highlighting the local dimension, manifests as an emphasis on adaptation; whereas 
the discussion about ways in which the states of the regions could collectively address 
root causes by reducing emissions (and pressuring other states to do so as well) is 
much less visible. In other words, climate change is something that is happening to the 
Arctic and the focus is on ways to adjust to the current and upcoming changes. This 
approach not only highlights protection against threats against national and human 
security; it also focuses on ways to take as much advantage as possible of the economic 
opportunities. The fact that utilizing the resources that now are likely to become 
more accessible – most notably the oil and gas resources – could further intensify the 
climate problem is only rarely mentioned and does not seem to lessen the interests of 
states to take full advantage of the oil and gas resources in the region. Man’s right to 
exploit nature is not questioned. On the contrary, the older images of the Arctic as a 
frontier have been revitalized, and once again the region has become a challenge for 
brave males to conquer. This time around, instead of discovering new land, the focus 
is on overcoming the obstacles of the harsh environmental conditions still present in 
the Arctic to conquer the resources that are now becoming more readily accessible. 
The earlier reference to the article written in an Icelandic newspaper by an oil investor, 
entitled “Conquering the North”, is one example of the revitalization of the frontier 
discourse (Morgunblaðið, 2014). Another can be found in Bergeson’s (2008) article, 
in which he uses the phrase “Go North – Young Man” as a subheading – as a metaphor 
to compare the Arctic to the Wild West – the North America frontier in earlier times, 
when young men were encouraged to “Go West” to conquer new lands.
Whereas the dominant discourse has focused in recent years on taking advantage 
of economic opportunities, alternative discourses can also be traced – discourses that 
focus more on ecological destruction due to climate change; the related human security 
threats at the local level; and the policy measures that would be necessary at the local, 
regional, and global level to reduce these insecurities.
These discourses do not appear out of thin air. They build on earlier environmental 
discourses that have influenced policy in the region and were instrumental in starting 
the process that eventually led to the establishment of the Arctic Council. Heininen 
(2011) claims that environmental concerns gained more attention in the Arctic in the 
1980s and links it to the environmental awakening that had already begun in the 1960s 
in the Western world (see Section 2.4). According to Heininen, indigenous groups 
and other non-state actors pushed Arctic states to place environmental issues on their 
agendas. The Arctic states reacted positively to this demand and started the so-called 
Rovaniemi Process for Arctic environmental protection, which later developed into 
the Arctic Council and associated working groups. From the beginning, environmental 
protection has been a core issue dealt with in these Arctic forums (Heininen, 2011). 
In other words, a discourse emphasizing the importance of environmental protection 
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has been present for some time in the Arctic, although the message about how to take 
advantage of economic opportunities has become more dominant in recent years, in 
association with climate change and the melting of the Arctic icecap.
The question remains, however, whether these counter discourses that warn against 
the dangers of climate change are loud enough to be heard and responded to by policy 
makers. Is the soil in the Arctic region fertile enough for some shift in values toward a 
more feminine way of viewing the relationship between humans and nature?
4.3  The Potential for a Value Shift?
In spite of the masculine themes evident in Arctic discourses, there is great potential 
for a counter discourse celebrating feminine values as an important contribution to 
the achievement of peaceful relations, economic justice, and environmental and hu-
man security.
Two factors deserve special attention as a source of optimism. First, in many in-
digenous cultures, the view of the relationship between humans and nature is quite 
different and more harmonious than the Western scientific rationalism dominant in 
Europe and North America. Listening to the voices of indigenous groups in the Arctic 
and giving their opinions some space can allow them to play an important role in in-
troducing an alternative perspective. Second, the Nordic countries, all of which belong 
to the Arctic, have been known as states that pay special attention to gender equality 
and social justice. Although the three other Arctic states (USA, Russia, and Canada) 
are larger and more powerful, the smaller Nordic states still have a seat at the table in 
the Arctic Council and have various ways of expressing their voice in Arctic forums.
Indigenous groups tend to emphasize the mutual relationship between humans and 
nature more than does the Western worldview, wherein the domination of humans over 
nature is a stronger theme. In an article about the ways in which indigenous groups in 
Alaska observe and respond to climate change, the authors emphasize the importance 
of recognizing and honoring the knowledge that indigenous perspectives can offer: 
“A western science emphasis on facts and an indigenous emphasis on relationships to 
spiritual and biophysical components indicate important but distinct contribution 
that each knowledge system can make” (Cochran, et al., 2013).
Cochran et al. argue that in spite of their keen awareness of climate change, in-
digenous groups in Alaska have not played a central role in national or international 
assessment of climate change. Yet, their perspective is vitally important. Indigenous 
groups recognize Earth as a coupled socio-biophysical system in which all things are 
connected. This view can provide an ethical framework that can guide our response to 
climate change (Cochran, et al., 2013). The same theme about the interconnectedness 
between human and nature can be seen in the message of Sheila Watt-Cloutier, who was 
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the leading indigenous voice in the POPs negotiations. Watt-Cloutier has continued her 
work as an environmental advocate, presenting examples of indigenous perspectives in 
climate change discourses. She has argued for the need to put a human face on climate 
change, framing it as a human-rights issue. In 2010, the Transformational Canadians 
program selected her as one of 25 transformational Canadians for her role as an Inuit 
activist. In an interview after her nomination, she described her approach: “The style 
of leadership that I have is one of bringing people together and understanding that 
we’re all one here. The planet and its people are one” (Rockel, 2010).
Indigenous female leaders like Patricia Cochran13 in Alaska and Sheila Watt-Cloutier 
in Canada have drawn attention to alternative perspectives on climate change, rooted 
in indigenous cultures but with a clear link to feminine values, such as the importance 
of relationships and the role of emotions in policy making. But what about the Nordic 
countries, which are known for their emphasis on gender equality? Has the emphasis 
on feminine values in Nordic cultures influenced climate policy in the Nordic states?
The Nordic countries are often referred to as states where gender equality and femi-
nine values have high priorities. This can be seen in welfare policies that emphasize 
childcare, maternal and paternal leaves, and the political participation of both women 
and men. The five Nordic countries usually place in the top rank in the Gender Gap 
Index, published annually by the World Economic Forum. This index benchmarks 
national gender gaps on economic, political, educational, and health-based criteria. 
In 2014, the five Nordic countries were placed in the first five seats. Sitting at the top 
of this list, for the 6th year in the row, was Iceland (World Economic Forum, 2014). 
One of the key factors that set the Nordic countries apart from the rest of the world 
is the political empowerment of women, indicating that women have more influence 
over public policy than do women in other regions.
The Nordic countries, along with the Netherlands, are also on the top of the list in 
Hofstede’s analysis of cultures that score high on characteristics that he labels as femi-
nine (Hofstede, 2011). The masculinity versus femininity index is one of six dimen-
sions14 Hofstede has used to analyze and compare the national cultures of 76 states. 
A masculine culture is likely to prefer competition and assertiveness over cooperation 
and caring for the weak. Gender roles are also likely to be more traditional in cultures 
that score high on the masculine dimension, whereas greater emphasis is placed on 
gender equality in the more feminine cultures (Hofstede, 2011).
13 Patricia Cochran, the lead author of the article cited about indigenous views on climate change in Alaska, 
is, like Watt-Cloutier, a former chair of the Inuit Circumpolar Council and served as the chair of the 
Indigenous People´s Global Summit on Climate Change.
14 The other five dimensions are: power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism versus collectivism, 
long-term versus short-term orientation, and indulgence versus restraint.
92 | Auður H Ingólfsdóttir: Climate Change and Security in the Arctic
Thus, the Nordic countries have shown leadership at the global level in eliminating 
gender equality and should be more open than many other states to feminine views, 
challenging the more dominant masculine worldview.
But does this have any influence on climate policy? The results of the Climate 
Change Performance Index indicate that there may be some relationship between an 
ambitious climate policy and the cooperative elements more noticeable in feminine 
cultures than those that score high on the masculine dimension. The index, which 
is published by the environmental NGOs German Watch and the Climate Action 
Network, uses standardized criteria to track the climate protection performance of 58 
countries that together are responsible for more than 90 percent of global energy-related 
emissions. In the most recent report, three out of the five Nordic countries are placed 
in the group of twelve states considered to have “good” climate policy; i.e. Denmark 
(4th place), Sweden (5th place) and Iceland (13th place). The first three places in the 
index are reserved for countries with a climate policy that can be considered “very 
good” and those spots remain empty because none of the countries being evaluated 
have an ambitious enough policy to be categorized in that way. Norway is ranked 27th, 
belonging to a group of states with moderate climate policies, but Finland’s number 
32 spot puts it in league with countries whose climate policy is considered “poor”. The 
three larger Arctic states are all below the Nordic countries on the list, with the USA 
in 44th place and also belonging to the group with “poor” policies, but Russia (56th 
place) and Canada (58th place) are close to the bottom, with “very poor” policies 
(Burch, Marten, & Bals, 2014).
Research by Magnusdottir & Kronsell (2015) illustrates, however, that although the 
Nordic countries have an image of being both climate- and gender-friendly, balanced 
gender representation in decision-making on climate policy does not automatically 
translate into gender-sensitive policies. These authors discovered that in spite of a 
relatively equal representation of men and women in institutions that shape climate 
policies in three Nordic states (Sweden, Norway, and Denmark), climate policies re-
main silent on gender. So although the Nordic countries can be considered successful 
in reducing greenhouse gas emissions according to their stated goals and although they 
have a fairly equal gender representation in institutions dealing with climate policy, 
awareness of the relationship between gender and climate is low. The authors of the 
study propose that one reason for this silence could be masculine norms and power, 
which are so deeply institutionalized in climate-relevant institutions that policy-makers, 
regardless of their gender, accept and adapt their views to fit these norms (Magnus-
dottir & Kronsell, 2015).
Values and beliefs are important in how we view the world. They are a key factor in 
how cultural norms emerge, and can be an influential factor in how public policy is 
shaped and implemented. Thus, exploring the values underlying discourse on climate 
change and security in the Artic is an important step in our search for solutions to 
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new security challenges associated with climate change. In Chapter 2 (State of the 
Art and Theory), an argument was presented claiming that dominant theories in 
international relations are based on a partial view of human nature that is stereotypi-
cally masculine. The current dominant discourse about the Arctic, emphasizing the 
inevitable exploitation of resources and the potential resource conflict is one example 
of how these masculine values can manifest. A worldview that is more inclusive of 
the feminine characteristics, paying attention to both the conflictual and cooperative 
elements of human nature, would broaden our policy options and be more likely to 
address the real security needs of people at the local level. Such a perspective gives 
hope for an international community that is more cooperative, capable of prioritizing 
long-term common benefits over short-term individual gains, and reshaping human 
interactions with nature away from a relationship of domination into one that bears 
the spirit of partnership.
In spite of the dominant Arctic discourse focusing on resource exploitation and 
competition between states, a counter discourse exists wherein more feminine values 
are in the forefront. Yet, it is not clear if those alternative voices are loud and powerful 
enough to influence policy and how Arctic states approach challenges related to climate 
change. A closer look at one Arctic state, where climate-related discourses are analyzed 
in more detail, could shed some light on this question. This will be the topic of Part II 
of this dissertation, where Iceland will be presented as a case study.
4.4  Concluding Remarks
In this chapter I have sought to answer the question: How is climate change impacting 
security in the Arctic? The discussion has included an examination of the relationship 
between geopolitical concerns at the international level and human security challenges 
at the local level. 
To answer the question about how climate change is impacting security, one must be 
clear about what is meant by “security”. In this dissertation, security is approached as a 
broad concept, encompassing not only traditional national security concerns, but also 
human security challenges at the local level. Although climate change may create some 
risks for the Arctic states that could threaten their national security and increase the 
likelihood of inter-state disputes, this danger has been overplayed in media accounts. Cur-
rently, the Arctic region is a relatively peaceful and stable region with good cooperation 
among the Arctic states, and there are no strong signs to indicate that this situation will 
change in the future. Although threats to national security may have been overplayed, 
the opposite is true with respect to the threats that climate change may pose to human 
security. The framing of climate change as a global problem tends to mask local conse-
quences and create the feeling that climate change is an abstract and distant problem.
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This point links us to the relationship between geopolitical concerns and local chal-
lenges. Because of the framing of climate change as a global issue, local consequences 
have often been overlooked. The picture is further complicated by the fact that the 
climate impact at the local level often gets entangled with other environmental issues 
or economic and political factors. There is a need for more stories from the grassroots 
level, helping us to understand the current and emerging local consequences of climate 
change in the communities most heavily affected. A feminist approach to security offers 
a more bottom-up approach to understanding security by drawing on narratives from 
the local level. Such an approach not only puts a human face on climate change in the 
Arctic, but helps us to understand the relationship between global climate change and 
the threats that those changes can pose to the daily lives of people in the Arctic region.
 
 
PART II: CASE STUDY – ICELAND
The second part of this dissertation presents the case study, where the research questions 
are examined by focusing on climate security, climate policy and climate discourses in 
one Arctic state, Iceland. The case study includes four chapters. The first one (Chapter 
5) sets the stage for the case study and gives some relevant background information 
about Iceland. Chapter 6 examines the climate impact and whether climate change 
is perceived as a threat in Iceland, whereas Chapter 7 is focused more on mitigation 
and the values that are guiding climate policy in addressing the root causes. Chapter 
8 focuses on one specific angle of the climate discussion in Iceland: the debate about 
whether Iceland should start its journey as an oil state by opening up for oil and gas 
exploration in the Dreki region northeast of the island. The oil and gas debate is relevant 
because it reveals the tension between different types of values and demonstrates how 
an open, democratic discussion can – over time – shift what is considered an accept-
able view and be instrumental in shaping the norms that influence policy makers in 
their decision making.
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5. Iceland as an Arctic State
This case study will focus on the way one state deals with climate change. It touches on 
all three questions that are at the heart of this dissertation. Is climate change perceived 
as a threat? What are the fundamental values underlying dominant climate-related 
discourses? How much room is there for alternative, feminine values in public dis-
courses related to climate change? It does so by in-depth examination of climate-related 
discourses in one Arctic state, Iceland. The discourse on the recent oil and gas develop-
ments in Iceland is given special consideration, with a focus on how this discourse is 
linked (or not linked) to climate change discourses.
Chapter 4 presents the argument that in the Arctic, climate change is generally 
perceived as a threat, although a somewhat distant and abstract threat at times. This 
case study will take a look at how this threat is being dealt with domestically in Iceland, 
both on the mitigation and adaptation side. What is being done and what is not being 
done? Which issues dominate in public discourses and which ones are marginalized 
or silenced? How is the discussion framed?
I rely on public policy documents, speeches of key political figures and material from 
interviews with policy shapers as my main sources when exploring those questions. At 
times I also refer to discussions that have taken place in the parliament, in the media, 
during a conference or in other public forums, although I have not systematically 
analyzed information from these sources.
As discussed earlier, Iceland is the only Arctic state that is located entirely within the 
Arctic region, as defined in the Arctic Human Development Report (Young & Einars-
son, 2004). Nevertheless, Arctic identity building is a relatively recent phenomenon 
in Iceland. Since gaining independence from Denmark in 1944, Icelandic authorities 
have emphasized the fact that Iceland is a Nordic country belonging to Europe. With 
respect to national security, the most important ties were with the USA and NATO. 
In recent years, however, the Arctic has been pushed higher on the political agenda in 
Iceland’s foreign policy. One of the first sign of this development can be traced to 1998, 
when the parliament established the Stefánsson Arctic Institute in the northern town 
of Akureyri. It bears the name of the Arctic explorer Vilhjálmur Stefánsson, who had 
Icelandic roots, and operates under the Icelandic Ministry for the Environment and 
Natural Resources. The Institute is meant to promote and facilitate Arctic research and 
has been involved in a number of Arctic initiatives, including acting as a secretariat 
for the two Arctic Human Development Reports (Stefanson Arctic Institute, n.d.). 
Iceland’s chairmanship in the Arctic Council in 2002–2004 also served to put Arctic 
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issues on the political agenda and shape Iceland’s identity as an Arctic state. As discussed 
later in the case study, the Icelandic president also took special interest in Arctic affairs 
and emphasized the importance of this region for Iceland in many of his speeches.
The added emphasis on Arctic identity became more noticeable during the time of 
the left wing government that was in power from 2009 to 2013, when the Parliament 
adopted a special Arctic strategy for the first time, but the emphasis on the Arctic has 
been even greater under the more right-wing government that came to power after the 
elections in 2013. The same cannot be said about awareness of climate change when 
there was a noticeable backlash with a change in governments in 2013.
Today it can be safely stated that Icelandic authorities consider Iceland to be an 
Arctic state, and Icelanders identify with living in the Arctic. What is unique about 
Iceland as an Arctic state, however, is that the entire country is categorized as belong-
ing to the Arctic region. The discussion about northern communities located in the 
Arctic region being marginalized and far away from their southern capital does not 
apply, therefore, because Reykjavik – the capital – also belongs to the Arctic region. 
Furthermore, Iceland is the only Arctic state that is not home to any indigenous groups. 
Nevertheless, Iceland shares a number of challenges with other Arctic states related to 
its location, and participates fully in Arctic regional cooperation as one of the eight 
Arctic states belonging to the Arctic Council.
Before digging into the analysis on discourses related the Arctic, security and climate 
change, a short discussion about the general political and economic landscape in Iceland 
is necessary. A special section on feminism and gender equality in the country follows. 
Together the two sections in this chapter give the necessary background information 
to put the chapters that follow, which focus specifically on climate-related discourses, 
into a wider context.
5.1  Political and Economic Landscape
Iceland is a small state. With a population of only 325,00015 (Statistics Iceland, 2015) 
Icelanders number less than the population of a medium-sized city in most other 
countries. Nevertheless, Iceland has been a well-functioning sovereign state since 
independence, with full control of its internal affairs and active participation in inter-
national relations.
Norwegian immigrants first settled Iceland in the 9th century. The Norwegian Vi-
kings brought slaves with them, adding Celtic to the gene pool. The settlers entered 
into a relationship with the Norwegian King in 1262, and in 1380 Norway’s rights 
passed to Denmark, which meant Iceland was under Danish control until 1944, when 
15  As of 1 January 2015 
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it gained full independence (Bailes & Cela, 2014). Because the ancestors of the mod-
ern-day Icelanders are mostly of Nordic and Celtic origin, Icelanders are generally not 
categorized as indigenous, in spite of the fact that no other groups lived in the country 
before it was settled by the Norwegians.
Since independence, Iceland has been a constitutional republic with a parliamentary 
government. Although the head of state is the president, who is directly elected by the 
public, the government exercises executive power. The legislative power is in the hands 
of the parliament (Althingi), with the president having a veto power, and judicial power 
is in the hands of district courts and the Supreme Court and is independent of both 
the executive and legislative branch (Government Offices of Iceland, N.d.).
According to the constitution, the president holds considerable power, but in reality 
presidential power has been limited, and the power of the president rests in the ability 
to be a voice of influence more than the ability to exercise direct power. Even though the 
president has the power to veto new legislation and refer the decision to a direct vote in 
general elections, for example, the first four presents never used this option. President 
Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, who was elected in 1996 and was serving his fifth term as a 
president when this dissertation was in making16, has gone against this tradition and 
used his veto power on three occasions17. Using veto power is only one of several ways 
President Grímsson has stretched the power of the presidency, and during his time 
in office the image of the Icelandic president has moved from a symbol of unification 
toward the idea that the president can act as an independent political actor.
The parliament comprises 63 members, and parliamentary elections take place every 
four years. Iceland has a multi-party system and the members of parliament usually 
come from 4 to 6 different parties. Historically, the Independence Party (Sjálfstæðisflok-
kurinn) has been the largest party, but the Progressive Party (Framsóknarflokkurinn), 
The Social Democratic Alliance (Samfylkingin) and the Left-Green (Vinstri græn) 
all have loyal followers. A number of other parties have been created, many having 
at least temporary success, although none of them have survived more than 2 or 3 
election periods.
Generally, the government has been formed with representatives from 2 to 3 par-
ties that have formed majority in the parliament. As with the other Nordic countries, 
Iceland can be categorized as a welfare state, although some scholars have argued that 
16 President Grímsson stepped down from office after his fifth term; a new president, Guðni Th. Jóhan-
nesson, was elected in June 2016 and took office in August the same year.
17 The first time President Grímsson used the veto power was when he refused to sign new legislation 
on ownership in media. The parliament withdrew the bill, and there was no referendum. The second 
time was in 2010, when he did not sign a bill on Iceland’s repayment of debts related to the ICESAVE 
accounts. The third time was in 2011, when another ICESAVE bill was passed in parliament. On these 
two occations, the public rejected the ICESAVE legislation in referendums that followed the veto of 
the president.
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in comparison to its neighbors it lags behind in progressive social policy. Jónsson 
(2001), for example, argues that for the greater part of the 20th century, the state was 
focused more on economic tasks than on social policy. Social issues played a subordi-
nate role in public policy, and the Icelandic welfare system has been less committed to 
social equality than the other Nordic countries have, resting instead on a policy that 
emphasizes market solutions and self-reliance. Jónsson suggests one explanation for 
this difference: the weakness of the Left in Icelandic politics compared to the Left in 
other Nordic countries and the dominance in government of the more right-leaning 
Independent party during the Post-World-War-II period ( Jónsson, 2001). Thus, when 
it comes to the role of the government to provide economic and social security, eco-
nomic security tends to be prioritized. The economy in Iceland is also unusual, in the 
sense that in spite of being an industrialized country with a high standard of living, it 
relies considerably on primary natural resources, including fishing, renewable energy 
sources and – increasingly – nature as an attraction for a rapidly growing tourism sector.
Fisheries have historically formed the backbone of the Icelandic economy, but in 
the past two decades aluminum production and tourism have become equally im-
portant sectors for foreign earnings. In 2010, the tourism sector provided 19 percent 
of total export of goods and services; 28 percent was from the aluminum sector, and 
marine products accounted for 26 percent (Statistics Iceland, 2015). Aluminum 
production in Iceland consists of aluminum from foreign-owned factories whose 
investors were drawn to Iceland for its low-cost hydropower and geothermal energy. 
Tourism also relies on the natural world, with nature consistently being rated as the 
greatest tourist attraction the country has to offer. In recent years there has been an 
explosion in the number of foreign visitors. In 1990, the total number of foreigners 
was about 140,000: the number was up to 300,000 visitors in 2000 and 800,000 in 
2013 (Icelandic Tourist Board, N.d.). In 2014, the total number of foreign visitors 
was close to 1,000,000 and the increase from 2013 to 2014 was 23.6 percent (Ice-
landic Tourism Board, 2015).
Iceland is a developed country whose citizens generally enjoy high standards of living. 
A serious backlash to economic development happened in 2008 when the Icelandic 
banks crashed as part of the global financial crisis, leading to an economic recession. 
For two years in a row economic growth was negative (-4.7 percent in 2009 and -3.6 
percent in 2010), but recovery has been faster than expected, partly because of the 
huge boom in the tourist sector. Since 2011, economic growth has been positive again, 
and the long-term impact of the crisis seem less than originally predicted (Statistics 
Iceland, n.d.).
In some ways, Iceland is a forward-looking society with progressive social policies, 
but in other aspects it holds on to the past, emphasizing traditional exploitation of 
natural resources and celebrating nationalism (the latter being one of the key reasons 
Iceland has chosen to stay outside the European Union).
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In terms of progressive social policies, gender equality is among the issues that allows 
Icelanders to proudly boast about some real success. This has not happened without 
a fight, however. Feminist movements have been active in Iceland for decades, and 
continue to stir up social debate on a regular basis.
5.2  Feminism and Gender Equality
On 24 October 1975, Icelandic women left their occupations and gathered on the 
streets of Reykjavík and in towns around the country. Up to 90 percent of Icelandic 
women took the day off. In Reykjavík alone 25,000 women met at Lækjartorg, the 
main square of the city, to bring attention to the role of women in society (Einarsdóttir 
Þ. , 2000). What made the event noteworthy was the exceptionally high participation, 
which, more than anything else, made the day a significant milestone in the battle for 
gender equality. According to Einarsdóttir (2000), the Icelandic women were able to 
demonstrate a united effort, and the power of this unity was seen by many as a threat 
to a stable society that rested on traditional gender roles.
Although developments related to gender equality in Iceland have been shaped by 
international trends, Icelanders have not merely followed ideas originated outside the 
country. At times, in fact, events in Iceland have served as an inspiration and an example 
for changes elsewhere. Women’s Day Off was one such event. Another noteworthy event 
occurred in 1980, when Vigdís Finnbogadóttir was elected as the fourth President of 
the Republic of Iceland – the first women in the world to be democratically elected 
Head of State (Centre for Gender Equality Iceland, 2012).
Because the topic of this thesis is focused on politics and climate-related public 
discourses, the role of women in politics is of special interest. As elsewhere, politics 
has traditionally been the domain of men, and only in the past few decades did the 
proportion of women in politics reach a two-digit number. An important milestone 
in this development was the establishment of the Women’s Alliance (Kvennalistinn) 
in 1983; its main objective was women’s liberation and the increased representation of 
women in politics. Before the existence of the Women’s Alliance, women comprised 
5 percent or less of parliamentarians, but after the elections in 1983, that figure rose 
to 15 percent (Centre for Gender Equality Iceland, 2012). The goal of the Women’s 
Alliance was to enter politics, not on the traditional right-left spectrum, but to bring 
the special experience of women to the table. This idea about women having a special 
experience related to the understanding that Icelandic society was infused with rules, 
norms and use of language, the underlying values of which were clearly masculine. The 
common experience of women was marginalized and silenced. The new party wanted 
to emphasize the experience of women and such feminine values as the importance of 
nurturing, intuition and holistic solutions (Einardóttir, 2004). Although the Women’s 
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Alliance had representatives in the parliament for only three election periods (1983, 
1987 and 1991) its influence on women’s representation in politics was considerable, 
not only because of their own members, but also because the existence of the Alliance 
encouraged other parties to pay more attention to gender equality and increase the 
representation of women in their own parties. The proportion of women in the parlia-
ment has continued to rise, and reached more than 40 percent for the first time in the 
2009 elections, when 42.9 percent of those elected were women. The corresponding 
number in the 2013 elections was 39.7 percent (Althingi, n.d.) . At the local level, 
the number of women in municipal councils reached close to 40 percent in elections 
held in 2010, and four years later the percentage was 44 percent (Centre for Gender 
Equality Iceland, 2014).
Not only is the political participation of women high compared to other countries, 
but Iceland also boasts the highest rate of women’s participation in the labor market 
among OECD countries: 77.6 percent (Centre for Gender Equality Iceland, 2012). 
One would expect – with such a high level of participation in both politics and the 
economy – that there would be few sectors where women had not left their mark. Yet, 
this is not the case. The labor market is highly gender segregated, with women being 
the majority employed in education, health care and certain service sectors and men 
still dominating the industrial sector. Women are still a minority in private-sector 
management positions. In 2009, only 19 percent of managers in the private sector 
were women and women represented only 13 percent of members on corporate boards 
(Centre for Gender Equality Iceland, 2012).
This strong gender segregation became quite obvious in the years leading up to the 
financial crisis that resulted in the crash of the Icelandic banks in the fall of 2008. 
Although more women than men were employed in the financial sector, they were 
primarily in the role of customer service officers, whereas men were much more likely 
to be experts and managers. A woman was a rare sight in the top management layers 
of the banks, and the financial sector was controlled by relatively small groups of ho-
mogenous males, whose actions were strongly colored by masculine values and ideas 
about hegemonic masculinity (Einarsdóttir & Pétursdóttir, 2010).
As Einarsdóttir and Pétursdóttir (2010) point out, the top executives of the Icelandic 
banks were often described as Vikings, and the discourse around the expanding bank-
ing activities abroad was loaded with masculine symbolism. Not only did the bankers 
themselves use this discourse, but key politicians did as well, and it became a generally 
accepted mainstream discourse in the years leading up to the crisis. The bankers were 
not only clever, but brave, quick to think and showing initiative. The discourse about 
the Icelandic bankers as “winners” was woven together with nationalism, and their 
nationality used as an explanation for their brilliance.
The crash of the financial sector was followed by a period of intense self-examination. 
This included some critical analysis of the dominant discourse. The gender imbalance 
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among top managers was one component often mention as a possible explanation for 
the reckless decision making that had occurred. The post-crash period also saw women 
taking leadership roles in the restructuring work, to rebuild the financial sector and 
to find ways to adapt society to a new reality. Women were put in charge of two of the 
three new banks that were established on the remains of the banks that had crashed, 
and for the first time in the history of Iceland, a woman became a prime minister. 
Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir assumed the position of prime minister in February 2009, and 
remained in that position until the spring of 2013.
The role of women in the aftermath of the financial crisis did not go unnoticed by 
the foreign media. As Janet Elise Johnson wrote in the US magazine The Nation: “After 
a testosterone-fueled boom and bust, the women of Iceland took charge” (2011). The 
quote is the subtitle of the article but the main title of the article is “The Most Feminist 
Place in the World”, referring to the fact that the Gender Gap Index has rated Iceland’s 
gender gap as the smallest in the world for several consecutive years.
There have also been words of caution about not over-glorifying the success of gender 
equality in Iceland. As Johnson, Einarsdottir and Petursdottir (2013) point out, in spite 
of Iceland’s high ranking in global equality indexes, gender equality is often missing in 
practice. They discuss the role of neoliberal political policies in Iceland in the 1990s 
and the first decade of the 21st century, which have been partly blamed for creating 
the conditions that led to the financial crisis, and give examples of how these policies 
contributed to gender inequality. The transnational business masculinity celebrated 
in the Icelandic banking sector before the crash was complemented by a reconstruc-
tion of femininity, with young Icelandic women being highly sexualized. Tourism, for 
example, was promoted with images of stunning Icelandic women ready and willing 
to “party” with visiting American and European men. Although the authors recognize 
the important role played by women in the aftermath of the crisis and the emphasis 
on gender-sensitive policies promoted by the left-wing government in power between 
2009 and 2013, they argue that the evidence is still mixed, and they caution against 
jumping too quickly to conclusions about a feminist success in the post-crash years 
( Johnson, Einarsdóttir, & Pétursdóttir, 2013).
Developments in the Icelandic financial sector in the years leading up to the crash 
demonstrate how gender inequality can exist in specific spheres of society, even in 
countries where the overall situation in gender equality is considered to be in good. 
It should be noted, however, that women did not wait until after the crash to try to 
have some influence in the financial sector. Among the few financial companies that 
did not lose massive amounts of money during the crash was a small investment fund 
established by two women who had purposely withdrawn from high-level management 
positions in the financial and corporate world because they felt that there was too little 
room for feminine values. Instead, they created a small investment fund called Auður 
Capital, in which the explicitly stated goal was to integrate feminine values into financial 
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services. Halla Tómasdóttir, one of the two women, explained how they managed this 
integration in a Ted Talk given in New York a couple of years after the financial crash. 
In her talk she emphasized four principles: Risk awareness (we don’t invest in things we 
don’t understand), straight talking (we use simple language that people understand), 
the valuing of emotional capital (people make or lose money, not excel sheets) and 
profits with principles (we care how profit is made) (Tómasdóttir, 2010).
In summary, even though feminism continues to be hotly debated, it stands strong 
in modern day Icelandic culture, and an emphasis on gender equality has reached 
most areas of Icelandic society. Even in the financial sector, where certain elements 
of masculinity were praised and highly valued during the boom years, the seeds of an 
alternative approach, embracing more feminine principles, had already been planted 
before the crash of 2008, and those seeds started to bear fruit in the period when new 
solutions were being searched for. In October 2011, six large companies established 
a new non-profit organization called Festa, Icelandic Center for Corporate Social 
Responsibility. Three years later the number of companies that were members of Festa 
had reached 49, including all three of the large banks, energy companies, aluminum 
production companies and insurance companies (Festa, n.d.). This development indi-
cates that principles of social responsibility are gaining ground in the private sector, and 
this could serve to counterbalance the still-present demands for quick and easy profits.
But does the influence of feminism reach even some of the most masculine sec-
tors of all – the security sector and the energy sector – organizations that are highly 
relevant when preventing and adapting to climate change? How much room is there 
for feminist values in those sectors and the associated climate-related discourses? Ex-
ploring this question is one of the tasks of this dissertation and an underlying theme 
in the analysis that follows. I begin by turning attention to the relationship between 
climate change and security.
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6. Is Climate Change a Threat to Security?
This chapter reviews public policy documents and draws upon information from 
interviews with policy shapers, to examine if and how climate change is perceived as a 
threat in Iceland. Speeches by the Icelandic president also serve as data.
Several policy documents have been published in Iceland in the past decade, in places 
where risks associated with climate change are discussed. This includes documents 
discussing Arctic issues, security issues and climate change more generally. References 
to the dangers of climate change have also become more common in more mainstream 
policy documents the main focus of which is foreign policy or economic development. 
President Grímsson, however, was one of the first high-level politicians in Iceland to 
warn about the dangers of climate change18. In his New Year’s speech on 1 January 
1998, shortly after the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, he highlighted the importance 
of paying attention to the risks associated with climate change:
The dialogue in Iceland about the risks of climate change, and the negotia-
tions in Kyoto, all too frequently forgot to mention what is at stake for us 
in Iceland – not in the form of exemptions from a new international agree-
ment, but rather in the threat posed to conditions for life in our country if 
mankind fails to adopt effective action.
…
Iceland’s geographical position and the key role of the Gulf Stream in our 
region mean that the impact of atmospheric change would be felt most se-
verely by us in Iceland and make our country almost uninhabitable for our 
children and their descendants (Grímsson, 1998).
The alarmist tone in the president’s speech is noteworthy, especially in light of the 
fact that the evening before, the prime minister at the time, Davíð Oddsson, had also 
discussed climate change, mainly from the point of view that it was important not to be 
scared by alarmist propaganda (Ingólfsdóttir, 2008). In other words, the president was 
emphasizing the risk of climate change at a time when other dominant political figures had 
18 Other politicians before President Grímsson had warned about the danger of climate change. Guðmundur 
Bjarnason, for example, Minister for the Environment when negotiations around the Kyoto Protocol 
took place in 1997, had published two news articles in the newspaper, Morgunblaðið, in the summer 
of 1997, in which he expressed his concerns about climate change. Bjarnason was quickly silenced by 
more powerful ministers in his own party (Ingólfsdóttir, 2008).
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not accepted the issue as a topic worthy of attention. It took several more years for refer-
ences to the risks associated to climate change to became commonly referred to in public 
documents, but since the publication of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (Arctic 
Council, 2004), the dangers of climate change have been discussed more frequently.
6.1  Iceland, Climate Change and the Arctic
As in the rest of the world, climate change is taking place in Iceland and impacting 
nature in various ways. The sixth national communication of Iceland to the UNFCCC 
summarizes some of the key impacts (Icelandic Ministry for the Environment and 
Natural Resources, 2014a).
The mean annual temperature has already risen by 1.2°C compared to the average 
1961–1990 temperatures. Glaciers are melting at a rapid rate, and past measurements 
indicate that precipitation will increase with warmer weather.
The climatic changes have already impacted agriculture. Barley production has in-
creased, for example, and new crops are now grown in the warmest periods. The high 
climate variability, however, is a cause for concern. One example is an untimely snow-
storm in September 2012 that caused thousands of sheep to be lost in North Iceland. 
Overall, however, the impact on agriculture is expected to be more positive than negative.
Projecting how climate change will influence the marine ecosystem is challenging. 
Most likely, both primary and secondary production will be enhanced in warm periods. 
Some changes in the distribution of commercial fish stocks have already been noted, 
and certain southern species (e.g. haddock, monkfish and mackerel) have moved 
further north. Of special concern is the rapid ocean acidification that has been meas-
ured in the Icelandic sea at 68°N. The impact of ocean acidification is still uncertain 
and requires further research (Icelandic Ministry for the Environment and Natural 
Resources, 2014a).
More recent research indicates that the melting of glaciers could also lead to more 
frequent volcanic eruptions. As the glaciers melt, the pressure on the underlying rocks 
decreases, causing more eruptions (Kluger, 2015).
A glimpse into key policy documents can help shed light on the way changes to the 
natural environment could influence the economy and Icelandic society and help ad-
dress the question of whether present and projected climate impacts are perceived as 
a threat to security. Some of the most relevant policy documents in this context are:
•	 Iceland in the Arctic (2009)
•	 Arctic Strategy (2011)
•	 Iceland’s Interests in the Arctic; draft (2015)
•	 Policy Declaration of the Independent Party and Progressive Party (2013)
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• Risk Assessment for Iceland (2009)
• Report by a Committee about a National Security Strategy for Iceland
(2014)
• Report of the Scientific Committee on Climate Change 2008)
In 2009 the Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs published a report entitled Iceland 
in the Arctic, and in 2011 the parliament adopted a special Arctic strategy for the first 
time. When those documents are reviewed, it becomes clear that security concerns 
related to climate change are an important factor for this added emphasis on Iceland’s 
foreign policy regarding the Arctic.
Environmental security is a major focus in Iceland in the Arctic. The report states 
that the risk of armed conflict between states in the region is not high. Thus, key secu-
rity threats in the region are not so much about inter-state conflicts as they are about 
environmental changes, like the increasing danger of oil spills due to increased ship-
ping traffic in the area and the risk of accidents due to utilization of natural resources 
that were not previously accessible. The report concludes that Arctic security will be 
ensured only with close cooperation of the relevant states, focusing on environmental 
security and creating trust and cooperative atmosphere among all players (Icelandic 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2009a). The same kind of emphasis on a broad security 
concept can be found in the Arctic strategy adopted by Althingi, the Icelandic parlia-
ment, in March 2011 (Althingi, 2011). The strategy states that Iceland should protect 
its security interests in the high north. The focus should be on the security of citizens, 
and militarization of the region should be opposed. The importance of contributing 
to the mitigation of climate change in the region and adaptation to the change already 
taking place is highlighted as important in order to secure the general wellbeing of 
inhabitants and communities in the north.
The Arctic strategy received support from all political parties, and there was a general 
consensus about its content in the parliament. The emphasis on Arctic affairs continued 
with the new government that came into power in 2013, but concern about security 
risks related to climate change has taken the backseat to the economic opportunities 
that climate change might bring to the Arctic region. Or as it says in the governmental 
agreement between the two parties in power: “The government will aim for Iceland to be 
a leading power in Arctic affairs and an active participant in West-Nordic cooperation. 
Preparations to utilize opportunities that will be created with the opening of shipping 
routes will begin and an effort put into drawing shipping related projects to Iceland”19 
19  My translation. The original Icelandic text reads: “Ríkisstjórnin mun vinna að því að Ísland verði leiðandi 
afl á norðurslóðum og virkur þátttakandi í vestnorrænu starfi. Undirbúningur verður hafinn að nýtingu 
tækifæra sem skapast með opnun siglingaleiða um norðurslóðir og áhersla lögð á að verkefni þeim tengd 
verði vistuð hérlendis.”
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(Prime Minister´s Office, 2013). Although climate change is mentioned as an issue 
elsewhere in the document, mainly to emphasize the importance of renewable energy 
and forestation projects, it is not referred to as a threat or security risk in the document.
A bit more balanced approach to threats and opportunities appears in a more recent 
policy document under the same government, revealed in draft form on the website 
of the Prime Minister’s Office (Minister Committee on Arctic Affairs, 2015). The 
starting point in the report is that Iceland has increasingly important interests in the 
Arctic region, not only because of the potential of new economic opportunities, but 
also because of the danger climate change poses to the vulnerable Arctic environment. 
The draft report points to increasing military tension in the region due to Russia’s ag-
gression in Ukraine and recognizes a dwindling interest among investors to explore for 
oil and gas in the Arctic region, at least in the short term, due to lower prices. There 
is a special chapter on climate change, emphasizing concerns related to the melting 
of the tundra and how melting of the Arctic ice cap can accelerate warming. Ocean 
acidification is given more attention than in previous reports and compared to other 
reports, in which the main focus is on Iceland’s interest in the Arctic, there is greater 
emphasis on the importance of reducing emissions to limit the impact of climate change 
(Minister Committee on Arctic Affairs, 2015).
It is not only in the Arctic context, however, that climate change has been discussed 
as a security issue in Icelandic policy documents. Climate change found its way into 
Iceland’s general security policy around the same time the issue was being securitized 
in international forums (see Section 2.2).
The geopolitical status of Iceland changed drastically after the Cold War. Shortly after 
gaining independence, the US army established a NATO base in Keflavík. The base was 
the corner stone of Iceland’s defense system for the next 55 years, but on 30 September 
2006 the base was closed, and the last US soldiers left Iceland (Ingimundarson, 2008). 
For the first time in history, the prime responsibility for forming a national security 
policy for Iceland rested on the shoulders of Icelanders themselves. In 2009, the Ice-
landic Ministry for Foreign Affairs published a risk assessment for Iceland, written by 
a team of experts, in which global, societal and military threats were analyzed (2009b). 
Climate change was one of the factors identified as a threat to Iceland’s security in the 
assessment. The experts noted that climate change will increase the danger of natural 
disasters and that the Civil Protection Department needs to take this factor into con-
sideration in the future. The report concludes that there are no indications of a military 
threat to Iceland in the near future and that the focus should rather be on societal or 
civil security. This approach is more in line with the human security agenda than the 
traditional security approach, in which military threats tend to be at the forefront.
Taking a more long-term perspective, however, the experts pointed out that tension 
may grow in the Arctic due to the future importance of the region and the potential for 
conflicts about access to resources. In this respect, according to the experts, increased 
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militarization of the region would go against Icelandic interests, but they also stress 
that there are no current indications that the Arctic will be a site for military conflict 
in the foreseeable future (Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2009b).
In early 2012, the foreign minister, at the request of the parliament, appointed a 
committee whose role was to come up with suggestions for a national security policy 
for Iceland. The committee members were members of parliament and came from all 
the political parties with parliamentary representatives during the 2009–2013 term. 
The committee published its final report in March 2014. Just like the experts who wrote 
the risk assessment report, the committee members emphasized the importance of ap-
proaching national security from a broad perspective, highlighting not only traditional 
military threats, but also a number of other threats associated with environmental 
security, cyber security, terrorism and financial and economic security.
Climate change and the increasing importance of the Arctic is the first point 
highlighted in the report, as an example of how the security environment of today is 
changing. The more frequent intense weather events are mentioned as a threat, as are 
the potential natural disasters associated with these events. The committee reminds 
the reader how dependent Icelanders are on the resources of the land and sea for their 
livelihoods and emphasize how increased shipping and increased utilization of resources 
in the Arctic would not only create new economic opportunities for Iceland, but also 
present a direct security threat because of the country’s vulnerability to environmental 
disasters such as oil spills or other types of pollution (Commitee for Formation of 
National Security Policy for Iceland, 2014). The report does not ignore threats related 
to military security, but as in other recent policy documents, the main emphasis is 
on the broader understanding of security, emphasizing human security rather than 
traditional military security.
Given the focus on human security in policy documents, one would expect that 
public documents on climate-change policy would provide an elaborate analysis of the 
potential socio-economic impact of climate change and how they could threaten the 
security and wellbeing of people living in the country. Yet, this is not the case. On the 
contrary, most of the research on climate change has been focused on either the impact 
on the natural environment or mitigation measures. The potential impact of climate 
change on humans have received much less attention. The national communications 
Iceland regularly turns in to the UNFCCC have taken special notice of the lack of 
research available in this area. For example, Iceland’s Sixth National Communication 
on Climate Change states:
Most of the climate-related research in Iceland is focused on climate pro-
cesses and climate system studies and impacts of climate change. Other ef-
forts involve modeling and prediction, and large ongoing projects deal with 
mitigation measures, but there has been less research on socio-economic 
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analysis. (Icelandic Ministry for the Environment and Natural Resources, 
2014a, p. 150)
This lack of information on the socio-economic impact of climate change is also 
noticeable in a report by the Scientific Committee on Climate Change, published by 
the same ministry a few years earlier (Björnsson, et al., 2008). The composition of the 
committee writing the report is the first indicator of an imbalance between natural 
sciences and social sciences. In a group of ten, there are experts on meteorology, biol-
ogy, forestry, geology and engineering. Not a single social scientist was appointed to 
the committee. In spite of this, the report does cover socio-economic impact, related 
to both predicted changes in natural disasters and the impacts on such sectors as agri-
culture, forestry, fisheries, transportation and energy production. There is also discus-
sion about the potential health effects of climate change and a chapter on the need to 
account for rising sea levels when designing harbors and other coastal constructions. In 
many cases, however, the analysis is relatively shallow and does not seem to have much 
research to build upon. This is particularly true in creating a link between potential 
environmental changes and how these changes will influence people and communities. 
The report states, for example, that climate change will likely have a positive impact 
on agriculture, due to higher temperatures and longer growing seasons. But what 
does this mean for farmers in Iceland? Will it improve their economic situation? Are 
those changes likely to create more jobs in the agricultural sector? If climate change 
influences which areas are best suited for farming and growing crops, will changes in 
settlement patterns follow?
A bit more sophisticated analysis is provided for the fisheries sector, one of Iceland’s 
key export sectors. Three scenarios are introduced: 1) an optimist assumption that 
fish stocks will increase by 20 percent in the next 50 years; 2) a pessimistic assump-
tion that fish stocks will slowly decrease by 10 percent in the next 50 years; and 3) an 
even more pessimistic assumption that fish stocks will soon collapse or decrease by 25 
percent within five years. The most likely development was seen to be a slow increase 
in fish stocks (Scenario 1), but it was not considered that this possibility would have 
substantial long-term effects on Gross Domestic Production (GDP). A sharp decline 
(Scenario 3) could have substantial negative effects on GDP and economic growth 
in the short term, but such changes would not lead to more long-term changes than 
would a slow decrease in fish stocks over a longer period. A final conclusion is that ef-
fective fisheries’ management is likely to be more important for the fisheries sector than 
is the potential impact of climate change (Björnsson, et al., 2008). Although overall 
impact was not found to be a great threat to the long-term economic growth of the 
country, analysis is missing on how potential changes could impact fishing communi-
ties around the country or the various groups that rely on fisheries for employment. A 
sharp decline in a specific stock, for example, could be a trigger for some deep social 
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changes in certain communities that rely on the utilization on this species, and those 
changes may not be reversible, even if the overall economic impact at the national level 
will not be measurable in the long run.
The scientific committee evaluates the socio-economic impact as likely to be positive 
more often than negative. Also, in the cases where negative impact does occur, they are 
predicted to be manageable for a society like Iceland, with strong institutions and the 
capacity to cope with change. This leads one to wonder if discussing climate change as 
a security issue in Iceland is even relevant.
Yet, in spite of limited knowledge about the socio-economic impact of climate 
change in Iceland and the scientific committee’s prediction that the socio-economic 
impact already been identified is likely to be more positive than negative, public docu-
ments consistently identify climate change as a threat. This position is emphasized in 
the scientific committee’s report, which states that climate change creates multiple 
threats (Björnsson, et al., 2008) and in the risk assessment report published by the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2009b), in which the following quote can be found in 
the English summary:
Climate change is now considered the greatest global environmental threat, 
and its impact has already been noted in Iceland. While it is not possible to 
predict the consequences of global warming in Iceland with any accuracy 
for the next 10-15 years, it is clear that efforts must be made both to fight 
and reverse climate change and curtail its effects. (p. 131)
But to whom, exactly, do those threats apply? Do they apply only to ecological 
systems, plants, and animals, or are humans also at risk? And if so, which humans? 
It is now time to turn to the interviews with policy shapers to see if more insightful 
answers to those questions can be gained.
6.2  Perceived or Actual Threats? Views of Policy shapers
The 18 policy shapers I interviewed were all well aware of the risks associated with 
climate change and readily acknowledged many of the current and projected impacts as 
security risks. The most commonly mentioned impacts in the interviews included the 
melting of glaciers; rising sea levels; and impacts on the marine ecosystem, including the 
movement of fish stocks and ocean acidification. A few policy shapers also referred to 
associated social, economic or political impacts such as a threat to Iceland’s sovereignty 
due to its increased geopolitical importance and an increase in international fisheries 
disputes similar to the mackerel dispute and to instability in other parts of the world 
that will negatively impact Icelandic society.
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“Will we still be able to get coffee in Iceland?” one interviewee asked. This ques-
tion was in some ways unusual because the policy shapers did not generally link 
the threats posed by climate change to their daily lives. In fact, although they all 
agreed that climate change posed a number of threats, few admitted that they felt 
personally threatened, and they did not expect that their own lives would be heavily 
influenced. A female politician offered the following answer when asked if she felt 
a personal threat:
I experience no more and no less fear than when I was growing up and was 
worried about a nuclear war. This is the same type of fear. And, I mean…it 
is not a more serious fear than for people in Africa who do not have access 
to clean water and live in fear every day. Humankind lives in constant fear 
due to our exploitation of nature. So…I think we can all sleep because of it.
A male expert readily admitted he was fearful, but also stated he would not neces-
sarily be willing to say so publicly:
I can admit, when the two of us are talking…when I am talking to another 
adult who knows what this is about, that I am very worried. I am very pes-
simistic. But this is not something I share, however, when I am lecturing to 
people whose behavior I am trying to influence.
This informant touches on an important issue that will be discussed in more detail 
later: the role of fear in behavior change. Is fear likely to be a good motivator for humans 
to change their behavior, or could fear of climate change end up being counteractive, 
paralyzing our ability to take action? But even if this person admits to being deeply 
worried, this does not translate into a fear that climate change will somehow negatively 
impact his personal life in the near future. But he was worried on behalf of his children 
and perhaps his grandchildren.
The worry on behalf of future generations was a common theme, as demonstrated 
by this quote taken from an interview with a male in his forties who is an active envi-
ronmental advocate:
Yes, I feel fear, but not for myself. Perhaps rather for my children. There is 
a lot of uncertainty about the future. But for me personally (laughs), I only 
have a few more decades to live. I don’t expect any drastic changes before that 
time. I think it is more of a future threat. Unless we will experience a tipping 
point, leading to more rapid changes. But I cannot say that I experience this 
yet as a direct threat.
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Given the emphasis on future generations, it is perhaps fitting that the youngest 
person interviewed was also the one who most readily admitted her personal fears: “I 
went into panic when I first started reading about climate change. I started to think 
about what would happen to my child or to me?”
The fear of the young generation was echoed in the words of one female politician, 
who said she was most likely to sense real concern and fear among young people. Her 
guess was that this related to the uncertainty, in turn, to the future impact of climate 
change. “I sense this fear more when discussing this at home with my children than in 
the political discussion,” she said, and added that not only did politicians show little 
fear, but in most cases they stayed silent when the topic was put on the agenda in the 
parliament. The few that did show up, would even make fun of the discussion.
This tendency to silence the discussion about the danger of climate change has been 
felt by other politicians who have tried to draw attention to the issue. Although Presi-
dent Grímsson discussed the dangers of climate change in his New Year’s address in 
1998, he remained mostly silent on the topic for a few years after that speech, or until 
the publication of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) in 2004. His silence 
seems to be directly associated with the strong opposition he experienced after his 1998 
speech. In more recent years, he has explicitly discussed the difficulty of talking about 
climate change when skeptical views were more dominant in public discourses. In his 
2007 New Year’s address, for example, he talked about a new tone that had entered 
the discussion on climate change. He noted that few people now dispute the fact that 
climate change is posing a great threat to the world. This, he said, is a radical shift from 
the dominant views in 1998:
Many people thought I painted far too dark a picture nearly a decade ago, 
and various people let their views be known. Now things have changed, and 
the majority of those who talk about the problem see it as a matter of urgency 
that the nations of the world take a united stance (Grímsson, 2007a).
In a speech in Bangladesh in 2008, he expressed similar views:
For a long time it was an uphill battle even to discuss climate change, because 
the doubters and the nay-sayers occupied centerstage. Recently, however, 
we have seen a fundamental shift, primarily because the evidence is now 
overwhelming. (Grímsson, 2008)
It seemed then that the key reason President Grímsson refrained from going into much 
depth when mentioning climate change in the years immediately following his speech 
in 1998 is related to the fact that his opinions deviated too much from the dominant 
political views at the time for him to feel comfortable emphasizing them in his speeches.
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As this example illustrates, there are clear limits to the extent that prominent political 
players can deviate from dominant discourses, if the aim is to influence the discourse or 
introduce new ideas to the agenda. If they engage in a discourse that is too radically dif-
ferent from the mainstream discourse, they risk being sidelined and not taken seriously. 
Many of the interviewees expressed frustrations about negative reactions they received 
if they deviated too far from the dominant discourse when stressing the importance of 
paying attention to the dangers of climate change. One civil servant explained how she 
was scolded by a group of people after she had criticized a lecturer at a public meeting for 
emphasizing only the opportunities climate change might bring to northern regions and 
ignoring the dangers experienced by other parts of the world: “Some of the politicians of 
the municipality were asked if it was appropriate for a civil servant to stand up at a meet-
ing like this and voice her opinion,” she said. A female politician had a similar experience 
if she tried too often to air an opinion that went against the generally accepted norm:
The way the public discourse is in Iceland means that as soon as you stick 
your head out it becomes chopped off. I have experienced this. So I think 
often people, both consciously and unconsciously, think: Do I have to take 
this fight as well? You see, because it is always the same people.
She goes on to explain the importance of someone echoing your views, for them to 
be taken seriously, preferably from another party. If a person not known for an envi-
ronmental agenda articulates concerns, she wonders, can that person’s voice be more 
powerful than the voice of someone known for environmental advocacy.
Another female politician is a bit more optimistic. She feels that the discourse has 
shifted in recent years and that green issues have moved somewhat from the left to the 
center in political debates. She had been heavily criticized a couple of years earlier by 
representatives from the business sector because of a stand she took on a certain envi-
ronmental issue: “There can be extremely harsh and strong reactions. Perhaps you just 
get used to it…. Because it is not comfortable. But still… I of course also received a lot of 
support,” she explains. A colleague of hers had not been so fortunate; she had received 
no support when involved in a controversial environmental debate a few years earlier.
This tendency to silence discussion about the dangers of climate change seems less 
visible in recent years, after the scientific consensus becomes stronger and more and 
more international reports confirm the present and future dangers posed by climate 
change. When it comes to responding to this threat, however, particularly suggesting 
ways of minimizing risks by reducing emissions, some topics seem off limits in the 
public discourses. This tendency is further discussed in the two following chapters. 
Before turning to that topic, I offer a brief discussion about the views of the general 
public on climate change in an effort to give a more holistic picture of the extent to 
which climate change is perceived as a threat in Iceland.
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6.3  What Does the General Public Think?
One way to determine the level of threat is to ask a representative sample in a survey. 
According to a Gallup poll conducted in January 2010, 40 percent of Icelanders are 
gravely concerned about climate change, one-third is neutral toward the issue and 27 
percent are not worried. Women are more concerned than men and older people are 
more concerned than younger people20. Political views also seem to influence how 
people answered; 61 percent of those supporting the Left Greens fell into the “gravely 
concerned” group, as did 51 percent of Social Democrats, 33 percent of those voting 
for the Progressive Party and only 27 percent of those supporting the Independent 
Party. This result mirrors studies from other regions of the world, showing a tendency 
for women to be more concerned than men, and those tilted to the political left to 
be more concerned than those on the right. McCright and Dunlap (2011) found, 
for example, that conservative, white males are significantly more likely than other 
Americans to be climate-change deniers, meaning they either do not believe climate 
change is taking place or are skeptical that there can be a link between human action 
and climate changes.
Respondents to the 2010 Icelandic Gallup survey were asked if believed that climate 
change was already seriously impacting their local environment. Respondents who 
described themselves as gravely concerned about climate change were slightly more 
likely than other Icelanders to agree that their lives were already seriously impacted; 
with 6 percent answered “strongly agree” and 30 percent answered “somewhat agree”) 
(Capacent Gallup, 2010). 
In other words, the survey responses suggests that more than one-third of the 
population is gravely concerned about climate change and believes that climate change 
is already having a local impact. Nevertheless, identifying exactly how those changes 
will impact socioeconomic factors seems to be a difficult task. This also complicates 
an evaluation of the risks and the ability to discover if specific groups or communi-
ties are being threatened, making the issue distant and abstract in people’s mind. 
Additionally, because climate change is often referred to as global warming (which 
is only one component of the larger and more complex issue of climate change), 
some people may even see it as something positive, hoping for warmer weather and 
more sunny days. This was, at least, a common view among the policy shapers, when 
asked about how they felt the general public perceived climate change. A male civil 
20 At first glance, this information seems to be in opposition to the discussion in the previous section about 
younger people being more likely to feel personal fear related to climate change. Yet, this need not be 
a contradiction. All of the policy shapers interviewed did express grave concern about climate change. 
Their concern did not necessarily translate into a personal fear about how it could negatively influence 
their own lives, however, mainly because they believed that the most serious changes would not happen 
for a few decades.
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servant, heavily involved in climate negotiations, does not sense much concern from 
the public: 
I think most people do not see climate change as a threat. Rather, they are 
happy about a milder climate. Perhaps they complain that they can’t go skiing 
as often in the Reykjavik area. Something like that. I do think some will feel a 
loss when the glaciers start to disappear. But overall, I don’t think Icelanders 
see climate change as a threat. For instance, the discourse about the Arctic has 
been the other way around…that climate change will create opportunities, 
new sailing routes, and Iceland will be more strategically located. 
A female politician expresses a similar view:
These are not changes that Icelanders believe are bad. Some people just joke 
that it is good to get better weather. But some people are worried about the 
extremes in the weather. Strange weather in November and so on. It makes 
people wonder, and perhaps get a little scared. I feel this more with the older 
generation that remembers further back.
Some of those interviewed believe this lack of interest is related to denial rather 
than ignorance. A female civil servant stated: “My feeling is that the Icelandic public 
is rather behind and thinks climate change is not a real threat. It is also a challenge to 
reach through, because it is uncomfortable to face the facts.”
This lack of interest can be seen in policy making at the local level. In spite of the 
fact that (according to the Gallup poll) more than one-third of the population claims 
to be gravely concerned about climate change and believes that the changes are already 
impacting the local environment, there is little pressure from the general public on 
municipalities or the national government to form an adaptation policy stating how 
authorities plan to respond to those changes.
As discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, climate change has generally been framed 
as a global issue. This could also explain why the public is not putting pressure on au-
thorities to respond to climate change. At the local level, the impact of climate change is 
often only one component of many interacting factors that contributes to vulnerability 
and the capacity of a community to adapt to change. Thus, local adaption to climate 
change might not even have been identified as such in a separate climate policy, but 
might rather have been integrated into such other policies as urban planning, health 
policies or local economic development plans.
Because of this complexity, it is difficult to trace where concern for climate change is 
influencing public decision making at the local level, at least with respect to the adapta-
tion side. As discussed further in the next chapter, Reykjavík (the capital area) is the 
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only municipality in Iceland that has adopted a special climate policy (although some 
others address climate change in Local Agenda 21 documents). Even the Reykjavík 
policy, however, is focused primarily on global responsibility to mitigate emissions 
locally, and there is no mention of local adaptation in the policy or associated docu-
ments (Reykjavíkurborg, 2009).
6.4  Concluding Remarks
In summary, although both experts and a large proportion of the population perceive 
climate change as a threat, the securitization of climate change seems to come from 
“above” rather than originating in local communities at the grassroots level. The se-
curitization of climate change at the international level has influenced how climate 
change is presented in domestic policy documents in Iceland. This has happened in 
spite of the fact that scant information exists about the socioeconomic impact of cli-
mate change and threats to national security, and human security threats at the local 
level are poorly defined.
The data collected from policy shapers through interviews and speeches reveals that 
some of them have felt a certain pressure to remain silent on issues related to climate 
change, or at least not to be too outspoken. Too much emphasis on the dangers as-
sociated with climate change has sometimes lead to harsh criticism or resulted in an 
experience whereby the individuals involved felt they were ignored or sidelined in public 
discussion. This tendency to silence or sideline voices emphasizing climate-related 
threats has decreased as new information have been brought into the discussion and 
the scientific consensus on climate change has grown stronger.
When climate change is discussed as a threat in policy documents, the president’s 
speeches, and in interviews with policy shapers, the topic is most often approached 
from the perspective of security as a broad concept and the threats discussed are focused 
on human insecurities rather than military security. In other words, the environmental 
security discourse that MacGregor (2010) identifies as one of two dominant masculine 
discourses in climate politics (see Section 2.5) is not very evident in political discourses 
about climate change threats in Iceland. MacGregor describes this discourse as one that 
stresses the danger of climate change resulting in conflicts over scarce resources between 
and within states, calling for militaristic solutions. This, she argues, harmonizes with 
traditional ideas about hegemonic masculinity. Whereas the danger of resource conflicts 
is mentioned in policy documents, and did arise occasionally in interviews with policy 
shapers, it is not a major theme, and other dangers were given more attention. Iceland, 
as a state without an army, consistently rejects military solutions to deal with tensions 
at the international level. In fact, in their comparative study on the Arctic strategies of 
the eight Arctic states, Bailes & Heininen (2012) specifically draw attention to how 
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the Icelandic strategy is the most explicit of all in warning against militarization of the 
Arctic region. The emphasis is on comprehensive security, as is the case with Finland 
and Sweden, whereas the five littoral states of the Arctic Ocean (Canada, The Kingdom 
of Denmark, Norway, Russia and the USA) put greater emphasis on state sovereignty 
and defense (Bailes & Heininen, 2012).
Although adaptation is crucial in dealing with the consequences of climate change, 
addressing the root causes is necessary for long-term environmental security. This 
means focusing on mitigation and finding ways to reduce emissions of greenhouse 
gases. This is in line with Barnett’s definition of environmental security, discussed in 
Chapter 2 (Section 2.2) which refers to the process of peacefully reducing human 
vulnerability to human-induced environmental degradation by addressing the root 
causes of this degradation and the associated human insecurity (Barnett, 2001). Yet, 
it is exactly this task that seems so difficult to accomplish. In spite of our knowledge 
about the relationship between human activities and climate change, and the explicitly 
stated goals of most states of the world that they will attempt to reduce emissions, the 
trend keeps moving the opposite direction. The desire for short-term economic gains 
outweighs the need to pay attention to the more long-term environmental security. 
The fact that emission reduction by a few people does not enhance environmental 
security unless others follow in their footsteps further complicates the situation. The 
temptation to act as a free rider is great, and global climate change is a prime example 
of the “Tragedy of the Commons” phenomena described by Garreth Harding in his 
famous 1968 article in Science.21
Because of the nature of climate change as a problem related to an overuse of a global 
common (the atmosphere), incentives to reduce emissions need to be coordinated 
and managed from “above”, which entails that states of the world need to negotiate at 
the international level and then form and implement policies domestically to follow 
up on international agreements. As the history of the UNFCCC and the associated 
Kyoto Protocol has shown, this is a challenging task. Not only is it difficult to reach 
an agreement at the international level, but individual states are also finding it difficult 
to implement policies that result in real emissions reductions in line with their inter-
national commitments. A close look at the formation and implementation of climate 
policy in one small state, again the site of the case study, Iceland, could reveal some of 
the obstacles that stand in the way.
 
21  Harding (1968) used the example of cattles on pasture land to explain the problems associated with 
utilization of open-access resources. If the land is unmanaged and herders can freely graze as many cattles 
as they like, there is great danger that the land will be overexploited. If ownership is not clear, individual 
herders have no interest in reducing the number of their own cattle, as their sacrifice would be of no use 
if someone else adds their cattle instead.
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7.  Addressing the Root Causes: Mitigation 
The previous chapter established that there is a general consensus in Iceland that 
human-induced climate change is a threat that needs to be taken seriously. Iceland has 
participated in climate negotiations at the international level from the beginning, when 
the first climate agreement was negotiated, and Iceland has signed both the UNFCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol. But international commitments are not automatically trans-
lated into ambitious domestic climate policy. Has the business sector and the general 
public modified their behavior in order to reduce emissions? What type of solution is 
preferred: changes in lifestyle or large-scale technological solutions? 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze domestic climate policy in Iceland, examine 
the associated climate-related discourses and explore the underlying values that are 
guiding the policy process. I begin by giving a short overview of Iceland’s greenhouse 
gas emissions before diving into a discussion of climate policy and related discourses. 
As in the previous chapter, I rely on policy documents, interviews with policy shapers 
and speeches of the president as my key sources of information.
Some of the key policy documents of relevance for this analysis are:
•	 Policy Declaration of the Government of the Independence Party and the 
Social Democratic Alliance (2007)
•	 Declaration of Cooperation of Government (2009)
•	 Policy Declaration of the Progressive Party and the Independence Party 
(2013)
•	 Iceland’s Fourth National Communication on Climate Change under the 
UNFCCC (2006)
•	 Iceland’s Sixth National Communication and First Bienal Report under 
the UNFCCC (2014)
•	 Climate Policy (2007)
•	 Climate Action Plan (2010)
•	 Legislation About Climate Issues (2012)
•	 Reykjavík Climate and Air Quality Policy (2009)  
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7.1  Iceland’s Emission Profile
In some ways, greenhouse gas emissions in Iceland are unusual, and differ from those 
of other industrial countries in several ways. Energy use per capita is among the high-
est in the world, at 750 PJ per person. About 85 percent of the primary energy used, 
however, is domestically produced (mostly geothermal energy and hydropower) and 
about 15 percent – mostly oil – is imported (National Energy Authority, n.d.). Geo-
thermal energy is used for space heating and hydropower and geothermal energy are 
used for the production of electricity. Oil is mainly used in the transport sector and 
as fuel for fishing vessels.
Due to the high proportion of renewable energy sources used, greenhouse gas emis-
sions from the residential sector are much lower than in other industrialized countries. 
The key sources of emissions are energy use in the transport sector and from fishing 
vessels and industrial processes. The high proportion of emissions from industrial 
processes is another unique feature of Iceland’s emission profile. Those are greenhouse 
gases released during the production phases in large-scale industries, mostly when pro-
ducing aluminum. Due to the easy access to renewable energy sources, international 
companies involved in energy-intensive production like aluminum production, have 
been attracted to the country. By placing their factories in Iceland, they not only have 
access to relatively cheap energy, but the energy is renewable, which improves the 
environmental profile of the company. But even if there are no emissions from energy 
use in those companies, greenhouse gases are still released through industrial processed 
during the production phases.
The Environmental Agency of Iceland is responsible for compiling inventory reports 
every year with detailed information about greenhouse emissions, and send to the 
secretariat of the UNFCCC agreement. The table that follows is taken from the inven-
tory report compiled in 2014 and gives a summary of total emissions of greenhouse 
gases in Iceland by source for the year 1990, and then for the period 2008–2012 (in 
Gg CO2-equivalents).
22
22 CO2-eqivalent is a metric used to compare the emissions from various greenhouse gases, based upon 
their global-warming potential (GWP). Total emissions include the six types of greenhouse gases covered 
by international agreements, and are most often expressed as “million metric tons of carbon dioxide 
equivalents” or Gg CO2-equivalents. 
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Table 3: Iceland’s Total Emissions by Gg CO2-eqivalents
(Environment	Agency	of	Iceland,	2014).
1990 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Changes 
´90-´12
Changes 
´11-´12
Energy 1,779 2,075 2,021 1,869 1,770 1,718 -3.44% -2.95%
Industrial Processes 869 2,020 1,861 1,890 1,798 1,883 116.70% 4.71%
Emissions	fulfilling	14/
CP.7
1,161 1,205 1,225 1,209 1,279
Solvent	and	Other	
Product Use
9 7 6 6 6 6 -31.95% -2.08%
Agriculture 737 704 680 671 669 678 -7.95% 1.42%
LULUCF 1,175 856 834 791 746 706 -39.91% -5.30%
Waste 145 216 211 210 198 183 26.27% -7.72%
Total	emissions	w/o	
LULUCF
3,538 5,022 4,779 4,646 4,441 4,468 26.28% 0.60%
Total	emissions	excluding	CO2	
emissions	fulfilling	14/CP.7
3,861 3,574 3,421 3,232 3,189
Removals	from	KP	3.3	and	3.4 256 272 307 338 366
Decision 14/CP.7 allows Iceland to exclude certain industrial process carbon dioxide 
emissions from national totals. LULUCF refers to Land Use and Land Use Change 
and Forestry. KP 3.3. and 3.4 refer to the emissions that can be deducted from national 
totals due to carbon sequestration through forestation or revegetation.
As can be seen from Table 3, Iceland stayed within the limits set by the Kyoto Pro-
tocol for the period 2008–2012, when Iceland was allowed to increase emissions by 
10 percent, compared to 1990 emissions, after taking into consideration emissions that 
can be excluded due to Decision 14/CP.7. Iceland’s commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol, however, were not very strict. If the country is to shoulder its part of the 
global responsibility for addressing the root causes of climate change emissions, cuts 
will need to be much more drastic in the future. Do current climate-related policies 
at the national and local level indicate a move toward more ambitious goals in cutting 
emissions?
7.2  Climate Policy at the National and Local Level
Icelandic authorities did not seem to take climate change seriously for the first 15 years 
after signing the UNFCCC, but a shift in policy can be noted in 2007.
Although Iceland participated in the UNFCCC negotiation process from its begin-
ning and is a party to both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, climate change was 
not perceived as a threat for much of this period or defined as such in policy documents. 
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In a study I conducted in 2006, in which Iceland’s negotiation strategy was analyzed 
in international negotiations about climate treaties for the period 1990–2005, I came 
to the conclusion that the main drive for defining Iceland’s position in the negotia-
tions was the desire to prevent any limitation put on the country’s opportunities for 
economic development, more specifically, the opportunities to attract foreign investor 
for energy intensive industries (Ingólfsdóttir, 2008). Therefore, concern for the climate 
was not the driving force behind Iceland’s participation in the negotiations, but rather 
economic interests. Iceland’s commitments according to the Kyoto Protocol were a 
result of this strategy. Not only was Iceland allowed to increase greenhouse gas emis-
sion for the period 2008–2012 by 10 percent compared to 1990 emissions, but the 
negotiation team also managed to push through a special decision, Decision 14/CP.7, 
on the “Impact of single project on emissions in the commitment period”, in which 
emissions from specific types of industrial projects are not included in total emissions 
(Icelandic Ministry for the Environment, 2006).
This lack of concern about the dangers of climate change at the political level was 
also demonstrated in the weak policy the government introduced in 2002, after Iceland 
had ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The policy included only seven measures, and not all 
of them were implemented. Environmental NGOs criticized the government for this 
lack of ambition, but received little attention (Ingólfsdóttir, 2008). In Iceland’s Fourth 
National Communication to the UNFCCC, the aim of the climate-change policy is 
described as: “to curb emissions of greenhouse gases so that they do not exceed the 
limits of Iceland’s obligations under the Kyoto Protocol” (Icelandic Ministry for the 
Environment, 2006). In short, the aim was to implement minimum measures to avoid 
exceeding commitments Iceland was bound by as a party to the Protocol, but there 
was no further ambition. Adaptation is not even mentioned.
The year 2007 was a turning point for climate debate in Iceland. This was, without 
doubt, influenced by the securitization of climate change in the political discourse at 
the international level, but changes on the political domestic scene also played a role. 
In parliamentary elections in the spring of 2007, the coalition government of the 
Independent Party and the Progressive party, which had been in power since 1991, 
was replaced by a new coalition of the Independent Party and the Social Democratic 
Alliance. Both the new minister of environment and the new foreign minister were 
Social Democrats, and more occupied with global responsibility than their predeces-
sors. For the first time, climate change was mentioned specifically in the political 
agreement between the two parties, and was categorized not only as an environmental 
issue, but also as an important foreign policy issue (Prime Minister´s Office, 2007). 
This emphasis continued with a new government in 2009, in spite of all the turmoil 
related to the collapse of the Icelandic banks in October 2008 and the subsequent 
political and economic crisis. The government that took over in 2009, included the 
Social Democratic Alliance and the Left Green, both of which had a stronger focus 
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on environmental issues than did the parties that were in power prior to 2007. In their 
declaration, the two parties stated their willingness to participate in the formation of 
a new international climate treaty, but the declaration was signed when the COP 15 
meeting in Copenhagen was upcoming (Prime Minister´s Office, 2009). Noteworthy 
in the declaration is the fact that there is no more emphasis on protecting the special 
economic interests of Iceland in the negotiations; rather, the emphasis is on a need to 
contribute to solve the problem at the global level.
After the 2013 elections, the Independence party and the Progressive party, which 
were in power from 1991 to 2007, reunited and formed a new government. Unlike pre-
viously, when the main emphasis in climate policy was to protect the special economic 
interests of Iceland in climate negotiations and domestic policy was either non-existent 
or weak, the two parties recognized climate change as an important issue in their decla-
ration in a special chapter about environmental issues. There, they emphasize the need 
to reduce the use of fossil fuels and call for a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, 
both directly by reducing emissions, and indirectly, by increasing carbon sequestration 
with afforestation, soil conservation and other types of reclamation projects. Yet, this 
emphasis seems to be only halfhearted, because in the chapter about foreign affairs, 
Arctic issues are highlighted only because of the economic opportunities the melting 
ice could bring, and there is no mention of the danger of climate change. Furthermore, 
in spite of the statement in the environmental chapter that a reduction of the use of 
fossil fuels is necessary, the declaration has a special chapter dedicated to oil and gas, 
emphasizing the support of the new government for oil and gas developments in the 
Dreki region, northeast of Iceland (Prime Minister´s Office, 2013). What is interest-
ing is that there is no reference to climate change in the chapter discussing oil and gas 
developments and the government seems to separate completely the issue of climate 
policy to fulfill Iceland’s obligations under international treaties and the policy to 
encourage oil and gas developments offshore in the Dragon region. This tendency to 
separate climate discourses from oil and gas developments is discussed in greater detail 
in the next chapter (Iceland as an Oil State?).
Negotiation Strategy and Domestic Policy
References to climate change in governmental declarations demonstrate that climate 
change is being taken seriously as an issue that needs to be addressed in public policy. 
But this emphasis does not automatically translate into a more ambitious domestic 
climate policy. Another factor that needs some attention is an exploration of the kind 
of policy solutions that are being promoted to mitigate emissions.
As mentioned, the climate policy published in 2002, after Iceland ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol, was not ambitious and only partially implemented. A new policy was pub-
lished in 2007, however, in which a more long-term approach was taken. This was fol-
lowed with an action plan in 2009 and a special legislation about climate issues in 2012.
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The policy from 2007 was published in February, before the parliamentary elections 
and a change in governments. It included the long-term goal of reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions by 50–75 percent before 2050, compared to the 1990 levels. Emphasis is 
placed on reducing emissions as efficiently as possible by focusing on new technologies, 
economic incentives, carbon sequestration through afforestation and revegetation, 
and by financing development projects abroad (Icelandic Ministry for the Environ-
ment, 2007). Although the new policy is more comprehensive than the one published 
in 2002, it does not set any short-term goals as mileposts toward the bigger goals of 
2050, and the actions proposed are not time-lined or prioritized. Nevertheless, it was 
sign of a more ambitious climate policy and laid the groundwork for much of the 
work that was done later. Of special importance is a decision the parliament made 
around the same time as the policy was published, devoting resources to two expert 
committees: one with the role of discussing climate impacts and adaptation; another 
that focused on analyzing the different options available for mitigation. The policy 
report states that the policy will be reviewed once the expert report on mitigation 
measures is published.
The report on possible mitigation measures was published two years later and gave 
a comprehensive overview and cost analysis of the various mitigation measures that 
could be implemented in the different sectors (Davíðsdóttir, et al., 2009). A year 
later, the government published a climate action plan with ten key actions that were 
introduced as priorities when the policy is to be implemented (Icelandic Ministry for 
the Environment, 2010). Other possible actions are also discussed, but the following 
ten are at the forefront: 
•	 Implementing the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS)
•	 Implementing carbon emission charge on fuel for domestic use
•	 Changing of tax systems and fees on cars and fuel
•	 Enhancing the use of environmentally friendly vehicles at governmental 
and municipality bodies
•	 Promoting alternative transport methods like walking, cycling, and public 
transport
•	 Using biofuel in the fishing fleet
•	 Using electricity as an energy resource in the fishmeal industry
•	 Increasing afforestation and revegetation
•	 Restoring wetlands
•	 Increasing research and innovation climate issues
The action plan also refers to the fact that in international negotiations Iceland had 
indicated a willingness to aim for a 30 percent reduction of emissions before 2020, in 
cooperation with the EU. This was in line with the approach Iceland took at the COP 
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15 meeting in Copenhagen, when states of the world failed massively in negotiating a 
follow-up to the Kyoto Protocol.
Although not discussed much publicly, a major change was taking place in 2009 
and 2010 about the way Iceland was approaching the international negotiations. The 
government decided to drop demands for special exemptions but instead align itself 
with the EU in the climate negotiations and put their pledges forward as a part of the 
wider EU package. In the report in which the action plan is detailed, an explanation 
is provided for this shift in policy: Because Iceland is bound by the EEA agreement23 
to implement the EU Emission Trading System, emissions from large-scale industries, 
including emissions from aluminum smelters, would eventually fall under the trading 
scheme. Being part of the trading scheme and at the same time asking for exemptions 
regarding emissions from large-scale industries in small economies would create double 
standards of commitments for Iceland that would be difficult to navigate. Based on 
this situation, Iceland approached the EU with the aim of getting under its umbrella 
of shared burdens for the period 2013–2020. The EU granted this request in a letter 
written shortly before the COP 15 meeting in Copenhagen (Council of the European 
Union, 2009), and since then Iceland has aligned itself with the EU in the international 
negotiations.
And interesting component of this policy shift is the fact that it was implemented 
with barely any public discussion. The topic received little attention in the parliament 
and was not discussed in the media. This is especially noteworthy given that the Ice-
landic exemption in the Kyoto Protocol was a highly political issue in the parliament 
in 1997, when the Protocol was being negotiated, and the alignment with the EU 
touched on another politically sensitive issue – the accession talks with the EU. Two 
factors seem to constitute the main explanation for this lack of discussion.
First, the method used by the Ministry for the Environment was to discuss the issue in 
private meetings with all relevant stakeholders, rather than stirring up public discussion. 
Some of the policy shapers interviewed were involved in this process, and when asked 
about this topic, they confirmed that it had been a conscious decision not to make it 
a political issue, but rather to approach it from a technical point of view and explain 
how the complexity of a double system would work against Icelandic interests. This 
method seems to have worked well, and was sufficient to convince key stakeholders, 
within industry and in the political parties. One interviewee summarized the position 
of the industry with the following quote:
23 The EEA agreement (Agreement on the European Economic Area), which entered into force on 1 
January 1994, brings togehter the EU member states and the three EFTA states (Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
and Norway) in a single market. In addition to the four freedoms (free movement of goods, services, 
persons, and capital), the EEA also covers cooperation in other areas, such as research and development, 
education, social policy, consumer protection, tourism and culture, and the environment (EFTA, n.d.).
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The business sector wants certainty and to have some idea what kind of 
regulatory framework will be implemented in the future. The business rep-
resentatives did not like the idea of difficult international negotiations about 
the Icelandic exemption occurring at the same time as the European Trading 
Scheme was being implemented.
Second, the level of complexity in the international negotiations and the EU 
regulatory framework seems to prevent politicians from initiating political discus-
sions about this topic. This tendency can be noted when parliamentary discussions 
are reviewed the few times climate policy has been on the agenda in the parliament. 
Not only do few politicians speak, but some of them simply admit that they find it 
difficult to form an opinion due to the complexity. An example is a discussion that 
took place in the parliament in March 2011, 16 months after the EU Council had 
agreed to include Iceland in their scheme of shared burdens. When reading through 
the speeches, it becomes obvious that some of the parliamentarians are confused 
about what had happened to the idea of special exemptions for Iceland in the climate 
negotiations and how that issue is related to the European Trading Scheme. Kristján 
Júlíusson, representative of the Independence Party, was one of those participating 
in the discussion, criticizing the government for not asking for a continuation of 
Decision 14/CP.7 about a special exemption in the international negotiations. Later 
in the discussion, he declared: “I will be the first one to admit that I have neither 
extensive nor deep knowledge about this trading scheme with emission permits24,” 
( Júlíusson, 2011).
This level of complexity may also explain why the media paid no attention to the 
news release from the Ministry for the Environment about the agreement with the 
EU, in spite of the fact that this was a radical policy shift in Iceland’s strategy in the 
climate negotiations.
A similar lack of interest was noticeable in parliamentary discussions one year later, 
when a comprehensive legislation about climate issues was adopted (Althingi, 2012). 
The new legislation was to replace earlier legislations about climate-related issues that 
had been fragmented. This new legislation was an important step in increasing the 
weight of climate change as an independent issue, rather than just one of many sub 
issues of environmental affairs. The legislation states four main objectives:
•	 To reduce greenhouse gas emissions in an economically efficient way
•	 To increase carbon sequestration
•	 To encourage adaptation to climate change
24 My translation. Original quote in Icelandic: „En ég skal verða fyrstur manna til að viðurkenna að ég hef 
hvorki mikla né djúpa þekkingu á þessu viðskiptadæmi með loftslagsheimildirnar”.
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•	 To create conditions so the government can fulfill Iceland’s international 
climate obligations
The documents associated with this legislation were long and comprehensive and they 
touch on some important interests of various stakeholders. In spite of this there was no 
discussion in the parliament about the issue, with the exception of one parliamentarian 
complaining about the short time available to work with the draft legislation in the 
environmental and transportation committee, especially given how large the topic is.
As this discussion demonstrates, it seems that the drive to put climate change on 
the agenda of the government or in the parliament often comes from outside pressure, 
from the need to fulfill international obligations. Climate-related policy documents 
or legislation receive little attention and generate little discussion in public forums. 
Perhaps the issues in the documents could be undisputed, or perhaps there is a lack of 
understanding and fear of participating in discussion about complex issues, as dem-
onstrated in the previous quote from one politician, or perhaps there is simply lack 
of interest. The fact that politicians are elected for four-year terms, whereas climate 
change is an issue that calls for a long-term vision could also play a role. Although 
climate change is recognized as an issue that needs to be addressed, it is not neces-
sarily prioritized high on the agenda when other issues compete for the attention of 
policy makers. This explanation is in line with views expressed by many of the policy 
shapers interviewed.
Policy at the Local Level
The lack of political interest could also be related to the fact that pressure to put climate 
change seems to come from above, from the international community, rather than from 
the grassroots level – from the voters the politicians rely on to stay in office. This brings 
us to the role of municipalities in climate policy. Municipalities are in a position to in-
fluence greenhouse gas emissions, especially through their power in planning processes, 
but also by paying attention to climate issues when working on various issues that are the 
responsibility of local governments – waste management, for example. They also play a 
key role when it comes to adaptation. In spite of this, few municipalities in Iceland have 
paid much attention to climate change. With respect to mitigation, Reykjavík is the 
only municipality with a formal climate policy, although climate change is mentioned 
in Local Agenda policy documents of some other municipalities. Additionally, some 
municipalities are involved in climate-related projects funded from outside sources, 
aimed at reducing emissions. One example of this is a project the environmental NGO 
Landvernd initiated. The project started in 2013 when one municipality was chosen 
as a pilot project and in late 2014 the second municipality, Fljótsdalshérað, was added. 
Landvernd works with municipalities in establishing a system to monitor emissions 
from transport, energy use and the waste sector. Once a baseline has been established, 
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an action plan is designed with steps the local authorities can take to reduce emissions 
from those sectors (Landvernd, 2015).
As mentioned, Reykjavík was the first municipality to adopt a formal climate policy. 
A closer look at the formation of the policy reveals some of the challenges related to 
putting climate change on the agenda at the local level. The city council agreed on 
the policy at their meeting on 1 September 2009. The aim of the policy is to moni-
tor emissions, inform citizens and work in cooperation with inhabitants, businesses, 
neighboring municipalities and the government to reduce emissions. The brochure 
that was published to introduce the policy gives an overview of sources of greenhouse 
gas emissions in the municipality. Almost 70 percent originates from the transport 
sector; 22 percent is from waste management; and the rest is from industry, agriculture 
and other sources (Reykjavíkurborg, 2009). What is especially noteworthy about the 
climate policy is that it is lumped together with air quality and introduced as climate 
and air quality policy. Interviews with policy shapers that participated in forming the 
policy confirm that this was first and foremost for political reasons. It related to the 
reluctance of politicians to talk too much about climate change; worrying the topic 
wouldn’t be popular among voters. “You will not convince people to drive less and 
bike more to protect global climate. You need to refer to something closer to them, 
something that affects them directly, like the kindergarten, saying that kids cannot 
go out and play on certain days if air pollution goes over a certain limit,” one of the 
interviewees shared with me when asked why climate and air quality had been tied 
together into one policy. This view harmonizes with one of the conclusions in the 
previous chapter, where it was illustrated how most people did not see climate change 
as something that was going to threaten them personally or influence their daily lives, 
but rather viewed it as an abstract and distant threat that would be influential in the 
future or have negative impacts in faraway places.
In summary, a review of public documents demonstrates that climate change has 
been receiving more and more attention as the years have passed, and this seems to be 
an issue that policy makers take seriously. More ambitious emission reductions targets 
have been put forward in international negotiations, followed by a more comprehensive 
domestic policy than in the past.
When actual emission numbers are examined (see Section 7.1) one can see that 
Iceland managed to fulfill its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol for the period 
2008–2012. Although overall emissions have increased, total emissions excluding those 
that fall under Decision 14/CP.7, have actually decreased compared to 1990 levels. 
The annual inventory reports complied by the Environmental Agency not only provide 
numbers, but also analyze trends and give explanations for why emissions are increas-
ing or decreasing in different sectors. According to the inventory report published in 
2014, outside factors seem to be the main explanation for a decrease in emissions for 
the period 2008–2012, rather than direct policy interventions aimed at decreasing 
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emissions. As the report explains, overall emissions are heavily influenced by general 
economic conditions and have been increasing during times of high economic growth, 
but started to decrease following the banking crisis in 2008. Factors like oil prices are 
also influential. Emissions from the transport sector, for example, continued to increase 
from 1990 to 2008, but high fuel prices are an important reason why emissions from 
this sector have been declining in recent years25. One of the few cases in which emissions 
have decreased substantially as a direct consequence of a climate policy measure is the 
reduction of PFCs emissions from aluminum smelters due to the implementation of 
new technologies (Environment Agency of Iceland, 2014).
In other words, in spite of relatively ambitious targets, comprehensive policy, action 
plan and new legislation, the actual impact of domestic climate policy on emissions is 
unclear. Implementation is based on small steps rather than a radical, systematic change 
that would create strong incentives for industry or individuals to change behavior. With 
this in mind, it is interesting to find out what the policy shapers interviewed think of 
domestic policy. President Grímsson’s speeches will also be used as data for this next 
section, where the views of policy shapers on the role of mitigation in dealing with the 
climate crisis will be explored.
7.3  The Views of Policy Shapers
In general, policy shapers were not overly impressed with domestic climate policy in 
Iceland. This was true both of those directly involved in policy making as civil serv-
ants and politicians and those who tried to influence policy indirectly as experts and 
or advocates. Many of them referred to a fairly ambitious policy, but one that lacked 
systematic implementation.
One expert explained that in spite of targets set and several initiatives aimed at 
developing solutions to reduce emissions, those tended to be small-scale solutions. He 
takes carbon sequestration as an example, including tree planting and the reclamation 
of wetlands: “We are moving very slowly there, especially when it comes to reclama-
tion of wetlands. There is not much happening…small grants but mostly this is done 
as volunteer work by interested farmers. Nothing large scale,” he says, and then goes 
on to discuss technological solutions in the transport sector, where he also says the 
small-scale thinking dominates: “These are sporadic initiatives, which indicates that a 
holistic governmental policy is missing.”
Among the policy shapers there was a general feeling that climate policy quickly 
took the back seat when other issues called for attention, especially issues related to 
25 High oil prices after 2008 are related not only to price fluctuations in the international market, but also 
to the sharp devaluation of the Icelandic krona following the banking crisis.
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economic development. They felt the emphasis was on small-scale technical solutions, 
but not on systematic changes, and the tendency was to focus on policy measures that 
did not require changes in lifestyle. A civil servant working at the municipal level 
shared her opinion that policy at the national level was too focused on technical solu-
tions avoiding any measures that would involve lifestyle changes. “In my mind this is 
about a change in lifestyle, a change in mindset and a change in how people behave in 
their daily lives,” she said. She pointed out that municipalities are in a unique position 
to work with those factors, but that the national government was not seeking advice 
or support from municipalities when forming and implementing climate policy. This 
comment is interesting, given that some of the priority actions in the action plan 
rely on municipalities to be involved in implementation: priority actions 4 and 5, for 
instance (to enhance the use of environmentally friendly vehicles at governmental 
and municipality bodies and to promote alternative transport methods like walking, 
cycling, and public transport).
Other policy shapers also mentioned the role of municipalities and most believed 
that local governments had failed to integrate climate concerns into their policies. Lack 
of discussion was mentioned as a factor, as were the role of interest groups and reluc-
tance of the public sector to allocate funding to initiatives aimed at reducing emissions.
Given the legislative power of the state, the national government plays a central 
role in creating incentives for municipalities, but also government institutions and the 
business sector. Without such incentives, it can be difficult to prioritize climate issues, 
even if those in charge are interested in doing so. One interviewee shared an example 
from the health sector. Although the healthcare sector is a subject with a number of 
requirements related to health surveillance, environmental surveillance barely existed 
in her opinion, and there was no pressure from the government to reduce emissions. 
Thus, it was difficult for managers to justify costly measures to reduce emissions, even 
if the technical solutions were available.
A civil servant working on climate policy at the national level also expressed frus-
tration that politicians were not taking climate policy seriously enough. Although he 
recognized the importance of technical solutions, he also emphasized the need for a 
change of values, especially in industrialized countries, in order to stop the endless 
race for more economic growth and to focus instead on welfare and quality of life 
from a broader perspective. As for the role of Iceland, he felt that a clear political vi-
sion was missing, especially as part of the foreign policy: “What is Iceland’s vision in 
the international context? We could create a great vision, because of our renewable 
resources. If we would allocate some resources to this subject, we could do some really 
neat things,” he said.
The criticism from the policy shapers was not so much on the current policy but 
rather on the lack of implementation. Some of my interviews were undertaken in 2011–
2012, when the left-wing government of the Left Greens and the Social Democrats was 
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in power, but some were taken in 2013–2014, when the more right-wing government 
was in charge. There was less difference that could have been expected, however, in the 
criticism on national climate policy, depending on which government was in power. 
Some of those interviewed when the left-wing government was still in power expressed 
disappointment about how little difference there was when a government was finally 
in power with representatives from parties that presented themselves as parties that 
wanted to prioritize environmental issues. One said the left-wing government was, in 
fact, implementing several measures, but that their public relations strategy was poor 
because the government did not really communicate to the public what they were doing.
This criticism on the slow pace of implementation raises the question of what is 
standing in the way for the government to implement its own policy. Where are the 
obstacles? When policy shapers were asked this question, most of them mentioned lack 
of funding, and this answer was often followed with a comment about a low awareness of 
the importance of climate issues within the Ministry for Finance. Some also mentioned 
a lack of interest in the Prime Minister’s Office. Also, while politicians may support 
the climate policy, their day-to-day work is often colored by reacting to pressure from 
various interest groups. There is little time left to be proactive and systematically form 
and implement policy on specific issues.
The tendency of politicians to be reactive is interesting to explore in relation to the 
direction from which the pressure of forming a climate policy is coming. As discussed 
previously, most of the pressure seems to come from above, from the international com-
munity, rather than from the voters at the grassroots level. Consequently, the civil serv-
ants who are working directly on climate issues are usually well aware of the importance 
of the topic, but as one interviewee noted, the responsibility of the climate policy is too 
much on their shoulders. In her opinion, stronger political leadership is needed. But she 
also notes that such leadership will not emerge unless the public (voters) puts pressure 
on politicians. In other words, top-down pressure from the international community is 
not enough; more pressure from the grassroots level is needed to activate the politicians.
Underlying all those obstacles, and sometimes mentioned explicitly by those inter-
viewed, are the values that guide decision making in policy, values that are too often 
colored by greed, and an emphasis on consumerism and economic growth. Short-term 
economic gains receive priority over more long-term interests of environmental secu-
rity. “Within the government, there is often conflict between those who emphasize 
exploitation and those who are concerned with conservation. And the values favoring 
conservation seem to lose more often,” one civil servant noted.
This focus on greed and consumerism is not a unique Icelandic phenomenon, of 
course, but rather an integral component of the global capitalistic system. The tension 
between the pressure to focus on economic growth and exploitation of resources and 
to care for the environment is also a core tension in the international negotiations on 
climate change.
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This tension was well described by one politician interviewed, one who had par-
ticipated in the COP 15 meeting in Copenhagen in 2009. She talked about the chal-
lenges involved in the negotiations, including the power struggles between the most 
powerful countries:
What this reminded me of is that the global financial system that emphasizes 
economic growth as the main tool to evaluate welfare…. this is a system that 
will destroy us in the end. I mean… we just really need to put the market 
economy to the side… it is not working. This is the underlying conflict, even 
if we are talking about climate issues.
The same person, later in the interview, noted the same tension in Iceland between 
the demand for emission reduction and the wish to prioritize economic growth. She 
observed that Iceland was most successful in reducing emissions when the country 
was going through economic crisis (when the emission reduction was a side effect of 
the crisis). “So the best way to reduce emissions is to reduce economic growth…. But 
at the same time our main goal is to increase economic growth, which will increase 
emissions,” she said, giving this as an example of the inherent tension underlying climate 
policy – not merely in Iceland, but globally.
When reflecting on the comments made by the policy shapers interviewed, it is 
interesting to not that the main obstacles do not involve open opposition to specific 
measures or explicit denial of climate change as a topic worthy of attention. Rather, 
climate issues are ignored, pushed to the side, or actions are delayed when other issues, 
considered more pressing, consume time and resources. When specific measures are 
implemented or certain initiatives supported, they tend to be sporadic and small-scale, 
requiring neither large investments nor systematic changes. There is little pressure to 
change lifestyles or undertake a fundamental rethinking of consumption patterns or 
the exploitation of natural resources.
With this in mind, the focus of President Grímsson’s speeches that relate to tackling 
climate change is especially noteworthy. His emphasis is on large-scale, systematic 
changes in the energy sector, and he uses Iceland as an example to demonstrate that 
such changes are possible. As noted in Chapter 6, the president was one of the first 
high-level politicians in Iceland to pay attention to the dangers of climate change. Af-
ter the publication of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment in 2004, he traveled the 
world and used the message of the report as a starting point to emphasize the danger of 
climate change and the need to respond. A narrative that later became a major theme 
in his speeches started to emerge during this period: The example of Iceland that was 
able – within the span of one generation – to transform energy use for space heating 
from fossil fuels to geothermal energy. This theme was developed more fully in 2007 
under the title: “If we can do it so can others,” (Grímsson, 2007b). Although the change 
132 | Auður H Ingólfsdóttir: Climate Change and Security in the Arctic
happened in the 1970s, mainly as a response to the oil crisis rather than as a response 
to climate change (because it happened before climate change became a recognized 
issue on the international agenda), the story is still relevant because it shows that deep, 
transformational change is possible and can be beneficial both environmentally and 
economically. The narrative is meant to inspire and encourage leaders to have faith that 
practical solutions exists. In his 2007 speech, Grímsson emphasized the importance of 
a new vision to successfully tackle the challenges of climate change:
Of course there are no easy solutions, no single road to success. The outcome 
will depend on many measures, international actions, common policies, 
global agreements – but above all on a new vision, on the inspired convic-
tion that nations, regions, cities and homes can change their economic 
behaviour sufficiently to create basis for new sustainable and sound energy 
systems that neither threaten the security of billions of people in different 
parts of the world nor destroy the environmental viability of Mother Earth. 
(Grímsson, 2007b)
In this context, the president sees his own country, Iceland, as an important role 
model. The successful transition from fossil fuels to geothermal energy in space heating 
in the 1970s can serve as an example for others to follow. This approach differs from 
the free-rider approach the Icelandic government used in the international climate 
negotiations leading up to the Kyoto Protocol, in which the small size of the country 
was used as a rationale for negotiating exemptions. This observation brings us to an 
interesting question, which is the role of small states26 in contributing to finding solu-
tions to a complex global problem like climate change.
7.4  Small State: Free Rider or Role Model?
When climate policy and climate-related discourses in Iceland are examined, a certain 
powerlessness can sometimes be noted, due to the small size of the country. In spite 
of relatively high per-capita emissions in Iceland, the overall emissions are only a tiny 
fraction of global emissions. Even if emissions would be cut to zero, it would not make 
a noticeable dent in the overall output. This fact creates a great temptation for small 
26 Small states have often been defined in terms of population or as states that have less than 5 to 10 mil-
lion inhabitants. The modern small-states literature, however, takes other factors into consideration: the 
state’s image, the way it is perceived by domestic and international actors, and the aims and priorities 
of state leaders (Thorhallsson & Bailes). As for Iceland, however, no matter which metric is used, the 
country falls into the category of a small state, and smallness is a defining feature of Iceland’s role in 
international politics.
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states to act as “free riders” in contributing toward solving the climate crisis. In some 
ways, this is what Iceland did during the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol, when the 
main emphasis of the negotiation team was on special exemption for Iceland, rather 
than focusing on common interests. Another approach, however, is noticeable in the 
president’s speeches and in the quote of one of the policy shapers interviewed (call-
ing for a clear future vision), where the unique position of Iceland as a country with 
abundance of renewable energy is emphasized, indicating that Iceland could, in fact, 
play a role well beyond its size by acting as a role model.
Climate change is being framed as a security issue in this dissertation. In this con-
text, mitigation is an important component of enhancing long-term environmental 
security. This is in line with Barnett’s definition of environmental security as a peaceful 
process to reduce human vulnerability to human-induced environmental degradation 
by addressing the root causes of this vulnerability (Barnett, 2001). But what options 
does a small state have in the face of a global problem like climate change, given that 
the main sources that create the threat are outside its borders?
Being a small state is not equal to being a weak state. Small states, like the Nordic 
countries, that enjoy high standards of living and strong infrastructures, are in a bet-
ter position to adapt to moderate climate change than are many larger states that are 
more economically and politically fragile. If the climate impact become more dramatic, 
however, the adaption capacity of even the more well-off states may be exceeded. Thus, 
it is clear that mitigation is a vital component of enhancing long-term climate security. 
In this case, small states like Iceland have little direct power to influence overall global 
emissions. In a book chapter I wrote about small states and environmental security 
(Ingólfsdóttir, 2014), I argued that although small states are vulnerable to environ-
mental threats, especially when such threats originate outside their borders, they also 
have opportunities to influence policy at the international level by acting as “norm 
entrepreneurs”27. The power to shape norms, however, is weakened if domestic policies 
are in conflict with the ideals that small states are advocating in international forums.
This argument is relevant in the context of climate change. Because reducing domestic 
emissions in one small state will not solve the problem, states that want to contribute to 
solving the climate crisis in a meaningful way need not only change their own behavior, 
but also try to influence the behavior of other states, especially the large states that are 
responsible for the bulk of the emissions. In this case, small states have more limited 
options than large states do. Small states cannot threaten the use of military power or 
economic sanctions to put pressure on other, more powerful states. What they can do 
is to enter into bilateral partnership with stronger states or reach agreements through 
multilateral methods. They can also rely on the power of ideas (Ingebritsen, 2006), and 
27 The term “norm entrepreneur” is borrowed from Christine Ingebritsen, who has written a great deal 
about the role of the Nordic countries in world politics (Ingebritsen, 2006).
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it is through this last approach that small states may be able to exercise their power to 
influence the climate agenda most effectively. This includes being active participants 
in planting new ideas and shaping new norms.
With the rise of social constructivism in international relations, the power of norms 
has been receiving increasing attention. Norms must usually go through three phases 
before they are institutionalized as legitimate behavior: norm emergence, norm accept-
ance, and norm internalization. Norms do not emerge as a coincidence. They are actively 
pursued by agents having strong opinions about a desirable behavior (Ingebritsen, 
2002). Several studies have specifically explored the power of small states to influence 
norms in international politics, including Ingebritsen’s research on the Nordic countries 
and Kronsell’s study on the effectiveness of Sweden to push for environmental norms 
within the EU. Kronsell identifies four factors as important for small states if they 
want to be effective as norm setters: reputation, expertise and knowledge, progressive 
domestic policies and an international negotiation strategy in alignment with national 
interests (Kronsell, 2002).
In some ways, Iceland has indeed tried to act as a role model with respect to climate 
policy. This is noticeable mainly in two areas: the utilization of renewable energy sources 
and the emphasis on integrating gender concerns into climate policies. As discussed 
in Section 7.1, about 85 percent of the primary energy used in Iceland is domestically 
produced. This includes geothermal energy for space heating and both hydro power 
and geothermal energy used for electrical production. Politicians, governmental institu-
tions and business representatives have all capitalized on the positive image of Iceland 
as a producer of green energy. One example is an information booklet published by 
the National Energy Authority, emphasizing the role of renewables to mitigate climate 
change. One of the messages in the leaflet is almost identical to the narrative President 
Grímsson has created:
Iceland has succeeded in doing what many consider impossible: transform-
ing its energy system from fossil fuels to clean energy. The use of geothermal 
energy in Iceland is highly cost-effective, reliable, clean and socially impor-
tant. It has also dramatically increased the quality of life for the inhabitants 
(National Energy Authority, 2009).
Good reputation, one of the factors identified by Kronsell as important for norm 
setters, is clearly there in the field of renewable energy. So is expertise and knowledge. 
Sharing expert knowledge in harnessing renewable energy sources, especially geothermal 
energy, has been central in Iceland’s development policy in the last few decades. This 
has been most clearly demonstrated with the UN Geothermal Training Programme 
that Iceland has financed and operated since 1979, offering technical training to fel-
lows from developing countries in the field of geothermal energy (United Nations 
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University, n.d.). Progressive domestic policy also seems to be in place when consid-
ering that Iceland has one of the highest proportions of renewable energies in the 
world. A closer look, however, reveals that the picture is not quite so simple. Progress 
has been limited in reducing emissions from sectors that still rely on fossil fuels (like 
the transport sector), and recent initiatives related to oil and gas explorations (further 
discussed in Chapter 8) do not seem to fit well with the image of a country famous for 
its production of green energy.
Iceland’s emphasis on gender and gender equality within the international climate 
negotiations is also interesting to explore with the norm-entrepreneur concept in mind. 
This is a topic that in recent years has become an integral part of Iceland’s message in 
the negotiations, and the Icelandic negotiation team has been instrumental in putting 
gender on the agenda in the international negotiations. According to one civil servant 
interviewed, this initiative has been well received both domestically and at the inter-
national level. Domestically the reaction has been positive because it is a good fit with 
the Icelandic identity as a state that emphasizes gender equality in its foreign policy. At 
the international level, the emphasis on gender has created a niche for Iceland as a small 
state with a special contribution to the global discussion. “We have good credibility 
because Iceland scores high in gender equality compared to other places,” she said.
In spite of Iceland’s emphasis on gender in the international negotiation, gender is 
not visible in domestic climate policy documents and is rarely an issue that is men-
tioned when climate change is discussed domestically. This is in line with the results 
of Magnusdottir & Kronsell’s (2015) study on the visibility of gender in Scandinavian 
climate policies (see discussion in Section 4.3).
The gendered impact of the Icelandic climate action plan, however, have been ana-
lyzed as one component in a larger project on gender budgeting. Three reports were 
published as part of this initiative: one in 2012 that analyzed the gendered impact 
of the action plan; a progress report in 2013; and a final report in 2014, in which a 
specific action was chosen to work with further from a gender perspective. In the first 
report there is information about gender balance among those involved in forming 
the action plan. The committee appointed included four males and four females. The 
gender balance was not as great, however, among the experts and representatives of 
stakeholders the committee called in to give input when forming the plan. Of the 30 
people who met with the committee, 25 were males and only 5 were females. When 
estimating the gendered impact of various actions, the report concludes that, in general, 
the proposed actions are likely to create more jobs for men than women, especially in the 
agricultural sector. Another point emphasized was the importance of considering the 
lighter ecological footprint of women – in the transportation sector, for instance – and 
that this should be kept in mind when implementing actions in this sector (Icelandic 
Ministry for the Environment, 2012). In the final report for the initiative, one item 
in the action plan, increased afforestation and revegetation, was researched further to 
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discover if resources allocated to this action item in government budgeting benefited 
men and women equally. The findings showed that due to certain requirements related 
to refunding of value-added tax, the system tended to be more beneficial for men than 
for women (Icelandic Ministry for the Environment and Natural Resources, 2014b).
This analysis reveals that even in a state where gender equality is highly prioritized, 
gender concerns are not automatically integrated into policy making in all sectors and a 
specific intervention is needed to ensure that gender issues are taken into consideration.
As this discussion indicates, the role of a norm entrepreneur is a challenging one, 
because it requires a long-term vision and the willingness to take a higher moral 
ground, advocating for policies that aim at supporting the common interests of all 
states rather than the special interests of the few. Whereas those ideals are often praised 
in political speeches and policy documents, they become more difficult to live up to 
when implementing policy, in a situation of tension between various interests and 
when the demand for quick economic growth tends to dominate. In many ways, the 
elements needed to act as a norm entrepreneur fit well with the feminine values that 
are so often pushed to the side in geopolitics and domestic power politics. Adopting 
and implementing climate policy that is more inclusive of feminine values, as argued 
for in this dissertation, is therefore likely to strengthen the capacity of small states like 
Iceland act as norm entrepreneur at the international level.
7.5  Concluding Remarks
Although Iceland has participated in international climate negotiations since 1992, 
when the UNFCCC was signed, the emphasis was largely on protecting Icelandic 
economic interests, and domestic policy was weak. A policy shift can be noted in 2007. 
This shift was influenced by discussions taking place at the international level and 
further strengthened with a change in government in the 2013 national elections. A 
more comprehensive policy has been adopted with ambitious emission reduction goals. 
The policy has been followed up with an action plan, and extensive climate legislation 
was passed in the parliament in 2012, giving climate change a stronger status in the 
legal framework as an independent issue. In the international negotiations, a shift in 
Iceland’s positions was also noticeable; before the Copenhagen meeting in 2009, Ice-
land dropped its demand for a continuation of a special exemption for single projects 
in small economies and aligned itself with the EU in the international negotiations.
This shift in policy and in the negotiations tactics at the international level went 
unnoticed, for the most part, in domestic political discourses and has not been dis-
cussed much in public forums. As for implementation, emissions kept increasing from 
1990 to 2008, but have been decreasing in the last few years. A closer look at trends, 
however, reveals that high oil prices and the economic crisis following the collapse of 
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the Icelandic banks in 2008 have been the most important factors influencing emis-
sions. The direct impact of domestic climate policy on emissions is unclear, but does 
not seem to be substantial. This observation is in harmony with the views of many of 
the policy shapers, who felt that implementation of climate policy was sporadic and 
that it focused on small steps rather than systematic change.
Going back to McGregor’s framework on stereotypically masculine and feminine 
climate discourses (MacGregor, 2010), the policy discourses in Iceland can be linked to 
elements of both the ecological modernization discourse and the alternative green duty 
discourse. As McGregor explains, the ecological modernization discourse advocates 
the use of technology to solve environmental problems in an economically efficient 
way, creating a win-win situation. The approach focuses on cooperation among govern-
ments, science and business to solve environmental problems where techno-innovators 
and capitalists join forces. The narrative President Grímsson has used in many of his 
speeches, in which he tells the story of Iceland’s transition from a reliance on fossil fuels 
for space heating to a utilization of geothermal energy is an example that fits well into 
the ecological modernization discourse. The government’s emphasis on the utilization 
of renewable energies, both domestically and by importing technological knowledge 
abroad via development aid and business partnerships, is another example. Many of the 
action items in the Icelandic climate policy, such as the emphasis on carbon sequestra-
tion and on research and innovation, also fit well into this agenda.
Although McGregor recognized that technical innovations are necessary for a more 
sustainable future, she is critical of the way ecological modernization discourse places 
so much faith in technical solutions that it ignores other important elements such as 
precaution, the awareness of ecological limits and the need for lifestyle changes. She also 
argues this discourse alienates women, focusing on clever men solving problems with 
innovative technology. The issues women have traditionally been more likely to organ-
ize around, such as environmental health, habitats and livelihoods, are marginalized.
Although the masculine ecological modernization discourse is clearly noticeable 
in climate discourses in Iceland, the parallel green-duty discourse is also present. This 
discourse, which McGregor labels as a feminine, focuses on the role of individuals 
as caretakers of the environment. In this discourse, climate change is being tackled 
from the demand side, emphasizing the responsibility of individuals to make lifestyle 
change, for example by conserving energy, recycling waste and growing food locally. 
If the Icelandic policy is examined, traces of this approach can be found, although the 
technical solutions are usually higher on the list. Some of the policy shapers called 
for more attention to the importance of lifestyle changes and the need to examine 
and re-evaluate the values underlying lifestyle choices. McGregor points out that the 
green-duty discourse is not gender neutral, because the burden of the lifestyle changes 
advocated for are likely to fall more on women than men, because women still tend 
to be more responsible for unpaid work in the home than men are. This observation 
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was validated in the report that analyzed the likely gendered impact of the Icelandic 
Climate Action Plan (Icelandic Ministry for the Environment, 2012). The analysis 
revealed that if the actions were to be implemented, they would likely to create more 
jobs for men than women – in the waste sector, for instance (with increased emphasis 
on recycling), but that women’s unpaid labor in the homes could increase because the 
work related to separating the waste in the home to render it suitable for recycling is 
more likely to fall on their shoulders.
As can be seen from this discussion, elements of both the masculine ecological 
modernization discourse and the more feminine green-duty discourse can be noted 
in Iceland’s climate policy and associated discourses on climate change and mitigation 
measures, although the ecological modernization discourse seems to be more dominat-
ing. Looking only at discourses as they appear in climate policy documents, however, 
is not enough. In this case, the framework provided by MacGregor is too limited. The 
climate discourses need to be put into larger context of the more mainstream discourses 
about economic development and the tension between the need for economic devel-
opment and nature conservation. If climate concerns are not integrated into the more 
general economic policy, climate issues are likely to remain marginal. How present are 
climate issues when the government or businesses are planning the future and mak-
ing decisions about new ventures? One way to explore this question is to step out of 
the environmental box and explore discourses within other sectors, where economic 
development is in the forefront, but decisions made can heavily influence emissions. 
This is the topic of the next chapter, where discourses related to possible oil and gas 
developments in offshore from Iceland are examined.
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8.  Iceland as an Oil State? 
Given Iceland’s image as a producer of green energy, it may come as a surprise that since 
2009 several steps have been taken to turn Iceland into an oil state. Three exploration 
licenses have been granted for the Dreki area on the Jan Mayen ridge northeast of 
Iceland. This chapter will examine public discourses related to oil and gas explorations 
northeast of Iceland, specifically examining the relationship between the oil and gas 
discourses and the climate change discourses. As explained in Chapter 2 (Section 
2.5), I find it important to look at climate discourses broadly. I therefore use the term 
“climate-related discourses” to refer both to discourses where climate change takes the 
center stage and to discourses in other sectors where policy decisions can influence 
either the adaptation or mitigation component of climate change, regardless if this 
impact is recognized in public discussions. By widening the lens to go beyond more 
narrowly defined types of climate discourses, some important additional information 
can be revealed about the underlying values that guide decision making in public policy.
The oil and gas sector is an example of a sector where the main emphasis has been 
on new economic opportunities and potential for a positive contribution to economic 
growth, but decisions made in this sector are still directly related to climate change, 
because the burning of fossil fuels is the single largest contributor to human-induced 
climate change. In this chapter, I first give an overview of how oil and gas explorations 
became part of the political agenda in Iceland and then provide an analysis of the way 
oil and gas discourses have included (or excluded) references to climate change. My 
interest in the oil and gas question was ignited by interviews with the policy shapers, 
in which the topic repeatedly came up in spite of not being on the original list of 
guiding questions. I rely heavily on the interviews as my data when discussing the oil 
and gas discourses, but I will also take notice of discussions in the media and refer to 
information in the president’s speeches.
One central question is: Can Iceland become an oil state and still preserve the image 
of a state that is a promoter of green energy? Related to this is the question of if it is 
possible to develop and implement an ambitious climate policy and be simultaneously 
involved in fossil fuel production? If oil and gas reserves are to be found off the coast 
of Iceland, would it even be a realistic option to decide not to use such resources, given 
the growing global need for energy? These are some of the questions addressed in the 
following sections. These questions relate to the overall research questions about the 
influence of dominant political and economic paradigms on climate-related policies 
and help shed light on the values underlying policy decisions.
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8.1  The Dreki Area
In 2007, the Ministry for Industry published a report with a proposal to issue exclusive 
licenses for exploration and production of oil and gas in the northern part of the Dreki 
area on the Jan Mayen Ridge, located in the northeast of Iceland. The report also in-
cluded a strategic environmental assessment of the proposed plan (Icelandic Ministry 
of Industry, 2007). The proposal and associated strategic environmental assessment 
served as basis for the first and second licensing rounds that were conducted in 2009 
(first round) and 2012 (second round). Because the first round did not result in any 
licenses being issued, a decision was made to repeat the process. The results of the 
second round were the issuing of three licenses: two in 2013 and one in the beginning 
of 2014. The exploration licenses will last up to 12 years, but may be prolonged to a 
maximum of 16 years. If exploration is successful, a priority can be given to the license 
holder for a production license for up to 30 years (National Energy Authority, 2014).
The idea to explore for oil and gas in the Jan Mayen Ridge, however, can be traced 
back further in time. In 1981 Norway and Iceland reached a bilateral agreement on the 
delimitation line on the continental shelf in the area between Iceland and Jan Mayen. 
The agreement also established cooperation between the two states in connection with 
the exploration and potential exploitation of hydrocarbon resources in the region. This 
included joined seismic and magnetic surveys and the right of Iceland to participate 
with a share of 25 percent in petroleum activities on the Norwegian side of the region 
and Norway having the same right on the Icelandic side (United Nations, 1981).
Norway has used its right to participate in exploration licenses on the Icelandic side 
through the company, Petoro Iceland, owned by the Norwegian state. All three licenses 
have been issued to investors comprising one foreign company, one Icelandic company 
and Petoro Iceland. The first two licenses were issued in January 2013, one to Faroe 
Petroleum (67.5 percent), Iceland Petroleum (6.7 percent) and Petoro Iceland (25 
percent); the other to Ithaca Petroleum (56.25 percent), Kolvetni (18.75 percent) and 
Petoro Iceland (25 percent). The third license was issued in January 2014 to CNOOC 
International (60 percent), Eykon Energy (15 percent) and Petoro Iceland (25 percent) 
(National Energy Authority, n.d.).
In December 2014, the investors led by Faroe Petroleum returned their license, saying 
that initial research results did not give promising results, and the investors preferred 
to focus on other projects in the Arctic with lower risks involved (Unnarsson, 2014). 
The other two licenses, however, were still valid as of late 2015.
The report from 2007 includes a strategic environmental impact assessment of the 
proposal for issuing licenses for oil and gas explorations and production in the Dreki 
area. Although a strategic environmental assessment is not as detailed as an environmen-
tal impact assessment, it does evaluate what could be the key environmental impacts. 
The report identifies a number of environmental issues that need to be considered, 
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Figure 2: The Dreki Region
A	map	showing	the	Dreki	area	on	the	Jan	Mayen	Ridge,	northeast	of	Iceland	(National	En-
ergy	Authority,	2014,	p.	2)
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such as noise pollution, marine pollution and air pollution. The relationship between 
oil and gas production and climate change, however, is never mentioned in the report 
(Icelandic Ministry of Industry, 2007), and this issue never comes up in the comments 
about the proposal that were received from representatives from 15 stakeholders. In 
other words, the fact that the burning of the oil and gas resources pumped from the 
Dreki area would contribute to climate change was not considered relevant when pos-
sible environmental impacts are evaluated.
This should come as no surprise, given that the bookkeeping of greenhouse gas 
emissions that all UNFCCC member states are required to keep is organized around 
the demand side rather than the supply side. Emissions are tracked by monitoring the 
users of fossil fuels rather than focusing on those involved in production. This also 
means that climate policies have, for the most part, aimed at changing behavior on the 
demand side, assuming that as demand drops, supply will automatically be reduced. As 
the discussion in Section 2.1 revealed, however, this is not the case. Huge economic 
interests are at stake, and the fossil fuel industry has deep roots in the power structures 
that shape global politics. A report from the International Energy Authority has dem-
onstrated that global subsidies to the fossil fuel industry are up to six times higher than 
subsidies for renewable energies (International Energy Agency, 2012), and investors 
are showing no sign of slowing down, in spite of governments around the world an-
nouncing more ambitious climate policies in the future.
In recent years, scientists have tried to estimate how much more of Earth’s fossil 
fuels can be extracted and burned and still stay within the 2°C limits, identified by 
the international community as the necessary target in order to avoid severe global 
warming. A study with results published in Nature suggests that in order to meet the 
target of 2°C, one-third of global oil reserves, half of gas reserves and over 80 percent of 
current coal reserves need to remain in the ground between 2010 and 2050 (McGlade 
& Ekins, 2015). The authors not only evaluate the overall global share of fossil fuel 
reserves that can be safely burned, but attempt to map out how much can be used in 
different regions from the point of view of economic efficiency. As for the Arctic region, 
they conclude that the 100 billion barrels of oil and 35 trillion cubic meters of gas they 
estimate to be located within the Arctic Circle should all be classified as unburnable.
McGlade & Ekins do not consider political factors in their analysis, which of course 
are of crucial importance when it comes to energy and the utilization of fossil fuel re-
sources. With an international system, in which sovereign states each try to maximize 
the benefits from its own resources, giving up the right to utilize resources within its 
borders seems unthinkable. At the same time, it is clear that the climate crisis will not 
be avoided unless massive cuts are made in the burning of fossil fuels. With this in 
mind, analyzing the oil and gas discourses in the Icelandic context, and whether they 
are related or not related to climate concerns, is a worthy endeavor.
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8.2  Oil and Gas Discourses
Although some preparatory work had been done in the parliament in the years pre-
ceding the report published in 2007, public discussion about a possible oil and gas 
exploration off the coast of Iceland was barely noticeable. It was not really until 2009, 
during the first licensing round, that the topic of oil and gas exploration off the coast 
of Iceland reached mainstream media. In the beginning, there was an almost unified 
consensus among political parties and the public in support of oil and gas exploration. 
The support was so strong that the few that dared to question the oil initiative were 
quickly silenced. It took a few years before critical voices, offering an alternative per-
spective, had carved out space to voice their concerns. By that time, the three licenses 
had already been issued and the course set for the future.
The following discussion provides an analysis of public discourses in Iceland on 
the oil and gas sector, and how this discourse has changed over time. As previously 
explained, I rely on media accounts, the president’s speeches and information drawn 
from interviews with policy shapers as my primary data.
The Lonely Opponent
In April 2009, during the first licensing round and shortly before national elections 
were to take place, Kolbrún Halldórdóttir, a parliamentarian for the Left Greens and 
the Minister for the Environment at the time, publicly criticized her government’s 
plans for oil and gas exploration in the Dreki region in the evening news on one of 
the TV stations. In the interview she expressed doubts if oil and gas production could 
be in harmony with sustainable development and questioned if this were the right 
path to recover from the economic crisis that followed the collapse of the Icelandic 
banks in October 2008 (Vísir, 2009). As Guðni Elísson (2011) has noted, in an 
article where he critically analyzed the discourses related to oil and gas exploration 
in Iceland, the minister was harshly criticized, not only by her political opponents, 
but also by her own party. Within an hour after the interview was aired on TV, the 
other parliamentarians belonging to the Left Green party had sent out a declaration, 
disagreeing with her views. Elísson also reviewed reactions to the interview in various 
social media platforms where the minister was also harshly criticized. She was called 
“stupid” and “crazy” and accused of working against national interests. In the elec-
tions that followed, Halldórsdóttir not only lost her seat in the parliament, but close 
to 25 percent of the voters that did vote for the Left Greens in her region crossed her 
name off the list (Elísson, 2011).
The doubts expressed by the former minister should not have come as a surprise, 
given that she was a representative of the Left Greens, a party that presents itself as 
guardian of the environment. Although criticism coming from her political opponents 
was to be expected, the rejection of her views by key politicians in her own party are 
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more puzzling. Not only did many of them openly disagree, no one stepped into the 
discussion to defend her position. The strong reaction to the views expressed in the TV 
interview clearly illustrate that there was little space for an alternative perspective at the 
time. Iceland was going through an economic crisis, and both politicians and the public 
were eagerly seeking new economic opportunities. In this context, the potential for 
lucrative oil and gas production off the coast of Iceland was too attractive to consider 
the option not to use this resource, should it become available.
In the next 3 to 4 years, the developments for a new licensing round took place 
with hardly any criticism, and when the oil and gas developments were discussed 
publicly, climate change was rarely mentioned as an issue. Politicians referred to how 
we should learn from Norway, use the best available technology and implement strict 
environmental regulations. When the Dreki region was discussed in the parliament in 
the period 2010–2012, the discussions centered on the status of the licensing and few 
parliamentarians participated. This was at the same time as the same government was 
developing a climate action plan, passing new climate legislation in the parliament, and 
emphasizing the importance of an ambitious climate policy (as described in Chapter 
7). The political discourse on climate policy and on the oil and gas development were 
neatly kept in separate boxes, and politicians repeatedly avoided mentioning climate 
change when discussing the oil question.
The same was true for the Icelanders who participated in the public discussion and 
were involved in the oil and gas licensing process as investors. One example can be 
found in a book written by Heiðar Guðjónsson, one of the investors, about new op-
portunities in the Arctic. Guðjónsson writes how Iceland can take advantage of new 
economic opportunities in the Arctic. Although he recognized that those opportuni-
ties are at least in part a consequence of a warmer climate and the melting of the ice, 
he never mentions climate change explicitly in the book and completely ignores the 
associated threats. In a chapter about oil and environment he briefly discusses the 
perspective expressed by the former Minister for the Environment that Iceland should 
show global responsibility and stop all plans for explorations and productions of oil 
and gas. He quickly dismisses this perspective, claiming that because CO2 emissions 
are higher from burning coal than oil, it would be beneficial to increase the use of oil 
and reduce the use of coal somewhere else instead (pointing specifically to the rapid 
increase in coal production China in this context) (Guðjónsson, 2013).
But what about politicians like the President Grímsson, who had been so outspo-
ken about the danger of climate change? Did he not see the relationship between 
oil and gas production in the Arctic and the climate issue? Although the Icelandic 
President usually does not participate in the day –to-day political discussion, President 
Grímsson continued to talk about both climate change and Arctic affairs during this 
period, as he travelled the world and gave speeches in various forums. The speeches 
clearly demonstrate that he is well aware of the tension that exists between the threats 
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climate change poses to the Arctic region and the potential economic opportunities 
the warming climate may bring. In a speech in Russia, Arkhangelsk in 2011 he said:
It is paradoxical: new venues for economic progress and the well-being of our 
nations being opened up, while at the same time we are reminded that the 
threat of climate change has become urgent. A failure to reach international 
agreements on carbon-emission reductions will expose us to the possibility 
of man-made disaster on a catastrophic scale. (Grímsson, 2011)
And he also recognized the paradox this presents for his own country:
Similarly, the opening by the Icelandic National Authority of bids for explora-
tion of oil in the so called Dragon Area, off the northeast coast of Iceland in 
the Jan Mayen Ocean we share with Norway, indicates how the resource-rich 
North faces us with unexpected challenges. Iceland, a country that has prided 
itself on its clean-energy success, with all electricity and space heating now 
derived from green energy resources, is cautiously taking the first steps into 
a potential oil-production future. (Grímsson, 2011)
On numerous occasions, Grímsson has emphasized the need to change the nature 
of energy system fundamentally in order to tackle challenges related to climate change. 
Yet, when the topic of oil and gas became an integral part of Arctic discourse, he initially 
refrained from questioning the wisdom of utilizing the oil and gas resources in the Arctic, 
both in international forums and in domestic discussions in Iceland. When he refers to 
the upcoming oil and gas developments in the region in many of his speeches, he seems 
to assume they are inevitable, but emphasizes the importance of responsible implementa-
tion of such endeavors. By doing so, he has played his part in legitimating the separation 
of discourse on the danger of climate change and the economic opportunities in the 
Arctic due to the melting of the ice, ignoring the obvious links between the two topics.28.
In summary, from the time Kolbrún Halldórsdóttir received the harsh reaction 
for expressing her doubts about the wisdom of oil and gas explorations in the Dreki 
region in April 2009, there was almost complete silence on the issue for more than 
three years – until the beginning of 2013, when the first two licenses were issued. It 
was exactly this silence that caught my attention in the initial stages of my research.
28 The president‘s speeches that formed part of the data set for this research were from the period 1998–2013. 
In more recent speeches, during the Arctic Circle conference in 2015, for example, President Grimsson 
has been more critical of oil and gas developments, arguing that instead of focusing on new fossil fuel 
resources, the Arctic states could explore opportunities as potential providers of clean energy for Europe 
(referring specifically to Iceland and Greenland in this context).
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The Views of the Policy Shapers
The silencing of alternative views first became evident to me during my interviews 
with policy shapers. I started the interview process in late 2011, when the Dreki area 
was not in the spotlight. I had not even planned to ask about oil and gas explorations 
in the interviews, and this topic was not part of my initial list of questions, as can be 
seen in Appendix I, which lists the guiding questions I used in the interviews. The 
topic emerged on its own, however, through discussions about general climate issues, 
early in the interview process. After the first 2 to 3 interviews, I began systematically 
integrating questions related to oil and gas exploration in the Dreki region, often as a 
follow-up question to discussion about domestic climate policy.
The oil and gas question first came up in an interview conducted in spring 2012 with 
a person working for an international institution. He had noticed the increased interest 
in utilizing oil and gas resources in the Arctic and felt people were blind to the negative 
consequences because they were so occupied with the economic potential. Discussing this 
in public forums seemed pointless in his view, because no one was ready to even put this 
on the agenda, so those concerned with the environment had instead focused on making 
sure the oil production would only be allowed under strict environmental regulations. 
In spite of his choice to stay silent in public forums, his views were clear: “…yes, there is a 
clear paradox. To go and get the last 10 to 15 percent of the world’s oil and gas resources 
in the Arctic, as this will only add to global warming and have serious consequences.”
The oil issue came up again a few weeks later in an interview with another civil serv-
ant, this one working at the municipal level:
Do we need oil? Us Icelanders with all this renewable energy? (Laughs). I 
think it would have been great…it would have been really cool if we would 
have said: There is oil there and we know about it. But we have this renew-
able energy and we are going to focus on those resources. I would have liked 
to see that […]…but I am a careful civil servant. I find it difficult to…I never 
feel like I am in a position to be able to express myself.
The power of civil servants to shape policy is related to their direct access to poli-
ticians, but this comes at a price: They are not always free to express their opinions 
publically. But what about other policy shapers, like activists and the politicians them-
selves? A representative of the NGO community mentioned oil and gas exploration in 
the Dreki region as an example of the powerlessness of the NGO sector due to their 
limited resources:
Like the current discussion, if we relate it back to climate change, about oil 
exploration in the Dreki region. There is no discussion. There is no discus-
sion because the NGO sector is too weak to provide professional analysis.
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For the politicians, the fear of being marginalized is what stops the discussion. The 
politician quoted below started talking about the Dreki region at her own initiative, 
relating it to the increasing interest of oil and gas resources in the Arctic region:
I am not sure…my personal opinion is that we should not go down this path. 
But I realize that it is extremely difficult to try to stand against it. It is almost 
impossible. That is just the way it is. Are you going to oppose that we do some 
research to find out if it is possible to drill there? That is just… you might as 
well crucify me tomorrow.
This politician belongs to a different party than Kolbrún Halldórsdóttir, the former 
Minister for the Environment, but is known for emphasizing the importance of envi-
ronmental issues. In her view, it is difficult when the same people are always responsible 
for bringing up the environmental issues.
These quotes are all from interviews conducted in 2012, when there was almost 
complete silence on the relationship between climate change and oil and gas explora-
tion in the Dreki region. The remaining interviews were conducted in 2013 and 2014, 
after the licenses had been issued and critical voices had become louder. In fact, some 
of those interviewed during this period had already spoken publicly against oil and 
gas exploration and were not as shy about their views as could be noted in the earlier 
interviews. “Personally I find it unethical”, one expert stated and emphasized that he 
felt the same about Norwegians and other Arctic nations that are choosing to take 
advantage of the warming of the region by utilizing previously inaccessible oil and gas 
resources. Another expert brought out the opportunities associated with making a 
conscious decision to leave the resource in the ground:
I think it would be great opportunity to be a role model by… not using the 
oil. We don´t know what the consequences will be from exploring in the 
area. We have no idea about the ecological impacts. We don´t even know 
what the price of oil will be when we finally might get some oil out of there. 
I think we should not touch it. Just say: This oil can stay there and we are 
going to focus on other things. That would be really cool if we, as a nation, 
would decide to do that.
One interviewee, belonging to the younger generation, did not hesitate when asked 
about the Dreki region: “I personally think we should not do this because somewhere 
someone has to say no to oil production and consumption. And we don’t need it.” She 
finds her approach completely realistic, but admits the idea is still “out of the box”, 
because the dominant thinking tends to favor exploitation. “But this is a thinking 
we need to change,” she said. “Because it is not like that. We cannot continue to burn 
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fossil fuels. We know that. And we don’t need it to survive. So we could channel our 
energy into something else.”
This policy shaper has been involved in politics and has also, on occasions, par-
ticipated in some international negotiations on behalf of Iceland. She provided an 
interesting perspective on why the ideology of exploitation of natural resources is so 
dominant in Iceland:
Our entire foreign policy is built around the idea that we are a nation that 
relies on natural resources. It is ingrained into our administrative system. So 
to speak against it is a big no-no. I also think this is related to the fact that 
in international forums we are consistently involved in fights that focus on 
our rights to use our resources, rather than speaking from a conservation 
point of view, even if we emphasize the sustainability factor. But still…this 
is a very dominant discourse within the administrative system. That Iceland 
is a resource-use nation and our survival and quality of life depends on the 
use of natural resources.
This referral to “fights” for rights to use resources is linked not only to Iceland’s 
emphasis in the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol that a new climate regime would 
not limit Iceland’s opportunities to utilize renewable energy resources, but even more 
to the negotiations Iceland is constantly involved in to protect its interests as a fishing 
nation. The controversy about whaling also plays a part, but for decades the Icelandic 
Foreign Service has been active in defending Iceland’s rights for sustainable use of 
marine mammals in international forums.
The oil issue was discussed in 13 of the 18 interviews with policy shapers. In 11 out of 
13 cases, the policy shapers expressed strong opposition to oil and gas exploration in the 
Dreki region, or more generally in the Arctic region. The issue did not come up in five 
interviews29, but at least three out of those five have, at some point, expressed themselves 
in a public forum to speak against potential oil production. In two interviews in which 
the oil and gas issue was discussed and the policy shapers did not express their opposition, 
they did not actively support the oil initiative either. Rather, they conveyed that they did 
not believe that this issue was important enough to put at the forefront in the climate 
discussion. One of them, a politician, admitted that he found the discussion about the 
Dreki region to be quite complicated. He claimed that it was difficult to oppose, given 
the strength of public support. “Why should only we sacrifice ourselves?” he asked.
29  These five interviews were all in the early stages of the interview process before I had identified the oil 
and gas issue as an important theme. After the first few interviews, however, I began to integrate ques-
tions related to the oil and gas development into the discussion more systematically, even though those 
questions were not listed on the original list of questions developed for the interviews (see Appendix I).
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In spite of this ambivalence, it is interesting to note that in general there was a strong 
sense among the policy shapers that the decision to issue licenses for oil and gas ex-
ploration off the coast of Iceland was the wrong one, and they connected the decision 
easily with the climate issue. At the same time, political discourses on the two issues 
were strangely separated. Although awareness of the dangers of climate change was 
increasing, both among the public and in political circles, support for oil production 
was overwhelming. It was only in late 2012 and early 2013, almost four years after the 
controversial TV interview with the former Minister for the Environment, that critical 
voices started to emerge in the public discussion.
Other Critical Voices
In January 2013, 80 percent of Icelanders supported oil production in the Dreki re-
gion, according to a poll conducted jointly by Stöð 2 (TV station) and Fréttablaðið 
(newspaper). Only 5 percent were against it, but 11 percent claimed to be neutral. 
Although the support was greatest among voters of the Independence Party and the 
Progressive Party, the majority of those that supported the Social Democrats were also 
in support of oil production (75 percent in favor, 17 percent against) and the same was 
true for the Left Greens, although opposition was stronger there (61 percent in favor, 
30 percent against) (Valþórsson, 2013).
In March 2015, the Social Democrats almost unanimously passed a declaration at 
their biannual assembly rejecting oil and gas explorations on the basis of its lack of 
harmony with Iceland’s climate policy (Samfylkingin, 2015). Within the Left Greens 
there was also growing opposition against oil and gas explorations, especially among the 
youths in the party (Arnarson, 2015), and in October that same year the party passed 
a similar declaration as the Social Democrats at their biannual assembly (Vinstri græn, 
2015). Although the two parties in power still fully supported oil and gas exploration, 
there had been a clear shift in the political discourse, with alternative perspectives tak-
ing up more room. But what had changed since two years earlier?
Elísson (2011) clearly links the oil and gas discussion to climate change in his article 
where he discussed the harsh reaction Kolbrún Halldórsdóttir received after her TV 
interview in 2009. His article is one of the first references that explicitly recognizes the 
relationship between climate change and oil and gas explorations in the Dreki region. 
It was not until late 2012 and early 2013, however, that others came forward with the 
same perspective. Initially this included a few articles and blogs in which the wisdom 
of Iceland becoming an oil state was questioned, but in early 2014, the first official 
protest was organized against oil and gas explorations.
Guðmundur Hörður Guðmundsson, who at the time was the Chair of the Board of 
the environmental NGO, Landvernd, was one of the first one to publish a blog speaking 
out against oil and gas explorations in the Dreki region. In the blog he accuses the Ice-
landic government of prioritizing the interests of oil investors over climate protection. 
150 | Auður H Ingólfsdóttir: Climate Change and Security in the Arctic
If Iceland would have publicly stated oil and gas explorations would be delayed, with 
the interests of future generations in mind, this could have brought some positive world 
attention and further strengthened Iceland’s image as a role model in environmental 
affairs (Guðmundsson, 2012). In February 2013, six theologians published an article 
opposing oil and gas explorations in the Dreki area, emphasizing the ethical dimen-
sion of oil production. “In this world everything is connected: nature, the oceans, the 
earth and the surrounding atmosphere,”30 they state and call for an awareness of how 
domestic actions can contribute to global problems (Guðmundsdóttir, et al., 2013).
The articles mentioned above were not met with the same kind of harsh criticism 
as was the case in 2009. In fact they did not receive much attention and were not 
picked up by mainstream media. Comments made by Ari Trausti Guðmundsson at an 
Arctic seminar in the spring of 2013, however, triggered the interest of a journalist at 
Morgunblaðið. Guðmundsson, a geologist, author and a presidential candidate in the 
elections in 2012 (when President Grímsson was elected for his fifth term), was a guest 
at a seminar where President Grímsson and Sauli Niinistö, the President of Finland, 
talked about Arctic affairs. Guðmundsson asked to speak after panel discussions; he 
was not only critical of oil and gas production in the Arctic, but challenged the two 
presidents to speak about developments in the oil and gas sector in the Arctic in the 
context of the danger of climate change. According to Morgunblaðið, neither of the 
two presidents responded to this comment, but the director of the Icelandic National 
Energy Authority (NEA) said a few words in support of oil and gas exploration in the 
Arctic, claiming such production was better than using other fossil fuels such as coal 
(Arnarson, 2013).
What is noteworthy about Guðmundsson’s intervention is not only that the dis-
cussion reached mainstream media, but also the fact that he was in a position to ask 
influential policy shapers (the two presidents) directly about their position. Their silence 
at the meeting confirms once again the tendency to ignore the relationship between 
climate change and oil and gas exploration in the Arctic, treating it as two separate 
issues. The reaction of the director of the NEA is also in line with the reasoning used 
by supporters of the oil and gas exploration the few times they do address the climate 
question, namely to refer to the fact that somewhere else someone is doing something 
that is even worse for the climate.
The experts and activists mentioned above are all established in their fields and 
experienced in participating in public discourses. The groups most influential in shift-
ing the discourse, however, by creating a more systematic opposition to oil and gas 
exploration in the Dreki area, all belonged to the younger generations. In August 2013, 
a workshop on how to engage in activism to protests against oil and gas productions 
30 My translation. Original quote in Icelandic: “Hér í heimi er allt samtengt: náttúran, hafdjúpin, jörðin 
og lofthjúpurinn umhverfis hana.“
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was on the agenda of a summer school hosted by the grassroots movement “Róttæki 
sumarháskólinn”31. The movement identified itself as a radical, left-wing organization 
(Róttæki sumarháskólinn, 2013). The people who attended later established the group, 
Grugg, and opened up the website grugg.is.
The seeds from the workshop later materialized in the first public protest against 
oil and gas explorations in the Dreki area that was held in Reykjavík on 22 January 
2014, the same day the government issued the third exploration license for the Dreki 
area. Although only 70 to 80 people participated in the protest, the event received 
considerable attention and was covered in all mainstream media outlets. Part of the 
protest was to issue a declaration that was signed by twelve NGOs, including both the 
older and more established environmental NGOs and the more recent ones were the 
youths who organized and led the protest were most active. The declaration is clear 
on that it is the relationship between climate change and oil and gas production that 
is the key reason for the opposition. The organizations that signed the declaration 
demand that the government and the parliament immediately stop all plans related 
to oil and gas production within the Icelandic Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). By 
doing so, Icelandic authorities would act in a globally responsible manner and send a 
strong message to the world that Iceland intends to be a leader in progressive climate 
policy (Sigurðsson, 2014).
The wide participation of NGOs and the attention the protest received in the 
media was a demonstration that the soil was much more fertile for alternative views 
on whether fossil fuels resources should be utilized within Iceland’s EEZ than was the 
case five years earlier when the fateful TV interview took place. But the day of the 
demonstration also marked a milestone, in the sense that all three licenses had been 
issued and oil and gas explorations were becoming a reality. If a shift had taken place 
in the public discourse, was it coming too late? Had decisions already been taken far 
into the future that would be impossible to revoke?
8.3  Is a Shift Taking Place? 
Discussions in the parliament in January 2013 shortly after the first two licenses were 
issued, illustrated that although there was still overwhelming support for the oil and 
gas explorations, there was more tolerance for perspectives other than those under 
political discussion a few years previously. Einar K. Guðfinnsson, member of the 
Independence party, started the discussion. After celebrating the recent licensing, he 
expressed his surprise at protesters who were criticizing the oil and gas explorations, 
indicating that such views were ridiculous and would never be heard in other countries 
31  In English: The Radical Summer University
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(Guðfinnsson, 2013). He used the same tactic as had been used to silence the Minister 
for the Environment in 2009, but this time several parliamentarians disagreed and 
rejected his attempt to silence the critics. Although none of them clearly stated that 
they were against oil and gas explorations, a few expressed concerns and posed some 
challenging questions, validating the views of those opposed as being at least worthy 
of discussion. Margrét Tryggvadóttir, member of the Movement32, pointed out that 
environmentalists existed in all countries, so Iceland was not the only country where 
critical perspectives were expressed. “I miss democratic discussion about this issue,” 
she said, believing that important decisions had been made before the necessary 
dialogue had occurred, to inform both politicians and the public what was at stake 
(Tryggvadóttir, 2013).
Articles and blogs started to appear around the same time, and more critical discus-
sion about the oil and gas issue was beginning within the left-wing political parties – 
both the Left Greens and the Social Democrats. In both cases, the youth movements 
within those parties were the ones pressing for this issue being discussed. By 2015, 
perspectives challenging the dominant consensus were clearly established as legitimate 
views although political support of the government in power was still in favor of oil 
and gas exploration. The climate question was no longer completely ignored.
Although the government has not changed its position on the oil issue, the debate 
has influenced the dominant discourse, making it more difficult for those in power to 
focus only on the opportunities in the Arctic, while ignoring the threats. One exam-
ple of this shift in discourse can be found in a draft report about Iceland’s interests in 
the Arctic, published on the website of the Prime Minister’s Office (discussed briefly 
in Chapter 6). Instead of the opportunistic discourse that dominated previously, the 
analysis is more balanced, emphasizing both threats and opportunities. The threats 
associated with ocean acidification receives more attention than in previous public 
documents and the potential tension between the image of Iceland as provider of green 
energy and as a potential oil state is recognized, at least implicitly, as the following 
quote demonstrates:
The discussion about energy issues in the Arctic is often focused on the 
production of fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas). The interests of Iceland include 
bringing attention to renewable and environmentally friendly energy op-
tions in the Arctic region, partly as a way to counterbalance an increase 
in greenhouse gas emissions. Also, it is important to think about how to 
32  The Movement (“Hreyfingin” in Icelandic) was a short-lived political movement that emerged from the 
grassroots movement that was most active in the Pots and Pan Revolution in Iceland in January 2009, 
which eventually led to the resignation of the government in power during the collapse of the Icelandic 
banks in late 2008.
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protect the image of Iceland as a country with a clean environment where 
environmentally friendly energy sources are harnessed wisely.33 (Minister 
Committee on Arctic Affairs, 2015, p. 11)
One noteworthy factor in the shift in discourse is that those concerned with climate 
change are placing increasing attention on the supply side of the energy sector instead 
of focusing solely on the demand side of energy use. This was the explanation given 
by the leaders of the Social Democrats when they were asked why they supported 
the declaration opposing the oil and gas exploration passed at their biannual assem-
bly, after having been keen supporters of the licensing process in the Dreki region. 
One example is Katrín Júlíusdóttir, the Vice Chairman of the Social Democrats 
and Minister for Industry during the first licensing round. In a TV program on the 
Internet-based TV, Hringbraut, she discussed her change in opinion regarding oil 
and gas explorations in the Dreki area. She explained that when the licensing process 
began, the dominant view was that the best way to reduce emissions was to imple-
ment policies that focused on the demand side of energy use. The 5th Assessment 
Report published by the IPCC in 2013 showed that past policies were not working, 
and that this called for some radical thinking and new solutions. According to her, 
this was one of the reasons her party concluded that it was important to look at the 
supply side as well (Heimsljós, 2015).
As is the case with climate policy, the oil and gas discussion in Iceland does not take 
place in a vacuum. Iceland is not the only Arctic state where the supply side of energy 
has been largely ignored in climate policy, and there are examples from other places 
where the calls for a change are getting louder, putting more pressure on the suppliers.
Although the situation is quite different and much more complex in the larger 
Arctic states (Russia, Canada and USA/Alaska), Norway provides some interesting 
comparisons. Even if Norway is smaller than Russia, Canada and the USA, it is still a 
much larger player than Iceland, both because Norway is a larger state and because the 
state has been heavily involved in oil and gas production for decades. Yet supporters of 
the development of an oil and gas sector in Iceland frequently refer to Norway as an 
example to demonstrate that it is possible to be a producer of fossil fuels while being 
considered an environmentally conscious state.
Just like Iceland, Norway prides itself of being a state with high environmental 
awareness, and the Norwegian government has repeatedly expressed its interest for 
33  My translation. Original quote in Icelandic: ”Umræðan um orkumál á norðurslóum fer oftan ekki fram 
undir formerkjum vinnslu jarðefnaeldsneytis (kolefna, olíu og gass). Hagsmunir Íslands liggja meðal 
annars í að vekja athygli á valkostum endurnýjanlegrar og umhverfisvænnar orku á norðurslóðum, meðal 
annars til að vinna á móti aukinni losun gróðurhúsalofttegunda. Jafnframt þarf að huga að því að verja 
hina jákvæðu ímynd landsins sem tengist hreinni náttúru og skynsamlegri nýtingu á umhverfisvænum 
orkugjöfum.”
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Norway to be a role model when it comes to ambitious climate policy. At the same 
time, Norway is an oil state, and investments in fossil fuel continue in spite of the 
increasing recognition of threats related to climate change. In this context, the High 
North (the part of Norway that belongs to the Arctic) is receiving more and more at-
tention. Kristoffersen (2015) notes that in political discourses about the High North, 
the threat of climate change has been reframed into a scenario of possibilities, in which 
changes in the Arctic are seen as opportunities. Kristofferson uses the term “opportun-
istic adaptation” to explain how economic benefits of climate change are prioritized 
over efforts to address the causes. She explain how this approach has helped to keep 
discussion about mitigation strategies separate from adaption strategies and notes how 
this attitude can promote a scenario in which climate change in the Arctic context is 
an environmental problem to be managed, but not resolved.
Kristoffersen also discusses the logic used by supporters of increased oil production. 
Just as in the Icelandic case, the rationale is that the oil and gas production in Norway 
is somehow “better” than fossil fuel production in other places. In the Norwegian case, 
one rationale used is that by providing energy to poor countries Norway is helping 
facilitate economic development in the Global South (Kristoffersen, 2015). Another 
common tactic in Norway, that was also evident in the Icelandic case, is to move at-
tention away from the climate question by focusing on other environmental aspects 
of fossil fuel production. This approach assumes that regardless of climate change, the 
world will need more energy in the future and it is unrealistic to believe that fossil fuels 
will not continue to be an important part of the global energy mix. In this context, 
what is important is not if those resources are used but how they are used. The emphasis 
should be on environmentally friendly production rather than the question of whether 
the resources should be used or not.
The petroleum discourse is one factor that Jensen (2012) examines in a compre-
hensive discourse analysis of how the High North is framed in Norwegian policy. His 
analysis reveals how the anti-oil production discourse – extracting oil in the Barents 
Sea was too risky, due to the sensitive environment – was turned on its head by those in 
support of opening up the area for production. The discourse was met with arguments 
that it was, in fact, an environmentally sound idea to start production in the area as 
soon as possible. By getting ahead of the Russians in utilizing the petroleum resources 
in the area, Norway would be able to lead by example and show good environmental 
management in practice, thereby increasing the likelihood of the Russians consider-
ing environmental factors when they started drilling on their side. In other words, the 
supporters not only argued that economic benefits outweigh environmental risks, but 
went further by indicating that the environment would in fact benefit if Norway would 
start production as soon as possible. As Jensen explains, this argument rests on the im-
age of Russia as an environmental laggard – an assumption seemed to have been taken 
at face value in the Norwegian debate. For the period he examined (2002–2005), the 
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discourse arguing that oil production in the Barents Sea would benefit the environment 
managed to overshadow the anti-oil drilling discourse.
In spite of the dominant discourse, those views are increasingly being challenged; 
Kristoffersen cites interviews she conducted with two politicians who have been criti-
cal of the opportunistic discourse. Politician Erik Solheim of the Socialist Party is one 
example. He has been particularly critical toward the rationale behind the arguments 
that Norway is drilling for oil for the climate and for the world’s poorest countries. In 
his view, those that claim they are drilling for climate mitigation and global develop-
ment may have a point if they would focus only on gas, but they undermine their views 
when they simultaneously justify part of the global climate solution their involvement 
of Statoil, the Norwegian-government-owned oil company, in tar-sand projects in 
Canada (Kristoffersen, 2015).
Both the Icelandic and Norwegian cases are examples of the so-called “Arctic 
Paradox” briefly discussed in Section 1.3. The Arctic Paradox refers to the peculiar 
situation that climate change has created conditions by which oil and gas resources in 
the region are easier to access. Using those resources, however, will further intensify 
the climate problem. Because oil and gas are associated with lucrative businesses, most 
Arctic states are eager to take advantage of the new economic opportunities, which 
is one of the key reason for the tendency to ignore the obvious relationship between 
climate change and oil and gas production in the Arctic. As long as the public stays 
unaware (or in denial) of the links between causes and consequences, the separation 
between the two discourses will remain unchallenged.
In both Iceland and in Norway, there are some signs of the alternative perspective 
challenging the dominant views. This is also the case in some other Arctic states. In 
Alaska, Shell was under such heavy criticism for its plans to restart drilling in the 
Chukchi Sea that it eventually abandoned its plans. The criticism has not only involved 
the dangers that drilling could pose to the fragile Arctic ecosystem, but the relationship 
to climate change has also been used. In an interview with The Guardian, Greenpeace 
representative Tim Donaghy, was critical of the federal government allowing Shell to 
operate in the Arctic and referred to scientific arguments for why Arctic oil must stay 
in the ground if catastrophic climate change is to be avoided (Neate, 2015).
On the global scale there are also calls for reductions in fossil-fuel production, with 
the focus moving away from the demand to the supply side. A symbolic step in this 
direction was taken in October 2014, when the Rockefeller Brothers Fund announced 
that it would stop investing in fossil fuels and focus instead on clean energy. With this 
decision, the Fund joined more than 180 institutions and 650 individuals who are taking 
part in a growing global initiative disinvesting from fossil fuels. The symbolic value of 
the Rockefellers joining this initiative rests on the fact that this famous foundation is 
built on oil wealth. The director of the fund, Stephen Heintz, was convinced that the 
founder of the fund, oil tycoon John D Rockefeller, would have agreed with the move 
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to divest from fossil fuels: “…if he were alive today, as an astute businessman looking out 
to the future, he would be moving out of fossil fuels and investing in clean, renewable 
energy,” Mr. Heintz said to media when the decision was announced (BBC, 2014).
Although this global initiative to disinvest away from the fossil fuel sector has sym-
bolic value, it is currently on a relatively small scale compared to the size of the global 
energy market. The initiative is an indication that new perspectives are gaining ground, 
but that they are not yet influential enough to make a real difference in global emissions.
8.4  Concluding Remarks
The oil and gas discourse in Iceland clearly shows that even in a country that sits at the 
top of the list of the Gender Gap Index and with a culture that scores high on char-
acteristics labeled as feminine (as per Hofstede´s analysis, see Section 4.4), masculine 
values still dominate in certain sectors of society – in this case the energy sector. The 
acceptance of feminine values in one sphere of society does not automatically open up 
space for policy based on the same values in other sectors.
In Iceland, as many other places, sectors focusing on the utilization of natural re-
sources have traditionally been the domain of males, whereas women are more involved 
in the service sector and care work. This is true for the fisheries sector and for the 
energy sector, and it is certainly true for the emerging oil and gas sector. In an article 
on the website of the Icelandic anti-oil group, Grugg, the gender composition of the 
oil investors in the Dreki region is analyzed by compiling photos of top managers and 
members of the boards of all of the companies involved, whether Icelandic owned or 
foreign owned. The results are striking. Not one woman was found in a management 
position or as a board member in any of the companies holding the three exploration 
licenses (Olguson, 2014).
Although masculine and feminine values are not necessarily tied to biological sex, 
women and men learn to identify with the dominant gender roles through socializa-
tion. Thus a great gender imbalance in one sector is unlikely to produce policies with 
a balance between masculine and feminine values. This is clearly noticeable in the 
Icelandic oil and gas discourse, where there is a heavy tilt toward masculine values in 
the dominant discourses.
 The Icelandic oil and gas discourse does not fit into MacGregor’s framework on 
masculine and feminine discourse, because her framework is limited to discourses focus-
ing directly on climate policies. Therefore a broader framework is needed, one that also 
considers dominant political and economic theories and underlying moral theories.
The oil and gas discourse can easily be linked to the political and economic discourses 
that Tickner refers to – discourses that rest on realist or liberal theories of how states 
behave. As Tickner argues, and is explained in more detail in the theoretical chapter 
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(Section 2.4), these dominant theories that have shaped politics and international 
relations in the past are underpinned with masculine values, projecting the behavior of 
elite males on the behavior of states. States are expected to mainly focus on protecting 
their self-interests and find ways to maximize their power. Nature is there for men to 
exploit. In this worldview, women are absent, and feminine values are relevant only in 
the personal sphere of the home and in people’s private lives.
Similarly, the masculine view of the market as a machine driven by rational, autono-
mous, self-interested individuals also has some relevance in the oil and gas debate. As 
Nelson argues (see Section 2.4), this view of the market ignores the more feminine 
traits of human nature and creates an unnecessary gap between economics and ethics. 
By assuming that only one type of behavior can be expected in the market, actors are 
freed from the responsibility to take ethics into consideration in their decision making. 
This could be one reason why the focus of climate policies has been almost entirely on 
the demand side of energy use rather than on the suppliers. Producers are expected to 
respond only to a reduction in demand – not to ethical pressures that would require 
them to look beyond their own narrow self-interests. Those that hold enough power 
to make influential decisions, either in politics or in the business sector, are assumed to 
be individuals caring only about themselves and the potential that all humans have to 
act from a place of compassion and care for others or the environment is downplayed.
But even if the oil and gas discourses in the Icelandic case study reveal how traditional 
masculine values still dominate certain sectors, the analysis also demonstrates that with 
strong civil society, increased awareness of the climate crisis, and active resistance to 
dominant views, it is possible to carve out space for alternative values, emphasizing a 
more feminine approach toward human interaction and toward the relationship be-
tween humans and nature. The emphasis of those objecting to oil and gas exploration 
has been on the ethics of care and our responsibility to protect the global environment. 
Even though other states are utilizing their fossil fuel resources, this does not auto-
matically mean that Iceland should do the same. Rather, the opponents argue, Iceland 
could act as a role model, showing the rest of the world that consciously choosing not 
to exploit potential oil and gas resources is a realistic option.
This shift does not happen automatically, however, but takes time and consistent 
effort. For feminine values to be recognized as a legitimate perspective in sectors tradi-
tionally dominated by masculine views is an important step, but it does automatically 
translate into a change in behavior. There are many hurdles along the way from values 
to policy to implementation.
As this chapter on oil and gas discourses in Iceland shows, identifying the hurdles 
that prevent us from successfully tackling the climate crisis requires us to go beyond 
narrowly defined climate policies and look more broadly at the economic and political 
policies that drive the decision making of those in power.
 

PART III: DISCUSSIONS – ANALYSIS – CONCLUDING 
REMARKS
The third and final part of the dissertation comprises two chapters. In the first one 
(Chapter 9), I offer a more systematic discourse analysis of the climate-related discourses 
discussed in the case study and weave together some of the insights I gained from the 
case study with the theories, concepts, and context introduced in the first part. I also 
dig deeper into my data in my search for underlying values, by exploring what motivates 
those trying to influence policy. In Chapter 10 I revisit the research questions raised 
in the introduction and provide condensed answers to those questions, drawing from 
the conclusions reached in the previous chapters.
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9.  Feminine Values and Climate-related Discourses
In this chapter, I explore in greater depth the values underpinning climate policy, draw-
ing from the analysis in the case study and the theories, concepts, and context discussed 
in Part I. I start by offering a more systematic discourse analysis of the texts used in the 
case study, applying Jóhannesson’s (2010) step-by-step process. This includes teasing out 
the discursive themes that emerged from the data, identifying the struggles and tensions 
in the discourses, and looking for historical junctures that shifted the discourse. I also 
elaborate more thoroughly than in previous chapters on how the various discourses 
match the masculine and feminine climate discourses in McGregor’s (2010) framework 
and how they fit some of the concepts and theories discussed in Chapter 2, especially 
those related to Tickner’s and Nelson’s analysis of how masculine values underpin the 
dominant political and economic models.
This analysis is followed by a section in which I explore the values underlying the 
different discourses, by examining the motivations that drive policy shapers. I make 
an effort to link those values to moral theories, particularly the feminist theory of the 
ethics of care. The final section of the chapter entails a more detailed discussion about 
one of the factors that consistently arose in the data, related to a lack of action in ad-
dressing the climate crisis: the importance of relating climate change more directly to 
the daily lives of people at the local level. This section also includes a discussion about 
the importance of social movements to push for radical changes.
9.1  Climate Policies and Critical Discourse Analysis
Critical discourse analysis is an approach whereby discourses are examined to reveal 
power relations, domination, and social inequality. As Jóhannesson (2010) identifies, a 
discourse is a process rather than a static phase. People who participate in the discourse 
produce and reproduce it with conscious and unconscious practices.
The step-by-step process Jóhannesson introduces as a way of conducting discourse 
analysis in a systematic way comprises six steps:
•	 Selecting an issue or event
•	 Choosing the material relevant to shed light on the issue or event
•	 Analyzing the documents/texts
•	 Analyzing struggles and tensions in the discourse
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•	 Identifying historical junctures in the discourses
•	 Documenting the results
I have already described in the introduction the issue being studied and why I chose 
this topic (Step 1), and in the chapter on methods, I described the material I chose 
to collect as data (Step 2). I therefore focus only on Steps 3, 4, and 5 in this section. 
The sixth step, which is documenting the results in some sort of report or a narrative, 
includes the work I have done both in preparation for writing this dissertation (includ-
ing memos and the narrative analyzing the president’s speeches) and the actual writing 
of this dissertation.
Discursive Themes
The first task when analyzing the data was to identify discursive themes or patterns in 
the text. Guiding questions are a useful tool, and I used two key questions. Is climate 
change perceived as a threat? What types of policy measures are emphasized to mitigate 
emissions? In the second question, I was particularly curious to discover if there was 
tension between conservation values and values emphasizing exploitation of resources, 
and if so, which set of values was more dominant.
As for the first question, climate change as a security threat is clearly a discursive 
theme, but the way this threat is constructed in the text frames the changes as something 
that will threaten the security of people in the future or in faraway places. Policy docu-
ments describe changes in nature, but an analysis of the way these changes can impact 
socioeconomic factors and threaten human security is missing. Both policy shapers 
(in interviews) and the public (through surveys) identify climate change as a threat, 
but this seems to be an abstract threat rather than something that they think will affect 
them in their daily lives. The fear they express is not personal, and they do not worry 
about their own safety. Rather, they communicate concerns about the wellbeing of 
future generations, and some of them wonder about how this will impact poor people 
in developing countries. The securitization of climate change seems to come from above 
as a warning in reports from the IPCC or from international organizations, rather than 
originating at the grassroots level. The main exception to this view of climate change 
as a distant and abstract threat was held by the youngest policy shaper interviewed, 
perhaps indicating the younger generations that are aware of the climate crisis are more 
likely than their older counterparts to experience climate change as a personal threat.
As for the second question (What types of policy measures are emphasized to 
mitigate emissions?), the main emphasis at the policy level is on technical solutions 
that are economically efficient and do not involve any radical systematic changes. 
Lifestyle changes are often mentioned as important in policy documents as well, but 
they are usually not listed as priority actions, and there is no discussion about how the 
national and local governments should work together on implementing policies that 
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involve lifestyle changes – in the transport sector, for example, where the planning 
power of municipalities is highly relevant. Some of the policy shapers criticized what 
they perceived as lack of emphasis on lifestyle changes, which, in their minds was more 
important than focusing only on technical issues.
Although the climate policies adopted and implemented usually involve small 
steps and adjustments of current rules and regulations rather than transformative 
changes, President Grímsson argues for the importance of transformational changes 
in the energy sector when he speaks in international forums. He repeatedly refers 
to the transformation in Iceland in the 1970s, when geothermal heat was used to 
replace oil for space heating. “If we can do it, so can you,” is his message to the world, 
ignoring that the shift in Iceland was purely on economic grounds, following the oil 
crisis, and no similar transformative changes have been suggested on moral grounds 
as part of Iceland’s climate policy. Public institutions in the energy sector have also 
capitalized on the image of Iceland as a provider of green energy in their publication 
material, yet this image seems to have played no role when authorities decided to 
embark upon the journey of opening up the Dreki region for oil and gas explorations. 
So the discursive theme in which Iceland is identified as a role model does not seem 
to cut deep and is quickly pushed to the side if economic opportunities that do not 
fit this image appear.
The Arctic and climate change are frequently linked in the data I examined and can 
be considered a discursive theme. The Arctic discourse, however, changes over time 
from focusing on the threats that climate change poses to the Arctic to an emphasis 
on the new economic opportunities that climate change is bringing to the region. This 
opportunistic discourse is similar to what Kristoffersen (2015) noticed in her study 
of Norwegian climate-related discourses, which she calls opportunistic adaptation.
This shift can be noticed in policy documents; an emphasis on threats was more 
evident in the early report on the Arctic published by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
(Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2009a), but an opportunistic discourse on the 
Arctic is more noticeable in later years – in the declaration of the government that came 
into power in 2013, for example (Prime Minister´s Office, 2013).
The shift of focus from threats to opportunities can also be clearly seen in President 
Grímsson’s speeches and is indicative of the increasing interest among private-sector 
investors in the Arctic region. Although the president often uses alarmist language to 
describe the threats related to climate change, he presents himself as an optimist offering 
realistic solutions. His common narrative about the shift from fossil fuels to geothermal 
energy for space heating in Iceland is one example. His agenda also includes a focus on 
the importance of the Arctic and toward the increasing geopolitical importance of this 
part of the world. In his New Year address in January 2014, the president dedicated 
the last part of his speech to Arctic affairs. He referred to the Arctic as a region that 
used to be beyond the edge of the habitable world but is now being drawn increasingly 
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into the center of global concerns. And he emphasizes how this could create new op-
portunities for Iceland:
This new development creates a multitude of new opportunities for Iceland 
– in the sciences, commerce, the economy and culture. Our island, once 
isolated in the far north, is now on the global highway in a key position in a 
region that will play a decisive role during this century, both as a staging post, 
as more and more is done to exploit natural resources and transport goods 
across the Arctic and, not least, in serving millions of tourists from all parts 
of the world who are eager to experience the wonders of nature and to see 
the Midnight sun and the Northern Lights. (Grímsson, 2014)
This message is in stark contrast to the alarmist tone a few years earlier, when the 
key thrust was a warning about the dangerous impact that climate change could have 
on the Arctic region.
Along with the increasing interest in economic opportunities, the oil and gas ex-
plorations off the northeast coast of Iceland emerge as a separate issue in the Arctic 
discourse as it appears in domestic political discussion, first in the media, then later 
in government declarations. Although climate change and the melting of the ice are 
frequently mentioned as reasons why oil and gas resources in the Arctic will be easier to 
access in the future, the fact that the burning of those fossil fuels will further intensify 
the climate crisis is rarely mentioned in the early phases, when the oil and gas issue 
first emerged as a political issue. The issue did arise in interviews with policy shapers, 
however, and also became evident in later public political discourses, after all three 
licenses had been issued.d
 
Tensions and Struggles
An important step in discourse analysis is to identify the internal struggles and tensions 
within the discourse and recognize contradictions. The policy documents, president’s 
speeches, transcribed interviews, and other data used in this analysis cannot be read in 
isolation from the general discourse in society about climate change or related topics, 
both domestically and internationally. The policy shapers are engaged with a dynamic 
discourse, and the boundaries of what is accepted in the discourse are constantly moving.
One obvious tension in the data is the safety issue involved in presenting climate 
change as a threat. The most striking example occurred when President Grímsson later 
shared that he had received strong negative reactions to his New Year’s speech in 1998, 
when he discussed the dangers of climate change. After having painted a dark picture 
of the potentially negative impact of climate change, the president barely mentioned 
the danger of climate change again until several years later, after the ACIA report was 
published in 2004. A few years later, once the IPCC had published its 4th assessment 
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report in 2007, and climate change had been recognized as a security issue in key 
international forums, including the UN Security Council, he openly discussed the 
harsh criticism he had received for painting a picture of the consequences of climate 
change that was considered too dark, and stated that talking about climate change dur-
ing that time had been an uphill battle. Although the president stated that times had 
changed and a number of public documents describe the dangers of climate change, 
some of the policy shapers interviewed mentioned negative reactions if they publicly 
talked about the importance of paying attention to the danger of climate change. One 
politician explained how she had experienced reactions of either total ignorance or 
parliamentarians in other parties laughing at her if she put the issue on the agenda in 
the parliament. (She was referring to the period 2010–2013, several years after the 
publication of the 4th assessment report in 2007.)
As evident from these examples, there are limits to how much even influential 
figures like the president can deviate from the dominant political discourse if the aim 
is to influence the discourse and introduce new ideas to the agenda. If they engage in 
a discourse that is radically different from the mainstream discourse, they risk being 
sidelined and not taken seriously.
This is exactly what happened in 2009 to Kolbrún Halldórsdóttir, former Minister 
for the Environment, when she expressed her doubts that oil and gas explorations in 
the Dreki area would be in line with Iceland’s international commitments. Her views 
clashed with the dominant discourse, and she was quickly sidelined, even by some of 
her own party members. With time, however, the dynamic of a dominant discourse can 
change. After refraining from talking about climate change in the years immediately 
following his 1998 speech, President Grímsson resumed the theme in 2004, and this 
time his message met with less resistance. The same can be said with respect to the oil 
and gas issue. When other politicians questioned the oil and gas explorations a few 
years later, they did not receive such harsh reactions as the former minister did. Even 
though the dominant discourse was still in favor of oil and gas explorations, there was 
more room for different perspectives.
The reference to the Dreki area brings us to another issue in which tension can be 
clearly identified in the texts analyzed. Once it was finally recognized that human-
induced climate change was actually occurring, tension emerged in the political dis-
courses about the Arctic between emphasizing threats associated with climate change 
and highlighting opportunities that the changes could bring. This can be clearly seen 
in the president’s speeches and in policy documents, whereas the policy shapers inter-
viewed tended to be critical of the opportunistic discourse. One policy shaper, after 
having expressed his frustration over what he felt was weak climate policy manifesting 
in sporadic initiatives to reduce emissions, turned his attention to the opportunistic 
discourse about the Arctic:
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To top this, all I listen to ministers, the president, and business men…[…] 
who paint the exploitation of Arctic resources in rosy colors and think it is a 
given that we will engage, for example, in drilling for oil and gas. I don’t think 
this will happen in the immediate future, but those speaking assume that it 
is fine to utilize those resources, in spite of the fact that most experts, even 
conservative financial institutes, agree that only about a quarter of known 
oil, gas, and coal reserves can be utilized… not to mention new reserves.
The policy shapers frequently expressed their wish that Iceland would be more 
proactive as a role model, acting as a norm entrepreneur for energy production and the 
implementation of climate policy. The same vision occasionally appears in public policy 
documents, although such ideas are quickly pushed aside if they seem to compromise 
Iceland’s opportunities to utilize natural resources.
Two underlying ideas, both of which could be categorized as “common-sense as-
sumptions” as Fairclough (1989) uses the concept (see Section 3.3), are helpful in 
explaining why the idea of Iceland acting as a norm entrepreneur has not taken off. 
First, even though the desire that Iceland can influence international affairs beyond 
its size can be detected, this desire is weakened by a deep-seated belief that small states 
will always have limited influence in international relations, so their main objective 
should be to protect their own interests in a harsh world. Although this belief is not 
often expressed explicitly in public discourse, it can often be sensed as an underlying 
assumption, not only in climate-related discourses, but also in other domains – in 
discourses related to EU accession talks and European integration, for example. This 
assumption is, of course, closely related to the assumption underpinning realist theories 
dominating international relations, both in the academic discipline and among policy 
makers. The unspoken assumption is that the main aim of all actors, be they states, 
corporations, or individuals, is to maximize their own power or wealth. To expand 
on the assumption, by deciding to act for the common interest of all, rather than 
focusing on narrow self-interests, they will lose the game: As a small state, Iceland is 
vulnerable and needs to use every opportunity available to protect its economic and 
political interests.
The second common-sense assumption underlying the dominant climate-related 
discourses is the idea that economic growth is possible only by increasing the utiliza-
tion of natural resources. The desire to keep Iceland among the wealthiest nations, 
where the citizens can enjoy high standards of living is taken for granted. And because 
Iceland has relied on natural resources to create wealth in the past, the assumption 
is this is the only way to create wealth in the future. This assumption exists in spite 
of numerous examples of successful Icelandic companies that rely on human capital 
and brainpower, rather than the exploitation of natural resources. One of the policy 
shapers referred to this underlying assumption when explaining the initially harsh 
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reaction against the view that perhaps oil and gas resources should be left alone, even 
if they exist within Iceland’s EEZ. As a civil servant, she had noted that the right to 
protect natural resources was an underlying theme in almost all aspects of Iceland’s 
foreign policy and something that was engrained into the administrative system: “…
in international forums we are consistently involved in fights that focus on our rights 
to use our resources, rather than speaking from a conservation point of view, even if 
we emphasize the sustainability factor,” she said.
When a view is presented that goes against common-sense assumptions that are 
seldom voiced but taken for granted by the majority, it inevitably calls for a strong 
reaction. Other views are not automatically accepted. An active and steady resistance 
is needed to challenge the dominant views, and it takes time to carve out space for 
new ideas. But as Fairclough emphasizes, if humans have created dominant discourses, 
humans can change them, and this process occurs through social struggle. When it 
comes to climate change, specific events, including international meetings and the 
publications of new scientific information, have also been instrumental in shifting 
dominant discourses – what Jóhannesson (2010) refers to as “historical junctures”.
 
Historical Junctures
To explain why some ideas and practice gain greater legitimacy than others in the 
discourse, the concept of historical juncture is relevant. Several events can be identi-
fied as important historical junctures that influenced climate-related discourses in the 
Icelandic case study. One is the Kyoto Protocol, signed in December 1997. The signing 
of the Protocol marks the beginning of climate change entering mainstream political 
debate in Iceland. The Protocol inspired President’s Grímsson’s New Year’s address 
in January 1998 (and the speech of Prime Minister Oddsson the evening before). As 
previously discussed, Grímsson’s message about the dangers of climate change did not 
fall on fertile soil, and Oddsson’s skepticism about climate change seemed to be more 
in line with mainstream views at the time. Yet the signing of the protocol put climate 
change on the political agenda as an issue worthy of attention, although, for the first 
few years, most of the focus was on how to prevent international climate conventions 
from putting any restraints on the Icelandic economy.
A second historical juncture is related to the publication of the Arctic Climate 
Impact Assessment (Arctic Council, 2004). The report validated earlier information 
about the dangers associated with climate change and pointed at several threats specific 
to the Arctic, including faster-than-average temperature increases, resulting in rapid 
melting of the Arctic ice. The ACIA report firmly tied climate change and Arctic issues 
together, providing scientific backing for the policy shapers who were concerned with 
climate change, and giving them firm ground on which to stand. This can be clearly 
seen in the speeches of President Grímsson, who frequently referred to the report in 
the first 2 or 3 years after it was published.
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A third historical juncture can be identified in 2007, when the IPCC published 
its 4th assessment report, and the IPCC and Al Gore were rewarded the Noble Peace 
Prize for their work on raising awareness of climate change. The rapid melting of the 
Arctic ice, which reached new a new level in the summer of 2007 (NASA, 2007), 
further strengthened the message of the IPCC report. That year was a turning point 
in the securitization of climate change at the international level, and a turning point 
in climate policy in Iceland, as further elaborated on in Chapter 6 and can be clearly 
noted in policy documents published in 2007 and later.
Identifying historical junctures closer in time is tricky, as it can be more difficult to 
evaluate the impact of events when they are still mingled with the noise of the present. 
The COP 15 meeting in Copenhagen in 2009 was certainly initiated in order to create 
a shift in global climate discourses. But the meeting – which was held in the shadow 
of the global financial crisis – was a total failure, and was more harmful than helpful 
in raising awareness of the climate crisis. The 5th IPCC assessment report, published 
in 2014, does seem to be one of the factors contributing to the shift in the oil and gas 
discourse in Iceland, however. Katrín Júlíusdóttir (The Vice Chairman of the Social 
Democrats for the period 2013-2016), for example, referred to the report when ex-
plaining her changed opinion about the oil and gas explorations in the Dreki area, as 
described in Chapter 8. The even more recent Paris agreement, signed in December 
2016, may also have the potential to create a shift in the discourse, but only time will 
tell if this will actually happen.
Most of the events serving as historical junctures in the discourse relate to happen-
ings originating outside Iceland even if they shape the domestic discussion. Reports 
from the IPCC and other international bodies have been instrumental in creating and 
distributing scientific knowledge about climate change and, as scientific knowledge has 
evolved, it has influenced policy discourses. Scientific knowledge, like other knowledge 
products, is socially situated, however, the clearest example of which is the way climate 
change is consistently framed as a global issue, keeping it at safe distance from the daily 
lives of ordinary people. Even though there is information in the reports about seri-
ous local consequences, the climate crisis is still first and foremost framed as a global 
problem calling for global solutions.
In the Icelandic case study, this circumstance results in a strange situation: global 
reports are more likely to spur debate and initiate changes in climate-related discourses 
than are domestic trends that can be associated with climate change, such as melting 
of the glaciers, movements of fish stocks, and ocean acidification.
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9.2  Masculine or Feminine Values?
Where do the climate-related discourses identified in the Icelandic case study fall on 
the masculine-feminine spectrum? Are the discourses driven mainly by masculine 
values or are feminine values also present? I first summarize how the various climate 
discourses fit with the masculine and feminine discourses described in MacGregor’s 
(2010) framework and then match the broader climate-related discourses with some 
of the values underpinning dominant political and economic theories, as discussed in 
the theoretical chapter. Those analyses are presented in bits and pieces in Part II of 
the dissertation, in the concluding remarks of each chapter, but are offered here in one 
place to provide a more holistic overview.
As discussed in Section 2.5, MacGregor identifies two climate discourses that 
she labels as masculine: the discourse on environmental security and the ecological 
modernization discourse. The environmental security discourse stresses the danger of 
resource conflicts, calling for militaristic approaches to address the consequences of 
climate change. It can be associated with the warrior image that Tickner (1992) relates 
to realist theories. The ecological modernization discourse favors technical solutions, 
and the associated image is one of clever men solving complex problems, harmonizing 
with the ideas underlying neo-liberal approaches, including the image of the rational 
economic man discussed by Tickner (1992), Mellor (1995), and Nelson (1995). Ac-
cording to McGregor, both discourses favor top-down approaches and the use of 
powerful institutions to implement policies. Both remain silent on the importance of 
integrating into climate policy such feminine values as a focus on cooperation, sustain-
able lifestyles, and ethical consumption.
When those two sets of discourses are matched with the Icelandic case study, one 
quickly sees some elements of the ecological modernization discourse but the envi-
ronmental security discourse, as defined by MacGregor, is not obvious. As discussed 
in Chapter 4 on the Arctic, the environmental security discourse has been prominent 
in recent years and often hyped up in the media as an upcoming race for resources. 
This approach is not echoed in Icelandic climate discourses. On the contrary, policy 
documents explicitly reject this approach and emphasize that the Arctic is a peaceful 
and stable region and that good cooperation exists among Arctic states. As Bailes & 
Heininen (2012) point out in their analysis of the Arctic strategies of the eight Arctic 
states, Iceland stresses the importance of comprehensive security and strongly argues 
against militarization of the region. Although a couple of the policy shapers mentioned 
that they had heard references to a potential race for resources in the Arctic, this was 
not an issue that the policy shapers were paying much attention to or seemed occupied 
with. When climate change is identified as a security threat in policy documents, in 
the president’s speeches, and in my interviews with the policy shapers, it is generally 
in the context of comprehensive or human security rather than military security. As 
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discussed in Chapter 6, however, the threat to human security is only vaguely defined. 
The securitization of climate change has been a top-down process; the themes of 
domestic climate discourses have been generated in international forums, rather than 
originating at the grassroots level. So even if the masculine values related to militari-
zation cannot be detected in climate discourses exploring climate as a security threat, 
feminine approaches that emphasize how climate change could threaten communities 
and influence the daily lives of ordinary people, are not noticeable either, except in an 
extremely vague form. In those cases where human security is highlighted as important 
in policy documents, this is generally without further elaborations on what that en-
tails. In fact, the values underlying the discourse on climate change as a security threat 
are particularly vague, and the discourse seems to be “borrowed” primarily from the 
international discourse with little analysis of how those threats could manifest locally 
in Iceland and who is most vulnerable to these threats.
Of the two masculine discourses identified by MacGregor, the ecological moderniza-
tion discourse is much more noticeable in the Icelandic case. The most obvious fit are 
the views of President Grímsson, who consistently stresses the importance of large-scale 
technical solutions as a way of transforming the global energy sector. In this context, 
he presents the case of Iceland moving from oil to geothermal energy for space heating, 
a narrative that is in perfect harmony with the image of clever men solving complex 
problems using win-win solutions that are beneficial for both the economy and the en-
vironment. This emphasis on technical solutions can also be noted in policy documents, 
although the policy measures suggested are of smaller scale and not a systematic change 
transforming an entire sector, as was the case with space heating some decades earlier.
MacGregor also identifies two less dominant discourses that she labels as feminine. 
The green-duty discourse primarily focuses on sustainable lifestyle. The discourse on 
neo-Malthusian population control is occupied with the importance of curbing the 
number of children people choose to have. Both approaches emphasize bottom-up 
solutions where the lens is on the behavior of individuals. Whereas the masculine 
discourses focus on technical solutions, parallel feminine discourses place the respon-
sibility on individuals as caretakers and consumers. MacGregor argues that because 
women still bear the main burden of domestic activities within households, the call for 
individuals to tackle climate change by conserving energy, recycling waste, and moving 
toward a low-carbon lifestyle is not gender neutral, but aimed at women more than 
men (MacGregor, 2010).
The discourse on neo-Malthusian population growth refers to women being seen 
as part of the climate problem because they have too many children, leading to unsus-
tainable population growth. In this context, climate policies would focus on family 
planning and finding ways to encourage women to have fewer children. This discourse 
is presently relevant primarily in the Global South, where population growth is still 
high. Themes associated with this discourse did not emerge in the Icelandic case study.
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The green-duty discourse, however, does play a strong role in the Icelandic case 
study, and references to lifestyle changes and ethical consumption can be found in 
both policy documents and in the transcribed interviews. The Climate Action Plan 
(Icelandic Ministry for the Environment, 2010), for example, lists the promotion of 
transport methods like walking, cycling, and public transport, as one of ten priority 
actions (number five on the list). Most of the other priority actions, however, are techni-
cal solutions and/or focus on using the market as a tool to create incentives (often with 
an associated complicated regulatory framework, as is the case with the EU Emission 
Trading Scheme). Furthermore, the implementation of the action related to promoting 
alternative transport methods does not seem to be a priority. The main emphasis in the 
climate legislation passed by the parliament in 2012 is on the EU trading scheme, and 
although efforts have been made in some municipalities to improve public transport 
and encourage bicycling, these attempts have not been systematic. With the exception 
of Reykjavík, municipalities have shown little initiative toward climate mitigation, and 
the national government has not made it a priority to team up with municipalities to 
implement climate policies in the action plan more effectively.
In some ways, the underlying assumption is that individuals will assume more sus-
tainable lifestyles merely on moral grounds, if the message is repeated often enough, 
without any systematic measures being implemented by the public sector to facilitate 
the changes. This position is in stark contrast to the assumption underlying most of 
the decisions based on the goal of influencing the private sector: that businesses will 
respond only to economic incentives. This assumption is in line with underlying as-
sumptions in dominant economic models: that each actor will focus on maximizing 
its own interests. The messages about sustainable lifestyles, however, refer to the moral 
responsibilities of those in charge of households, a responsibility that women are still 
shouldering more than men are. As the analysis in the gender budgeting project con-
ducted on the Climate Action Plan revealed (see discussion in Section 7.4), a focus on 
sustainable lifestyle without a conscious decision to design gender-sensitive measures is 
likely to lead to women spending more hours doing unpaid work (Icelandic Ministry 
for the Environment, 2012). What is interesting to note, in this respect, is that when 
men are the main targets (managers in the business sector), policy measures focus on 
economic incentives, but when policies are aimed at households, where women tend 
to have more decision-making power, references are made to moral responsibility. In 
other words, the policies are legitimizing and reproducing the stereotypical gender 
roles, whereby men are assumed to be motivated only by self-interest, but women are 
expected to be more caring and altruistic.
The green-duty discourse was even more noticeable in interviews with policy shap-
ers than in policy documents, and many of them stressed the importance of lifestyle 
changes. Interestingly, President Grímsson rarely mentions the importance of lifestyle 
or overconsumption in his speeches when talking about solutions to climate change. 
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His sole focus is on technical solutions in the spirit of ecological modernization.
As indicated, one danger of the green-duty discourse is that is places the burden of 
lifestyle changes disproportionally on women. While men get the glory of coming up 
with clever technical solutions, women are pressured with the duty of cutting back 
their consumption and modifying their behavior. As MacGregor states in her article, 
targeting women specifically for climate policies that aim for lifestyle change is more 
common in developing countries, where development programs often rely on the free 
labor of women doing volunteer work, assuming they are the natural caretakers of the 
environment. In the developed world, the pressure on women is subtler and often un-
intentional. Women are more likely than men to be targeted as consumers, for example. 
Small cars are sometimes advertised and talked about as “wife cars”34, indicating that 
small, fuel-efficient cars are acceptable for women but not masculine enough for men. 
A few years ago, a book was published in Iceland under the title: Women Can Change 
the World by Adopting a New Lifestyle. In the book, author Guðrún Bergman argues 
that because women hold more power than men as consumers, they have the power 
to make more ethical consumption choices (Bergmann, 2009).
When evaluating climate discourses in Iceland using MacGregor’s framework, the 
overall conclusion is that they can be labeled neither overwhelmingly masculine nor 
overwhelmingly feminine. When it comes to adaptation, the tilt is toward a more 
feminine perspective, emphasizing the importance of human security but rejecting 
militarization of the climate crisis. Yet, the underlying feminine values are relatively 
vague. This results in an emphasis on human security, but the ways in which climate 
change could threaten human security are poorly defined, and bottom-up stories about 
the impact of climate change at the local level are missing. On the mitigation side, the 
results are even more conflicted. There are some clear elements favoring technical solu-
tions, but calls for lifestyle changes are also present, although they tend to be pushed 
to the side if they call for a compromise on the comforts of modern lifestyles. In fact, 
some of the policy shapers, whose views tend to be more progressive than mainstream 
policy, have expressed frustration in society’s resistance to scale down consumption 
and face the reality that Earth cannot sustain our excessive lifestyles in the long run.
The analysis of the masculine and feminine values underlying dominant discourses 
does not stop here, however. In order to obtain a holistic picture of the dominant 
values that influence how climate change is responded to, we need to look beyond nar-
rowly defined climate discourses and explore the values driving the more mainstream 
discourses on security and economic development.
With this in mind, we can broaden the analysis to include climate-related discourses, 
such as discourses on economic development and, more specifically, the oil and gas dis-
courses. From this perspective, masculine values are more dominant than what can be 
34  In Icelandic: Frúarbíll
172 | Auður H Ingólfsdóttir: Climate Change and Security in the Arctic
noted when examining only the more narrowly defined climate policy discourses. Man’s 
right to exploit nature – a central value in Western thought and an underlying assumption 
in dominant economic and political theories – is a fundamental, virtually unquestioned 
idea in the oil and gas discourse in Iceland. As one policy shaper noted, the right of Iceland, 
as a sovereign state, to exploit resources is engrained in the administrative system. This 
view manifested clearly in the aftermath of the TV interview with the former minister in 
2009, when she expressed doubts about the plans of her government to start a licensing 
process for oil and gas explorations in the Dreki area. The same values were the driving 
force behind Iceland’s lobbying for a special exemption (Decision CP.7/14) in the Kyoto 
Protocol. As a small state, Iceland’s primary duty is to protect its economic and political 
interests, so the argument goes, and if a clash exists between economic security (including 
protecting short-term economic gains) and enhancing long-term environmental security 
(as in the case with climate change), economic security has the upper hand.
The emerging oil and gas sector in Iceland is highly male dominated, with no women 
among the oil investors. Although this fact alone will not automatically translate into 
decision-making based only on masculine values, the socialization of men and women 
to behave in accordance with traditional gender roles increases the likelihood of a 
heavy tilt toward masculine values if there is no gender balance among top managers.
Analysis of the oil and gas discourses reveals that both politicians and investors 
systematically ignored the relationship between climate change and oil and gas explo-
rations and were able to get away with it because climate policies have focused almost 
entirely on the demand side. Those involved in the production side are assumed to be 
ruled entirely by the free market and will decrease production only if demand drops. 
This perspective is not gender neutral, because women are relatively active consumers 
and are therefore the targets of information aimed at pressuring individuals to make 
more ethical consumer choices. On the supply side, however, where men dominate as 
investors and managers, a similar pressure for ethical behavior is missing, although the 
seeds of a new approach can be detected through recent initiatives like campaigns to 
disinvest from fossil fuels (discussed in Chapter 8).
As can be seen from the analysis in this section, dominant political and economic 
theories tend to assume that humans are autonomous individuals driven by self-interest 
and that their desire is to maximize either their material wealth or their power to control 
others. As pointed out by feminists in the various disciplines, these theories rest on 
limited ideas about humans, taking into account only the masculine traits of human 
nature but ignoring other traits, more often associated with feminine characteristics, 
such as the need for relationships, the fact that we all need to be taken care of during 
some periods of our lives, and our abilities to be nurturing and caring toward others. Is 
it possible that human beings can be driven by other motives, more closely related to 
human traits that have been historically associated with the feminine qualities? This 
idea is explored further in the upcoming section.
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9.3  What Motivates Policy Shapers? 
One of the key themes in this dissertation is an exploration of the values underlying 
climate-related discourses and the associated public policies. In this context, I consider 
values to be guiding principles in a person’s life, associated with his or her worldview 
and instrumental in shaping the choices an individual makes about how to live life. In 
this sense, the values we hold are the driving force that motivates us and gives meaning 
to our daily lives. With this in mind, one of the questions I asked all the policy shapers 
I interviewed was about their motivations and why they continued their work, which 
included raising awareness of climate change.
As discussed in Section 2.3, research has demonstrated that people who endorse self-
transcendent values and who exhibit high levels of altruism are more likely to engage 
in sustainable behavior, show higher concern about environmental risks, perform such 
actions as recycling, and engage positively with climate change, as opposed to those 
holding more self-enhancement values. In fact, the more people endorse hierarchical 
and individualistic worldviews, the more likely they are to downplay environmental 
risks (Corner, Markowitz, & Pidgeon, 2014).
The same article also discusses a qualitative study that explored in detail the values 
of a group of individuals who had made concrete changes in their lifestyles in response 
to climate change. The findings were that although concern for the environment was a 
motivating factor for some of the people, the perceived social injustice climate change 
would bring was more dominant as a motivation factor. Another study showed that 
individuals with stronger egalitarian and communitarian worldviews perceived climate 
change as riskier than did those with individualistic and hierarchical values (Corner, 
Markowitz, & Pidgeon, 2014).
Although these authors do not label values as feminine or masculine, the cluster of 
values associated more with environmental awareness and concern for climate change 
can easily be linked to characteristics traditionally labeled feminine, whereas the other 
cluster of values, belonging to those more likely to downplay environmental risks, have 
some clear resemblance to our ideas about masculinity. (See Section 2.3 for a discussion 
of my definiation of feminine and masculine values.)
Based on this knowledge, one of the key criteria I used when selecting people for 
interviews was that those individuals had shown some initiative in raising awareness of 
climate change. I wanted to interview policy shapers who would be likely to endorse 
more feminine values than could be detected in the dominant climate-related discourses 
and was curious to find out if they experienced tension when expressing their views 
in public forums. In my questions related to values and guiding principles, I did find 
out that most of the policy shapers were driven by values that could be located on the 
feminine side of the feminine-masculine spectrum. What surprised me, however, was 
that some of them were hesitant to discuss their values, initially masking them with 
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answers indicating that they were guided by more rationalistic, individualistic motives 
than really was the case. This was especially true for the men I interviewed, although 
a hesitation to discuss the deeper underlying values was also present among some of 
the women.
“This is my work. I make a living by pushing forward certain ideas”, one male civil 
servant said when asked about his motivations. After I pushed the issue, he admitted 
that there was also a feeling of responsibility involved, especially toward future genera-
tions. Later in the interview, he revisited the issue on his own initiative:
The interest does not get ignited at any one point. It gets ignited when you 
are a child. When you realize you enjoy being out in nature. When you have 
a good natural science teacher that helps you put things into a larger context.
Having followed the work of this individual for several years, I knew he was deeply 
passionate about nature conservation, and it surprised me that he did not mention his 
love for nature immediately when I asked about his motivation. But it seemed that 
expressing something that was associated with strong emotions (in this case caring for 
the environment) was difficult in this context; a reference to the rational, materialistic 
explanation “I get paid for it” was a safer choice.
“This is, of course, first and foremost, part of my job,” was the initial reaction of 
another male interviewee. And a third one, when asked about his motives, stressed 
that his interest in climate change was based on his interest in science, not on an ethi-
cal position on environmental protection. Yet, as the conversation continued, a strong 
ethical position emerged:
I have always deeply believed that we don’t own nature. We don’t own Esja. 
There are some owners registered for the land around, and the government 
probably owns the common areas, but we are only creatures that walk there 
for a short amount of time. Ownership is the legal side, but in the large 
context, we are just a small piece in the chain of life. Our legal structures are 
just something that help us get along without hurting each other.
A woman civil servant also hesitated when asked about her motivations. “I cannot 
answer without being sentimental,” she said, as if she were obligated to warn me. Her 
motivation was linked to her strong feelings toward nature:
I have a deep connection with nature. I am a country girl and feel that I 
have deep roots in the land. I tend to think far ahead, both in my own life 
and others…far into the future. But I just feel there is a connection…how 
we think about the environment and…[…] There is this great power that I 
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can feel in our nature that makes it impossible for me not to become aware 
of certain things.
When asked why she felt the need to apologize in advance for her answer, she admit-
ted she worried about the reaction to such an emotional answer:
There is some sort of masculine discourse where the informed rational man 
relies on logic when he speaks. Emotions are something that have generally 
not been viewed positively in the public discourse in Iceland. Therefore, 
perhaps I am shy to express emotions as my driving force.
As can be seen from these quotes, strong affiliation to nature is one of the factors that 
motivates the policy shapers. Another theme that emerged as a major driving force was 
social justice and a sense of responsibility. Although social justice is also a value often 
associated with strong emotions, the policy shapers seemed more relaxed about express-
ing their views related to social justice than those related their relationship to nature.
“It is a sense of justice,” one male expert replied, relating environmental degrada-
tion to greed and inequality in the distribution of world resources. “This is something 
that has been going on for centuries,” he said, “and I feel a duty to take a stand and do 
something about this.”
A woman expert talked about her passion to improve society:
When I studied biology, I realized the seriousness of environmental affairs 
but also that there are plenty of actions that can be taken. So I found it very 
intriguing to work on that. I very much like working towards change. I am 
also very interested in how you can influence the behavior of people through 
policy.
“I think it is a sense of justice and the will to fight,” one female politician said. “You 
need to show you are awake and allow your thoughts and emotions to create some 
actions.” This policy shaper referred to people who relied primarily on logic as “excel 
people”, whereas activists, she believed, were driven by emotions. Interestingly, she 
can be seen as being on the other end of the spectrum, because she devalues a rational 
approach to decision-making. Perhaps this approach is a defense mechanism, as she 
had often been publicly criticized for being overly emotional and not rational enough 
in her approach to environmental issues.
Another female politician emphasized the importance of being guided by a clear vi-
sion rather than by fear. She also explained how part of her vision in politics was to listen 
to vulnerable groups and give a voice to people who cannot speak for themselves. With 
respect to climate change, she believes she is speaking on behalf of future generations:
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So my guiding light and my values are social justice, sustainability… and then 
there are some additional concepts like moderation…but also the importance 
of living fearlessly. To be fearless in the face of ruling powers and fearless 
against the tasks at hand, even if they seem to be without a solution.
Only one of the policy shapers mentioned fear as a motivating factor. “I am just very 
worried about the future of my children,” she said referring to fears about the avail-
ability of food in the future, how ocean acidification will impact fish stocks around the 
country, and other factors that could influence the daily life of her family.
The role of fear as a motivating factor is an interesting issue to ponder. The case study 
clearly illustrated that voters are not putting much pressure on politicians to respond to 
climate change, and although members of the public are aware of the risks associated 
with climate change, they seem to perceive climate change as an abstract and distant 
threat. Connecting the impact of climate change more directly with the daily lives of 
ordinary people may be a way to increase awareness at the local level and encourage 
more grassroots-level initiatives. But communicating information about climate change 
can be tricky. On one hand, the message needs to be clear enough that the public can 
sense the urgency of the issue. On the other hand, if the message is framed with too 
much alarmist language, there is the risk that people will be paralyzed by fear and will 
feel powerless to react. This is the type of scenario that can push people into the state 
of denial described by Norgaard (2011) in her case study from Norway. (See discus-
sion in Chapter 4.)
This point also brings us to the topic of emotions more generally – not only fear, 
but other emotions related to justice and to humans caring for each other and for the 
environment. Some of the policy shapers referred to motives that fit well with the key 
features of the ethics of care that feminist scholars have offered as an alternative to 
the more dominant moral theories that are occupied more with abstract principles 
and human beings as autonomous rational beings. (See discussion in Section 2.4.) 
The hesitation, or even shame, some of the policy shapers appeared to exhibit when 
expressing these emotions – especially if they suggested that they cared for nature – 
is consistent with the fact that these are emotions associated with ethics of care and 
feminine values. It seems that some of the policy shapers fear their motivations will 
be associated with irrationality and weakness – some of the negative traits associated 
with femininity – whereas a reference to rationality and self-interested motives are 
more likely to be accepted as valid. 
These findings from the interviews were surprising in some respects and worthy of 
greater attention. I elaborate more on the role of emotions in the next section, but I 
also believe that this is a topic requiring greater in-depth discussion in future research. 
A recent book by Per Espen Stoknes, a Norwegian scholar educated in economics and 
psychology, provides a noteworthy contribution to the field. Stoknes identifies five 
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psychological barriers preventing action on climate change and suggests some ways 
to overcome those barriers. Although his work is coming from a completely different 
theoretical background than mine is, some of his solutions are in harmony with the 
findings of this research: the relevance of framing, the importance of storytelling as 
a way to help people to link climate change with their daily lives, and the benefits of 
igniting positive emotions that will motivate people to join forces to develop more 
sustainable communities (Stoknes, 2015).
In the fourth and final section of this chapter, the attention turns to what it would 
entail to connect the impact of climate change more closely with people’s daily lives 
and how climate change could – now or in the future – threaten human security. Is it 
possible to reframe discourses about climate change in such a way that they will have 
more relevance for the common citizen? And would it be possible to do this in a way 
that would empower people at the community level and inspire them to take action, 
rather than merely creating fear and hopelessness.
9.4  Securitization from the Bottom Up
Feminist writers have emphasized the need to articulate security not only with national 
security in mind – protecting borders from outside threats – but also to address the 
security needs at the community level. One example is Hoogensen and Stuvøy, who 
argue that a gender approach to human security makes it possible to be more reflec-
tive of security concerns that originate from the bottom up. A gender focus generally 
includes analysis of power relations and can provide a useful framework for examin-
ing structural relations that are often ignored – namely relations of dominance and 
non-dominance (Hoogensen & Stuvøy, 2006). Wibben also argues for the need of a 
bottom-up approach to security. She uses a narrative approach, telling stories about 
how the incidents of 9/11 influenced the daily lives of ordinary women living in the 
United States at the time. By reframing the events through security narratives from 
the ground up, the attention moves away from traditional national security concerns 
to the way security policies influence the everyday lives of people (Wibben, 2011).
Although Barnett does not identify himself as a feminist scholar, his arguments in 
his study on adaptation policies in the Pacific Islands are along similar lines as Wib-
ben’s. Rather than relying on modeling to evaluate the impact of climate change, he 
advocates for a bottom-up approach, in which local knowledge is valued and emphasis 
is placed on the local context (Barnett, 2010).
Would this type of approach – collecting narratives from the local level about the 
influence of climate change on the daily lives of people around the world – change our 
perception of the problem? How would this type of securitization of climate change 
from the bottom up influence climate-related discourses? Would it change how peo-
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ple view climate change, and would this shift in attitudes lead to more action at the 
local level and an increasing pressure on politicians to implement policies aimed at 
mitigating climate change?
Using such a narrative approach would include the introduction of emotions into 
the political discussion and putting a human face on climate change. This is similar 
to the method leaders of Arctic indigenous groups used in international negotiations 
for a convention on persistent organic pollutants (POPs), in which story telling was 
used to create compassion and empathy: to speak from the local to the global, rather 
than only the other way around.
Part of integrating more feminine values into climate policy is the creation of more 
room for emotions in public discourses, in line with the principles argued for in the 
ethics of care as a moral theory. As Held (2006) explains, in the ethics of care, such 
emotions as sympathy, empathy, sensitivity, and responsiveness are seen as the kind of 
moral emotions that need to be cultivated as a significant element when making moral 
decisions – in contrast with the rationalistic approaches in the more dominant moral 
theories. The role of emotions, however, is not straightforward, and Held stresses that 
this does not mean raw emotions can be guide to morality, because feelings need to 
be reflected upon.
Positive emotions like compassion and empathy, along with a strong affinity with 
nature, can inspire and encourage positive action, but negative emotions like fear and 
anger can lead to hurtful action or even denial and non-action, especially if the main 
emphasis is on alarming messages, without offering realistic solutions to the problem.
Although knowledge and facts are crucial to understand climate change, reaching 
people’s emotions can be equally important if the goal is to influence their behavior. 
Humans tend to be driven by their emotions and are likely to filter all information 
through their value system and worldview. Often, it is only through our emotions that 
we are stirred deeply enough that we may consider changing our ways. Yet, the tendency 
is to ignore the role of emotions in policy making, and policy makers often speak as 
if their decisions are based only on knowledge, facts, rationality, and logic. To admit 
to emotions as a driving force is somehow considered shameful or a sign of weakness. 
Because emotions are linked to femininity and logic and rationality are considered 
masculine traits, emotional responses do not receive the same respect as answers that 
seem to rest on purely logical thinking. This was especially striking in the interviews 
with the policy shapers who referred to strong emotions related to their care for the 
environment as their driving force. The policy shapers that referred to social justice as 
their key driving force were less shy about revealing their motives, perhaps because the 
concept of justice is more developed and accepted in dominant moral theories than 
is the concept of care.
But is it possible that by ignoring the strong influence of emotions on human behav-
ior, we are missing the opportunity to use emotions in a constructive way to tackle the 
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climate crisis? Instead of using approaches that ignite positive emotions like compassion 
and empathy, policy makers rely on economic models, assuming that the only way to 
influence behavior is through economic incentives. The metaphor of the market as a 
machine is still alive and is driving policy.
A feminist approach to international relations includes a bridge over the gap between 
the local and the global – taking seriously the lives of people living in local communities 
around the world and by giving a voice to marginal groups. Individuals and individual 
communities have stories to tell about how climate change is influencing their lives. But 
unless those stories are collected, compiled, and disseminated, we may not recognize 
the patterns and the collective experience we are having as humans on this planet. Un-
less we connect the dots, the consequences of climate change are interpreted as single 
events and policy responses focus on symptoms rather than causes.
Another important aspect of bottom-up approaches is the ability of individuals to 
organize into social networks and create social movements that are strong enough to 
influence politics. In the Icelandic case study, bottom-up pressure from social move-
ments was minimal, and the politicians were not experiencing great pressure from 
voters to implement ambitious climate policies.
Well-known Canadian activist Naomi Klein has highlighted the importance of 
social movements in a recent book on the politics of climate change in her book, This 
Changes Everything. Klein presents capitalism as the main obstacle preventing us from 
successfully tackling the challenges related to climate change and stresses the need for 
radical social changes that would simultaneously reduce the need for fossil fuels and 
reduce social inequality. Strong social movements are, in her view, the only force that 
could elicit the deep transformation needed. “We are left with a stark choice”, she says: 
“…allow climate disruption to change everything about our world, or change pretty 
much everything about our economy to avoid that fate” (Klein, 2014).
Klein is calling not only for different policies, but for a deeper change that can occur 
only if there is a clear shift in values. Or in her own words:
…the real reason we are failing to rise to the climate moment is because the 
actions required directly challenge our reigning economic paradigm (de-
regulated capitalism combined with public austerity), the stories on which 
Western cultures are founded (that we stand apart from nature and can 
outsmart its limits), as well as many of the activities that form our identi-
ties and define our communities (shopping, living virtually, shopping some 
more). They also spell extinction for the richest and most powerful industry 
the world has ever known – the oil and gas industry, which cannot survive in 
anything like its current form if we humans are to avoid our own extinction. 
(Klein, 2014, p. 63)
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Klein calls for a reevaluation of worldviews and the way humans relate to nature. 
She emphasizes the importance of new values gaining ground. Although she does not 
use the terms “masculine and feminine values”, the values she is calling for have some 
clear resemblances to the values that have been categorized as feminine values in this 
research, and her criticism of dominant values and the associated capitalistic system 
can be easily linked to the feminist critique of the patriarchal system35. The way for-
ward in pushing for this shift in values, she asserts, is through bottom-up mass social 
movements that create enough disruption to shake up current power structures. In this 
context, she refers specifically to the importance of recent movements fighting against 
the fossil fuel industry, both the anti-pipeline movements in North America and the 
disinvestment movement calling for investors to stop providing capital for the fossil 
fuel industry and to use their resources to invest in such economic options as cleaner 
energy sources.
Klein’s book is inspired by the question of why we are failing to respond to climate 
change, which is the same overarching question that spurred the research presented in 
this dissertation. The work on her book started around the same time I began work-
ing on this dissertation (in 2009), and I read it only after having finished writing the 
first draft. Although her book takes a broader and more global approach than I did 
in this research, it is noteworthy that many of her insights are in harmony with the 
conclusions of this study.
In summary, the purpose of this chapter has been to elaborate further on some of 
the understandings gained from the data presented in the case study and to relate them 
more tightly to the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2. This discussion 
included providing a more comprehensive discourse analysis of the climate-related 
discourses described in the case study, evaluating the degree to which masculine or 
feminine values are underpinning those discourses, and digging deeper into the role of 
emotions as a motivating factor in behavioral change. It also involved an envisioning 
of what a more feminist approach toward addressing climate change would look like. 
A feminist approach, in this case, would involve framing climate change more often as 
a local issue by describing the influence climate change can (our could in the future) 
have on the daily lives of ordinary people, and by highlighting the actions available 
to people at the individual and community level. It would also recognize the role of 
emotions as a motivating factor and encourage behavior in the spirit of ethics of care, 
where caring emotions toward the environment are cherished and celebrated.
35  In an interview she gave on her book, Klein recognized that her criticism of capitalism is closely 
related to criticism of patriarchy (Jaffe, 2014).
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10.  Key Conclusions
“Climate change is the big story of my generation,” one policy shaper stated in an inter-
view. Human-induced climate change is influencing Earth’s ecosystems in various ways, 
disrupting the harmony of nature, and creating imbalances that can have unforeseen 
consequences for all life on Earth, including the humans that are causing the changes. 
Although more than twenty years have passed since climate change became an issue 
on the international agenda – and the scientific knowledge has been available for even 
longer – global greenhouse gas emissions continue to rise. Knowledge does not seem 
enough to ignite actions that are radical enough to address the root causes. Climate 
policies are too weak to counteract the increasing energy use and states, corporations, 
and individuals are entangled in the dilemma ingrained into what Harding (1968) 
called “The Tragedy of the Commons”. People tend not to be willing to sacrifice their 
material comfort unless they have some assurance that others do the same, because 
otherwise their sacrifice may not lead to any climatic benefits. This situation exists 
in spite of the multiple security threats that climate change is already creating and is 
projected to create in the future.
It was my deep desire to gain a better understanding of why the international com-
munity is failing to address the climate problem successfully that led me to the topic 
of this dissertation. I wanted to discover the political, economic, and cultural values 
that were preventing action and was eager to search for ideas on how our mindset 
could be shifted toward values more likely to produce effective policies. In my search 
for answer, I turned to feminism as a gateway to new ideas and learned that feminist 
concepts were useful analytical tools for examining discourses and deconstructing 
dominant ideas that are often hiding in the background – not expressed explicitly, yet 
serving as a powerful force that controls social behavior.
Rather than adding to the rapidly growing literature discussing climate change as 
a global problem, I have used my background to offer a unique perspective, focusing 
on climate-related policies in one small Nordic state. This approach has given me the 
opportunity to delve more deeply into the questions and keep a clear focus, in spite of 
the enormity of the topic and the many layers of complexity.
The research questions posed in the introduction have been the guiding lights 
throughout the dissertation, and each chapter addresses some components of those 
questions. In this final chapter, I revisit the questions and provide a more condensed 
answer to each one by summarizing some of my key research findings. I do not present 
my answers as absolute truths, but rather as insights and perspectives that build on 
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the information and analysis presented in previous chapters. I begin by revisiting the 
three research questions, and from that discussion extract some factors that I believe 
can help to gain insight into the more general, overarching question I have grappled 
with over the research and writing of this dissertation.
Returning to the first research questions posed in the introduction:
•	 How is climate change impacting security in the Arctic, and more specifi-
cally, in Iceland, which serves as the main case study site?
I address this question mainly in Chapters 4 and 6. In the Arctic context, climate 
change is impacting security in a variety of ways. If we first look at the more traditional 
approach to security, with a focus on sovereignty, national security, and military solu-
tions to security threats, climate change could possibly create risks that would increase 
the likelihood of inter-state disputes, including the danger of conflicts over the utiliza-
tion of resources that are becoming more accessible, due to the melting of the Arctic 
ice. In general, however, these types of security threats have been overemphasized in the 
media, and in spite of an increasing tension between Russia and the West over issues 
related to Ukraine, the spillover effects into Arctic affairs have been limited. Currently, 
the Arctic region is a relatively peaceful and stable region; there is good cooperation 
among the Arctic states and no strong signs of upcoming resource conflicts among 
states in the region.
This dissertation, however, looks at security from a broader perspective than the 
traditional national security, and has a more comprehensive understanding of the 
concept. The focus is more on human security, whereby threats are observed as they 
apply to individuals and communities at the local level. From this point of view, 
climate change can generate a number of threats to local communities. Changes in 
temperature, sea-level rise, coastal erosion, melting of permafrost, and ocean acidifica-
tion – to name a few of the impacts of climate change – can all threaten livelihoods, 
health, and the general wellbeing of various groups and communities, especially those 
already in a vulnerable position. The framing of climate change as a global problem, 
however, tends to mask local consequences and creates the feeling that climate change 
is an abstract and distant problem. Climate impacts at the local level often become 
entangled with other environmental issues or with economic or political factors, and 
this further complicates the picture. The chapter on the Arctic showed that there is 
a need for more stories from the grassroots level to deepen our understanding of the 
current and emerging local consequences of climate change and how these changes are 
impacting human security. This need was confirmed in the case study about Iceland, in 
which there is an obvious lack of information about the human security challenges that 
climate change could create at the local level. This lack of information also means that 
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it was impossible to go into greater in-depth analysis of the risks and threats created 
by climate change at the local level and to determine which groups were most likely to 
suffer the consequences. Instead, the focus moved to a new level: if climate change was 
perceived as a threat by policy shapers, regardless of if this perceived threat had basis 
in actual physical evidences or calculated risks. And if so, in what way?
The case study demonstrates that climate change is considered a security threat 
in Icelandic policy documents and political discourses. The securitization of climate 
change, however, seems to come from “above” – from the international level rather than 
local communities at the grassroots level. So in spite of the fact that climate change is 
perceived as a threat by both experts and a large proportion of the population, most 
people seem to consider it an abstract threat and do not associate it with their daily lives.
When climate change is identified as a threat in policy documents, political speeches, 
and my interviews with policy shapers, the topic has usually been approached from the 
perspective of security as a broad concept, and most of the associated threats fall into the 
category of human security rather than military security. So the environmental security 
discourse that MacGregor identifies as one of two dominant masculine discourses in 
climate politics – discourses that can be clearly noted in media accounts about the 
Arctic in recent years – is not evident in political discourses about climate change in 
Iceland. Iceland, as a state without an army, consistently rejects military solutions to 
deal with tensions at the international level.
The issues identified as threats to human security, however, are poorly defined. Scant 
information exists about the socioeconomic impact of climate change and social science 
research that provides an analysis of how changes in nature could impact local commu-
nities is missing. This knowledge gap increases the likelihood that adaption at the local 
level will be more reactive than proactive, dealing with the symptoms of climate change 
once they appear, rather than taking steps to prepare before the changes materialize, 
or – even better – addressing the root causes in an effort to slow down the changes.
This lack of information could be one reason why people find climate change to be 
an abstract threat and distant from their daily lives. Communicating facts and technical 
information about climate change can increase knowledge, but it will not necessarily 
ignite enough passion that people will change their behaviors. Stories from the field, 
where narratives from the local level are told, could help put a human face on climate 
change and its associated impacts. Although sporadic efforts have been made to move 
the discussion in this direction, such narratives have not received much attention or 
managed to shift the global discourse on climate change. The same holds true in Iceland, 
where dominant discourses on climate change are shaped by the global discourse, and 
shifts in the discourse more often come from events originating outside the country 
than from social stirrings caused by the impact of climate change at the local level. 
There seems to be some resistance to open up the climate discussion to include per-
sonal, local narratives. Instead, the scientific community, environmental NGOs and 
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policy makers, continue to rely on technical, scientific information to communicate 
their message about climate change, that often includes alarming facts, but without 
the personal stories or practical solutions that are needed to move people’s emotions 
and inspire positive action.
This last point brings us to the second research question:
•	 What do existing dominant political, economic, and security discourses 
reveal about the values underpinning policy decisions related to climate 
change and security?
I use the case study to explore this question, and my analysis is limited to exploring 
climate-related discourses in only one state. Nevertheless, discourses in Iceland can-
not be viewed in isolation from the outside world, and as the analysis shows, domestic 
discourses are heavily influenced by climate discourses at the global level and in inter-
national forums.
After having evaluated the climate discourses in Iceland using MacGregor’s frame-
work, my overall conclusion is that they can neither be labeled overwhelmingly mas-
culine nor feminine. When it comes to adaptation and the securitization of climate 
change, the tilt is toward a more feminine perspective, emphasizing the importance 
of human security but rejecting militarization of the climate crisis. On the mitigation 
side, the results are even more conflicted. Technical solutions seem to be prioritized, 
but calls for lifestyle changes are also present.
After viewing the discourses directly related to climate policies, one could easily con-
clude that a certain balance has been reached between masculine and feminine values. 
A closer look, however, is necessary. First, although human security is in the forefront 
when climate is discussed as a threat, this is not really followed through by thorough 
analysis of how the changes in nature could influence socioeconomic factors. Thus, 
human security challenges at the local level are poorly defined, and the relationships 
between global changes and local consequences are not highlighted. Second, even 
though the importance of lifestyle changes is mentioned in policy documents, most of 
the effort goes into such technical, market-oriented solutions as the implementation of 
the European emission trading scheme. In reality, there is little pressure on individuals or 
businesses to change their behavior, to rethink consumption patterns or the exploitation 
of natural resources at a fundamental level. All of this brings us to the third point – the 
insufficiency of examining only discourses directly related to climate policies. In this 
sense, MacGregor’s framework is too narrow. To obtain a holistic picture, one must ex-
pand the box to include such climate-related discourses as those surrounding economic 
development and how dominant theories and the values underpinning those theories 
are shaping policy. In this context, the oil and gas discourse provides a good example.
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The oil and gas discourse in Iceland clearly illustrates that even in a country that 
prides itself on high awareness of gender issues and with a culture that scores high on 
characteristics labeled as feminine, masculine values still dominate in certain sectors 
of society, especially in the utilization of natural resources. The acceptance of feminine 
values in one sphere of society does not automatically open up space for policies based 
on the same values in other sectors.
When oil and gas explorations in the Dreki area first appeared on the political 
agenda in Iceland in 2009, there was no room for doubts, and climate concerns were 
not even considered relevant. During the period 2009–2013, the government built on 
the climate policy from 2007 by creating a climate action plan, and new, comprehensive 
climate legislation was passed in the parliament. It seemed that policy makers were tak-
ing climate change seriously and were ready to adopt a more ambitious climate policy 
than ever before. When it came to the oil and gas question, however, issues related to 
climate change were ignored or pushed to the side. Man’s right to exploit nature came 
across as a fundamental, unquestioned value. Or as one policy shaper noted, the right 
of Iceland to exploit its natural resources is engrained in the administrative system. As a 
small state, Iceland’s primary duty is to protect its economic and political interests and 
if there is a clash between economic and environmental security, economic interests 
tend to have the upper hand.
The oil and gas discourse can easily be linked to the dominant political and economic 
discourses that Tickner argues rests on realist or liberal theories of how states behave. 
These dominant theories that have shaped politics and international relations in the 
past are underpinned with masculine values, projecting the behavior of elite males in 
power on the behavior of states. States are expected to focus primarily on protecting 
their self-interests and find ways to maximize their power. Women are absent, and 
feminine values are relevant only in the home and in people’s private lives.
Similarly, the masculine view of the market as a machine, driven by rational, autono-
mous, and self-interested individuals, can also be traced in the oil and gas discourse. 
Producers of fossil fuels are expected to respond only to a reduction in demand – not 
to ethical pressure that would require them to look beyond their own narrow business 
interests. As Nelson points out, this view of the market ignores the more feminine 
traits of human nature and creates an unnecessary gap between economics and ethics.
The values underlying the dominant discourses are generally not explicit; rather 
they appear in the discourses as unspoken assumptions. In this case, the unspoken as-
sumption is that the main aim of all actors – states, corporations, and individuals – is 
to maximize their own power or wealth. Anyone who decides to act with the common 
interest of all in mind, the value system suggests, will lose the game. As a small state, 
Iceland is vulnerable and needs to use every opportunity available to protect its interests.
Although dominant political and economic paradigms are strongly influential in 
shaping climate policy and climate-related discourses in Iceland, alternative perspec-
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tives that are critical of the dominant discourse can also be detected. It is time now to 
turn to the third and final research question:
•	 How much room is there for alternative approaches in public discourses 
related to climate change – especially feminist perspectives – and do such 
perspectives offer any new and useful ideas on ways to address issues related 
to climate change and human security?
Again, as was the case with the second question, this question was addressed not on 
a global scale, but in the context of the case study, focusing on one small state. Given 
Iceland’s status as a place where gender equality is taken seriously and feminism is a 
dynamic political force, the assumption was that feminine values would be more likely 
to find their way into climate-related discourses than would be the case in cultures where 
the status of women is worse and gender equality is not recognized as a priority issue.
To some degree, this turned out to be true. Climate discourses emphasize human 
security rather than focusing only on the ways in which climate change could threaten 
national security, and policy documents seem to offer a mixture of technical solutions 
and measures that facilitate lifestyle changes. As argued previously, however, feminine 
values seem to be rather superficial. The concerns for human security at the local level 
is mostly an echo from international reports rather than based on sound analysis from 
the local level in Iceland. And when it comes to implementation of mitigation policies, 
most of the effort has been concentrated on the technical, market-oriented solutions 
related to emission trading schemes. Few incentives have been created to facilitate a 
change toward a more sustainable lifestyle, and there is little pressure on individuals 
or businesses to change their behavior.
When the focus widens to include a broader set of climate-related discourses, like 
the oil and gas discourse, the room for feminine values is even less. Alternative voices 
were either ignored or silenced, and the idea that Iceland could take a leadership role 
in the climate debate by deciding not to explore the potential oil and gas resources in 
the Dreki area was not taken seriously. The interviews with policy shapers revealed that 
many of them felt uneasy about expressing doubts about the oil and gas explorations 
publicly, even though they silently questioned if it were a wise choice for Iceland. But 
analysis of the oil and gas discourse also showed that with a strong civil society, increased 
awareness of the climate crisis and active resistance to dominant views, it is possible to 
carve out space for alternative values, emphasizing a more feminine approach toward 
human interactions and toward the relationship between humans and nature. A clear 
shift in the discourse indicates that these alternative views have gained some legitimacy. 
Such a shift does not automatically translate into a change in policy or behavior, but 
is still an important step toward opening the dialogue to include a broader spectrum 
of solutions to tackle the climate crisis. For radical changes to occur, however, it is 
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necessary that the shift in values is not limited to a few concerned activists. As Klein 
argues, it is important that new ideas gain enough momentum so they become part of 
the mainstream discourse and reach the masses, creating widespread social movements 
demanding a change.
In the theoretical chapter (Section 2.6), I highlight Tickner’s suggestions that in 
order to create an ecologically secure future, we need a shift in values whereby there is 
greater balance between masculine and feminine values. By elevating feminine values so 
they receive equal space and respect in public decision making as the masculine values 
that have traditionally underpinned policy, we will be taking a crucial step toward dis-
solving the hierarchy that fuels both gender inequality and the tendency of humans to 
overexploit natural resources. Inclusion of feminine values in policy would also increase 
the range of options available when designing solutions. A more feminine approach 
to climate policy would emphasize the importance of changes in our mindset and 
encourage behavioral changes that aim at creating lifestyles that respect the ecologi-
cal limits of nature. One route toward this goal would be the merging of two of the 
discourses MacGregor identifies: the masculine ecological modernization discourse 
and the feminine green duty discourse, reshaping it into a new discourse focusing on 
sustainable living, whereby people – both men and woman – were encouraged to use 
an entrepreneurial mindset to spur innovations and find fun and interesting ways to 
create sustainable communities. A sustainable way of living needs to be presented as 
an attractive option that cannot only improve the environment, but can also enhance 
quality of life and the general wellbeing of people. Capitalizing on social networks 
and sharing successful and inspiring stories would be an integral component of such 
a discourse.
A feminine approach would also emphasize the ethics of care and open up space for 
emotions to play a role in policy. As the example from the POPs negotiations dem-
onstrated, where indigenous leaders told stories from their communities on how the 
chemicals from the south were influencing their daily lives, bringing emotions into the 
dialogue and putting a human face on an environmental problem can help inspire ac-
tion. Using emotions as arguments in public policy debates, however, can be risky. Even 
though emotions are more likely to reach people at a deeper level than facts, figures, and 
logic, there is still a tendency to ignore the role of emotions in policy making. Admitting 
emotions as a driving forces can be considered shameful or a sign of weakness. Because 
emotions are related to femininity and logic and rationality are considered masculine 
traits, emotional responses often do not receive the same respect as answers that seem 
to rest on pure logical thinking. This tendency is still evident in political discourses in 
Iceland, as was highlighted in the interviews with policy shapers. For feminine values 
to gain ground, we need to respect people who speak out on emotional grounds and 
accept their views as a valuable contribution to the public discourse.
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The recent revolutions by young women in Iceland36 who have cracked open the 
walls of silence surrounding sexual violence and gender discrimination by sharing their 
stories, can serve as a source of inspiration. Could their initiatives feed into other areas 
of society and create more room for emotions in other sectors as well?
With this analysis in mind, where I have summarized my answers to the three re-
search questions, am I any closer to gaining an understanding of the key question of 
the thesis? It is now time to turn to the primary question that ignited this research and 
has been guiding me throughout the research journey:
•	 What political and economic interests and cultural values are preventing 
the international community from addressing the climate crisis in an ef-
fective way?
 
As stressed at the beginning of this dissertation, a qualitative study focusing on one 
case study cannot produce ultimate answers; rather it can provide and deepen our 
understanding of certain phenomena and relationships. My primary question refers 
to the international community, recognizing that, in spite of some valid criticism on 
how the global aspect has been overemphasized, climate change is still a global problem 
(even if it has critical – too often ignored – local dimensions) and as such it calls for a 
coordinated approach at the international level. That being said, the research focuses 
on only one state and any insights gained need to be understood in that context. 
Early in the recognition of climate change issues, the main factor that prevented ac-
tion in the Icelandic case was the fact that climate change was not really taken seriously. 
Participation in international negotiations were aimed merely at protecting economic 
interest. At this point, the chief obstacle to ambitious climate policy was a hesitancy to 
trust the emerging climate science and lack of understanding about the consequences.
A policy shift can be detected in 2007, coinciding with developments at the inter-
national level, and since then climate change has been openly recognized in political 
discourses as a key issue that must be addressed through public policy. Yet, even if 
policy documents, policy shapers, and the general public all identify climate change 
as a security threat, this threat seems to be abstract and distant from the daily lives of 
most people. One result is that although more ambitious policies have been adopted, 
implementation has been slow. Furthermore, the policies are often too narrow and 
isolated from the broader mainstream policies on security and economic development. 
36  In 2015, young women in Iceland started a campaign on social media, under the hashtag: #freethenipple. 
The campaign was meant to highlight the double standards for men and women about nakedness and 
the tendency to sexualize women’s bodies. Several other campaigns followed, including one emphasizing 
the discrimination women experience in everyday life and another in which women publicly told stories 
about sexual violence they had experienced, with the aim of returning the shame to the perpetrators 
(Steen, 2015).
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In other words, climate change is not seen as a priority issue, and it quickly takes a back 
seat when other issues call for attention.
A lesson learned from the Icelandic case is that the key obstacles are not necessarily 
an open opposition to specific measures or an explicit denial of climate change as a topic 
worthy of attention. Rather, climate issues are ignored, pushed to the side or actions 
are delayed when other issues, considered more pressing, consume time and resources.
Another important conclusion of this study is that in order to understand which 
factors are preventing more radical action to tackling the climate crisis, we need to 
go beyond narrowly defined climate discourses and explore the more mainstream 
discourses on security and economic development and how climate change is ad-
dressed (or ignored) within these discourses. Masculine values associated with man's 
unquestioned right to exploit nature are deeply engrained in the culture, resulting in 
short-term economic benefits overshadowing the more long-term approach needed 
when dealing with climate change.
It is easy to feel depressed and hopeless when exploring topics related to climate 
change. In spite of the dire danger that looms around the corner and is already present 
in some parts of the world, hardcore economic interests always seem to overshadow 
the softer values related to caring: caring for those most vulnerable to climate change; 
caring for nature; and last but not least, caring for future generations. But, just as softly 
flowing water eventually cracks even the most hardened rocks and reduces them to sand 
and soil, feminine values may eventually grow strong enough to melt our resistance to 
change and create soil, fertile for the deep transformation that needs to occur in the 
relationship between humans and nature. Will it be too late?
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Appendix I: Interviews – Guiding Questions
A total of 18 qualitative interviews were undertaken during the period September 2011 
to May 2014, 9 with females and 9 with males. The interviews were semi-structured, 
insofar as some guiding questions were used as a framework for the interview, leaving 
room for the discussion to flow and to follow up on topics as they arose. The guiding 
questions were asked in Icelandic but provided in English below:
1. What is your background and how have you been involved with policy making 
related to climate change?
2. How do you evaluate the current and potential impacts of climate change in 
Iceland?
(Possible follow-up questions: Do you experience climate change as a threat? If 
yes, what kind of threat? Threat to global, national, or human security? Do you 
personally feel threatened in your daily life?)
3. What do you think about domestic climate policy?
(Possible follow-up question: For example, in comparison to other states?)
4. In your opinion who bears the greatest responsibility for responding to climate 
change?
(Possible follow-up questions: Individuals? NGOs? The educational sector? 
National and local governments? Other states? International organizations?)
5. What are the most important values that guide you in your work?
(Possible follow-up questions: What drives you to continue what you do?)
6. How do those values harmonize with dominant ideas? Do you experience a fertile 
soil for your ideas?
(Possible follow-up questions: Are there any obstacles? What kind of obsta-
cles? Have you noticed a change in the last 10 to 15 years?)
7. Has the turmoil in Icelandic society related to the 2008 financial crisis influenced 
how society views climate change and associated impacts?
(Possible follow-up questions: Have other issues been marginalized? Did the 
crisis change values? More understanding of threshold and what happens if a 
system crumbles?)
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8. How do you understand the concept of sustainable development? Is it of any 
relevance in the context of climate change?
9. Do you see any relationships between gender and climate change?
(Possible follow-up question: Climate impacts? Contribution to the problem? 
How men and women view nature?)
10. Do you believe that your gender plays any role when you participate in discussions 
about climate change and climate policy?
